

HADRIAN'S POLICY IN JUDAEA AND THE BAR KOKHBA REVOLT: A REASSESSMENT

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The search for the causes behind the violent outbreak of the Bar Kokhba revolt, whose relentlessness surpasses and whose aftermath outweighs that of even the first Jewish War, continues to occupy scholars with unmitigated intensity.¹ The three reasons afforded by the sources, namely the retraction of permission to rebuild the Temple, the foundation of Jerusalem as the Roman colony Aelia Capitolina and Hadrian's prohibition of circumcision, have been discussed at length and do not require further interpretation.² The first reason, the planned or initiated construction of the Temple is the least likely. As concerns the foundation of Aelia Capitolina, contemporary research is for the most part in consensus that the decision was made during Hadrian's visit to the province of Judaea in the spring of 130. To what extent this decision was responsible for the outbreak of the revolt is a moot point. The majority of the more recent scholars see the impulse to revolt less in the foundation of Aelia than in the prohibition of circumcision. Of necessity, this implies that the foundation had to have taken place before the beginning of the war (i.e. between Hadrian's visit in 130 and the outbreak of the revolt in 132).³

An isolated discussion of possible causes for the Bar Kokhba revolt is unproductive and is furthermore methodologically questionable. Through the critical examination of the available evidence of Hadrian's policy in Judaea and through the questioning of the sources pertaining to Jewish reaction to this policy, the following contribution attempts to define more closely the political and intellectual climate which existed before the revolt.

Judaea between 117 and 132 CE

Information regarding the state of affairs in Judaea between the suppression of the Diaspora revolt and the outbreak of the Bar Kokhba War is limited, but nonetheless the general contours of the situation are discernible. Hadrian belonged to Trajan's general staff at the start of the Parthian War in 114 and was Governor (*legatus Augusti pro praetore*) of Syria from the summer of 117. During the Parthian War, in 115, the revolt within the Diaspora broke out, beginning in Egypt and Cyrene and then extending to Cyprus and the Mesopotamian theatre of war. The revolt in North Africa was suppressed by Marcius Turbo, *praefectus Aegypti* and friend of Hadrian, while the suppression of the revolt in Mesopotamia was undertaken by the Moorish General Lusius Quietus on the command of Trajan. Lusius Quietus achieved success quickly through the use of extreme brutality and was subsequently appointed *legatus Augusti pro praetore* in Judaea in 117. Trajan, who had in the meantime become seriously ill, discontinued the Parthian campaign and died while returning to Rome in August of 117 in the city of Selinus on the Black Sea. Hadrian had himself declared Emperor by the Syrian troops as the adoptive son of Trajan and concluded the retreat initiated by him. (This adoption had probably been feigned by Trajan's wife Plotina and the *praefectus praetorio*, Attianus.) He abandoned Assyria, Mesopotamia and Armenia and subverted the power of the most prominent representatives of the warring faction. Lusius Quietus, the main advocate of the hard-liners, was deposed as Governor of Judaea and in the early summer of 118 was executed together with three of Trajan's close war companions following the accusation of having instigated a conspiracy. Hadrian's declared goal was to be remembered as an Emperor of peace and as *restitutor orbis*.⁴

1. Judaea had since 74 been an autonomous Roman province under the authority of a governor of praetorian rank. In the space of time between 117 and 132 the status of the province was changed and Judaea was raised to the rank of a consular province (i.e. with a former consul as governor). The exact date of this change is unknown although there are a number of points of reference. First of all, it is generally accepted that the dispatching of Lusius Quietus to Judaea in the rank of consul in 117 does not necessarily entail Judaea's status as having been that of a consular province, but was rather the result of the particular situation following the suppression

of the revolt in the Diaspora.⁵ On the other hand, the Governor of Judaea during the Bar Kokhba revolt, Tineius Rufus, is referred to as *consul suffectus*⁶ in 127, which would imply that the change in Judaea's status had to have taken place before 127. Finally, it has been pointed out that the *procurator* of the province of Judaea in 123 received the salary of a *ducenarius*.⁷ This presupposes a governor of consular rank, which of necessity then places the change in the status of the province in the period prior to 123.

2. The status of Judaea as a consular province implies the stationing of a second legion in the territory. Following the first Jewish War the *legio X Fretensis* had been stationed in Judaea, with its headquarters in the destroyed Jerusalem. The Governor, however, resided with parts of the tenth legion in *Colonia Prima Flavia Augusta Caesarensis*, the Roman colony into which Caesarea had been transformed. We do not know which legion was stationed in Judaea after 117 nor when this occurred; however, since the discovery of the milestone 13 km southeast of Akko, it appears most likely that it was the *legio II Traiana*.⁸ The inscription on the milestone is, by the evidence of Hadrian's fourth *tribunicia potestas*, clearly dated in the year 120. Hence it follows that the year 120 was the *terminus ante quem* for the transformation of Judaea into a consular province and the obligatory stationing of a second legion.

3. Hadrian continued the active road-construction policy of his predecessors. In Syria and Arabia this construction had been completed either under Vespasian or Trajan, and Hadrian clearly directed his attention to the province of Judaea. The milestones identified recently⁹ have evidenced Caparcotna (Legio) in the Jezreel Valley as having been an important military base which was then connected with Sepphoris and further with Akko (Ptolemais) in 120. Hence, it follows that Caparcotna was the headquarters of the new legion which controlled movement between Judaea and Galilee¹⁰ and furthermore secured the 'lebenswichtige Verbindung zwischen Ägypten und Syrien'.¹¹ Further construction and restoration efforts appear to have been concentrated in 129/30 and to have included Jerusalem.¹² These may be connected with Hadrian's visit to Judaea, but there can be no doubt that the Roman road construction in the provinces was primarily concerned with the improvement of military infrastructure.

4. Several changes in important cities also attest to the political activity of the Romans in the years 119/20 (following the Diaspora

revolt) and 129/30 (in connection with Hadrian's visit to the province). Tiberias had always been a city with a predominantly Jewish population, but nevertheless had a hellenistic constitution.¹³ During the first Jewish War the city belonged to the territory of Agrippa II. Although the rebellious faction was dominant, parts of the population acted loyally towards Agrippa and the Romans. Thus, when Vespasian approached, the city surrendered without a fight and was for the most part spared. Coins from Hadrian's time show Zeus sitting in a temple, which is believed to represent the *Hadrianeion*¹⁴ as attested by Epiphanius,¹⁵ in other words the sanctuary dedicated to the Emperor cult.

Similar coins from Neapolis¹⁶ and Sepphoris are well known.¹⁷ Sepphoris, the capital of Galilee, likewise had a predominantly Jewish population and was decidedly against the revolt during the first Jewish War, the clear majority of its inhabitants having supported the Romans (Josephus, the Jewish commander of Galilee had to subdue the city by force). Sepphoris was in all likelihood renamed Diocaesarea in 129/30¹⁸ and received the official title Διοκαισάρεια ἱερὰ ἄσυλος καὶ αὐτόνομος.¹⁹ It has already been assumed by Hill²⁰ that the renaming of the city may have been connected with Hadrian's visit to Judaea and with his identification with Zeus Olympios.

Another *Hadrianeion* has been attested in Caesarea, which Vespasian had transformed into a Roman colony.²¹ Perhaps the Hadrian statues and the portrait of Antinoos,²² which supposedly stems from Caesarea, should also be seen in this light. Certainly the Jewish population of Caesarea was, in contrast to Tiberias and Sepphoris, not a significant factor.²³

5. The decision to reestablish Jerusalem as the Roman colony Aelia Capitolina coheres with Hadrian's political and religious activities outlined above, namely the stationing of a second legion, the intensive road construction and the Emperor cult. Hadrian was the most active founder and builder of cities since Augustus.²⁴ B. Isaac and I. Roll have pointed out that the connection between road construction and the founding of colonies was 'a familiar pattern in Roman history'²⁵ and that the stationing of a legion generally followed the founding of a colony: 'In Judaea we have seen the foundation of Caesarea as a Roman colony at the time when X Fret. was first established at Jerusalem. Similarly there may be a connection between the two decisions taken by Hadrian: to assign a

second legion to the province and to found another colony'.²⁶ Although the assignment of the second legion (which Isaac and Roll date prior to 120) and the foundation of Aelia are not to be placed in an immediate temporal context, a factual connection does seem to be apparent. Today most scholars agree that Hadrian's decision to found Aelia Capitolina was made during his visit to the province of Judaea in the spring of 130. Of the evidence presented to support this claim, I do not believe, however, that the one Aelia coin which was found in a *single* hoard together with revolt coins and *denarii* between the time of Trajan and Hadrian and 130, is sufficient proof, for there is no indication that this hoard was necessarily hidden during the Bar Kokhba revolt.²⁷ On the other hand, there is much which supports Mildenberg's argument that the various strikings of the Hadrianic Aelia coins took place over a longer period of time than merely between the end of the war and Hadrian's death (i.e. the end of 135/beginning of 136 and July of 138).²⁸

Jewish Reaction to Hadrian's Policy

The description of the political situation in the province of Judaea during Hadrian's reign is not basically controversial. What is controversial, however, is the interpretation of the evidence in relation to the question of the Bar Kokhba revolt. Does Roman action taken after 117 reflect a tense relationship between Rome and its notoriously restless province? Was the interval between 117 and 132 a period of intensified local unrest met by Roman measures of suppression which then inevitably led to the explosive outbreak of the revolt? Was this situation similar to that which existed in the years prior to the first Jewish War? These questions have been answered affirmatively by B. Isaac and A. Oppenheimer, who have characterized the transformation of the province after 117 under the rubric 'prior unrest' and summarize as follows: 'In sum, it may be concluded that there is evidence of increased Roman military activity in the area, both in the years following Trajan's death and in 129/30, which may reflect a response to local unrest, or preparations for the suppression of anticipated hostilities, or both'.²⁹

1. The transformation of Judaea into a consular province and the subsequent assignment of a second legion very probably occurred, as we have seen, during the first years of Hadrian's reign. The reasons behind this action are sufficiently explained by Hadrian's desire to

secure peace on the eastern border of the Empire following his renunciation of claims to the provinces of Mesopotamia, Assyria and Armenia. At best it could be assumed that the transformation was connected with the revolt in the Diaspora, although to date no positive evidence has been presented which would suggest Judaeon involvement in the uprising. (On the contrary, the reorganization of the province is one of the main arguments for an alleged involvement, or rather for the theory that the Romans, through the stationing of a second legion, prevented the outbreak of a revolt in Judaea.³⁰) One must also ask why the transformation occurred so late—not until Hadrian's reign—and *following* the suppression of the revolts. Furthermore, why would Hadrian have deposed the governor of Judaea, who had been so successful in suppressing the revolt in Mesopotamia, at a time when Judaea remained a hotbed of unrest? The recalling and execution of Lusius Quietus naturally had inner political motivations, but they would have come at a very inopportune time had Judaea indeed found itself on the brink of open revolt.

2. The forced road construction is also doubtless to be seen in relation to the efforts to ensure peace and secure the borders in the Near East. The undisputedly military character of this construction does not, however, necessarily imply that it was undertaken solely in order to serve the suppression or hindrance of actual unrest in Judaea. It is much more plausible to view the extension of the network of roads under the larger aspect of improving connections between the provinces of Egypt, Arabia and Syria. Equally important is the establishment of a passageway and military corridor for the defence of the Empire's eastern borders which this construction enabled: 'His (= Hadrian's) activity was devoted chiefly to the lands which by their position were destined to be the bases on which the most important military frontiers rested'.³¹ It is not, of course, possible to separate clearly the Romans' overall political aims and the local political effects. However, it is a question of the point one wants to stress. To argue that Hadrian's military road construction policy had been 'part of plans for taking drastic measures'³² (sc. against the Jewish population of Judaea) is a rash and exaggerated conclusion.

3. Similar conclusions can be applied to the erection of the *Hadrianeia* as the centre of the Emperor cult in Caesarea and Tiberias, to the renaming of Sepphoris as Diocaesarea and to the pagan character of the coinage of Sepphoris/Diocaesarea, Tiberias

and Neapolis from 119/20. Pursuing a reference made by A.H.M. Jones,³³ Isaac-Roll³⁴ and Isaac-Oppenheimer³⁵ have interpreted the pagan coinage as evidence 'that Hadrian disenfranchised the Jewish and Samaritan aristocracies which had hitherto ruled these three cities and entrusted their government to pagans'.³⁶ The transference of the civic administrations to 'non-Jewish elements' is, according to Isaac-Oppenheimer, best understood as having been a deliberate anti-Jewish measure, namely the Roman response to local unrest during the years 117-118.³⁷

This interpretation of an unequivocal finding is also questionable. We possess no concrete evidence that the erection of the *Hadrianeia* in Caesarea and Tiberias and the striking of pagan coins were carried out against the will of the Jewish population and despite their resistance. The passages from rabbinic literature³⁸ which Isaac-Roll, following the example of G. Alon,³⁹ provide as proof of 'political brigandage' in the years before the Bar Kokhba revolt and as the reason 'for the removal of Jewish leaders from the local administration'⁴⁰ are altogether dubious. There is absolutely no evidence which can justify classifying the 'bandits' mentioned in these passages as having been 'political terrorists'. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that quite ordinary bandits are here being referred to.⁴¹ Moreover, at least Tiberias, as we have pointed out above,⁴² had since its foundation been a city with a Hellenistic constitution and Hadrian had therefore no need to exclude the Jewish population from the city council. Scholars do at times change trains. The same A. Oppenheimer, who, in 1985, together with B. Isaac speaks of the provocative transfer of the civic administration in Tiberias to 'non-Jewish elements' had, in 1980, argued in a very different manner: 'The Jews residing in Tiberias and Sepphoris apparently accepted Hadrian's measures in silence, and it is possible that the influential among them, some of whom were leading members of the municipal institutions, were even pleased with them'.⁴³

4. What were the implications of Hadrian's decision to found the Roman colony *Aelia Capitolina* upon the ruins of Jerusalem? Was this the decisive catalyst which led to the revolt, following years of suppression and increased military activity? Here as well, there is a lack of direct information regarding the reaction of the Jewish population, and we can therefore only speculate as to the consequences which the foundation of *Aelia* had for the native population.

As has been illustrated by B. Isaac,⁴⁴ the founding of a colony was

accompanied by two advantages in addition to the increase in status (for a colony ranked higher than a *polis*). First, there was the land and poll-tax exemption and, secondly, the acquisition of Roman citizenship. These privileges were granted to all inhabitants of the colony, both to Roman veterans and to the native population. In consequence, there is nothing which suggests that the foundation of a colony would have met with such bitter resistance, and this applies to Jerusalem as well. Isaac concludes that 'Jewish resistance against the foundation of Aelia may not have been directed against the establishment of a colony as such. Jews were willing to live as citizens in *poleis* and there may be evidence that the status of a colony was, in their eyes, desirable.'⁴⁵ As proof of this, he cites the desire of Agrippa I to solicit Roman citizenship, or at least tax exemption, for Jerusalem,⁴⁶ which can only be referring to the status of a colony:⁴⁷ 'We can be reasonably sure that Agrippa I would not have considered involving Jerusalem in anything abhorrent to the Jews'.⁴⁸ Although not being a historically reliable bit of information, the reported offer made by the Emperor 'Antoninus' to the Patriarch R. Jehudah ha-Nasi' to raise Tiberias's status to that of a colony⁴⁹ also displays the Jews' positive assessment of colonial status. Oppenheimer had originally argued along similar lines, and saw a direct connection between the transformation of the civic administration of Tiberias and Sepphoris and the foundation of Aelia Capitolina: 'Probably the absence of opposition in Tiberias and Sepphoris and the satisfaction revealed by the notables encouraged Hadrian in his endeavor to turn Jerusalem into a pagan city with a temple of Jupiter'.⁵⁰

If the foundation of the Roman colony Aelia Capitolina as such had not been offensive, but perhaps even welcomed, then the provocation must have had its roots elsewhere. Oppenheimer argues that Hadrian must have known what the foundation of precisely this colony implied for the Jews (which also differed from all others, in that a legion was assigned to it): 'It is unthinkable that Hadrian, who travelled widely and was naturally curious, did not understand that he was taking action against Judaism'.⁵¹ On the other hand, B. Isaac states: 'It is therefore quite possible that not the organization of Jerusalem as a colony provoked Jewish resistance, but the decision to make it a pagan city and the plans for the site of the temple'.⁵² However, here again we find ourselves in uncertain waters. Until now, neither archaeological nor literary evidence has been furnished

which clearly indicates that Hadrian had a temple to Jupiter built upon the site of the Jewish Temple. As G.W. Bowersock has shown, the often quoted statement in Xiphilinus' *epitome* of Dio Cassius, ἐς τὸν τοῦ ναοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τόπον ναὸν τῷ Διὶ ἕτερον ἀντιγείραντος,⁵³ cannot be translated as 'when he, *on the place* of the Temple of God, built a different temple (dedicated) to Jupiter', but must rather be translated as 'when he, *in place (instead)* of the Temple of God built a different temple. . .'⁵⁴ It is very likely that Hadrian had two statues erected upon the ruins of the Temple⁵⁵ and built the Capitol further to the west with a temple for the Capitoline triad Jupiter, Juno and Minerva.⁵⁶ This was surely provocative enough, but not necessarily more so than the erection of a *Hadrianeion* in Tiberias. M. Hengel has, furthermore, recalled that 'die Juden auf den Trümmern Jerusalems schon seit 60 Jahren das Legionslager der 10. Legion, deren Symbol ein Eber war, und den dazugehörigen heidnischen Kultbetrieb dulden mußten'.⁵⁷ As such, neither the erection of a statue of Hadrian upon the site of the Temple, nor the construction of a temple to Jupiter upon the Capitol in the new colony Aelia Capitolina had been a dramatic new step which by itself would suffice to explain the explosive outbreak of the revolt.

The attempt to interpret Hadrian's political and military activities in the province of Judaea as anti-Jewish measures which were understood as such by the Jewish population, who then responded to them appropriately, has shown itself to be rather weak. We must ask, therefore, whether there are any other direct references to Jewish reaction, either positive or negative, towards the political situation under Hadrian. The findings here are indeed even less fertile.

1. As has been mentioned above, the few passages in rabbinic literature which refer to 'bandits' probably active during Trajan's or Hadrian's reign cannot be interpreted as referring to political terrorists fighting against Roman rule. Isaac-Oppenheimer furthermore wish to show the Rabbis of Yavneh as having been the spiritual initiators of the revolt. Their unbroken will to rebuild the Temple and aspirations towards a unified Jewish nation created the spiritual climate which then led to the outbreak of the revolt: 'In any event, it is intrinsically likely that a connection existed between the activities of the Jewish authorities at Yavneh and the revolt of Bar Kokhba'.⁵⁸ Jewry as guided by the Rabbis of Yavneh wholeheartedly and unanimously supported the revolt, and there are even clear indications that the family of the patriarch moved to Bethar near Jerusalem before

the war, thereby documenting the political desire 'that after its liberation the centre of Jewish authority would again be established there'.⁵⁹ According to Isaac-Oppenheimer, the Rabbis' policy of unification and the 'undivided resistance to Rome under the leadership of Bar Kokhba' are inseparable: 'This unity certainly contributed to the impact of the rebellion, as did the fact that there was no Jewish party at that time opposed to the revolt'.⁶⁰

We know very little about the attitudes of the rabbinic leaders of Jewry towards Roman supremacy during the Yavneh period. Certainly it was hoped that the Temple would be rebuilt; there is, however, little indication that it was specifically the Rabbis who had been the main advocates of this goal. The thesis that there existed an unbroken political and ideological continuity from Zealot and Pharisaic circles through the Shammaites and the Rabbis of Yavneh to Bar Kokhba and his followers⁶¹ is not very convincing. The Rabbis of Yavneh and Usha were much more concerned with the transference of the priestly halakhah to all Israel than with the rebuilding of the Temple. The only Rabbi of whom we hear *expressis verbis* that he supported Bar Kokhba was R. Akiva,⁶² and it is well known that he met with the fierce opposition of the otherwise unfamiliar R. Yoḥanan ben Torta. To conclude, by basing one's argument upon this one dictum alone, that R. Akiva was the spiritual leader of the revolt and that his behaviour reflected 'the prevailing attitude of the sages to the revolt and to the man who headed it',⁶³ is more than hasty.

The same is true as regards the claim that Bethar was the seat 'in waiting' of the patriarch until the reconquest of Jerusalem. This assumption is based above all upon the statement made by Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel that he had been one of the many schoolchildren in Bethar's 500 schools:⁶⁴ 'We cannot assume that he was a student during the war, for he was appointed patriarch shortly afterwards. He will therefore have studied in this place before the revolt and it follows that the family of the patriarch was settled there at the time'.⁶⁵ This is a pseudo-historical explanation of an aggadic midrash, which surely is not intended to inform us that Shimon b. Gamliel was a schoolchild at Bethar and therefore not able to become the immediate successor of his father Gamliel II, who died about 120, but first became *Nasi'* following the Bar Kokhba revolt, as Oppenheimer has argued.⁶⁶ If one takes the midrash literally, then one must conclude that Shimon b. Gamliel was, on the contrary, still a schoolchild during the revolt and thus was unable to assume the

office of patriarch shortly thereafter. Typical for such a pseudo-historical interpretation is the arbitrary choice of elements which fit into the historical analysis. We learn that the stated numbers of schools and pupils are, of course, exaggerated,⁶⁷ but nevertheless Shimon b. Gamliel was a student in one of the schools. Surely though, this had to have been the case some time prior to the revolt, for we know that he became *Nasi'* following the rebellion. That he claimed to be the only valiant Torah student to have survived the revolt must then be attributed to aggadadic embellishment.

All in all, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that it was precisely the Rabbis, with R. Akiva at the helm, who spiritually paved the way toward the revolt and that all of the factions among the people became united under their leadership. Neither were the Rabbis of a unified opinion, as is illustrated by the controversy between Akiva and Yoḥanan b. Torta, nor do we have concrete evidence that particular Rabbis supported the revolt. Much more probable is the thesis put forward by D. Goodblatt, that it was the priestly faction who provided the ideological background for the revolt.⁶⁸ This can be implied, among other things, from Bar Kokhba's use of the title of *Nasi'*, which apparently continues the priestly traditions of Ezekiel and the Qumran community, and above all through the legend 'Elazar the Priest' which appears on numerous rebellion coins.⁶⁹ M. Hengel has further pointed out that the palaeo-Hebrew letters found on coins of both the first and second revolts are the "nationales Schibboleth" *priesterlicher Kreise* and refer to the theocratic-priestly background of both uprisings.⁷⁰ Bar Kokhba's ritual observance and devotion to the Torah, which, among other things, place great importance upon the sabbatical year and the tithe, can also be seen in this context.⁷¹

2. The thesis that the Jewish population, unified under the leadership of the Rabbis, fully supported the revolt must be viewed as belonging more to the realm of fantasy than to reality. This can further be illustrated by the often quoted text from the fifth book of the Sibylline Oracles:

After him (*sc.* Trajan) another will reign,
a silver-headed man. He will have the name of a sea.⁷²

He will also be a most excellent man and he will consider
everything.

And in your time, most excellent, outstanding, dark-haired one,
and in the days of your descendants,⁷³ all these days will come to
pass.⁷⁴

Scholars are for the most part in agreement that the fifth book of the Sibylline Oracles originated between 80 and 132 and that it was the work of an Egyptian Jew.⁷⁵ The list of the Roman Emperors from the beginning up until Hadrian (vv. 1-50), to which the above quoted text belongs, must be considered an addition made by a second Jewish author who was active during Hadrian's reign and before the outbreak of the Bar Kokhba revolt.⁷⁶ Otherwise there is no way of explaining the extremely positive portrayal of Hadrian found here.⁷⁷ The controversial question is what conclusions can be drawn from this text. Some scholars see it as echoing the transition of power from Trajan to Hadrian and the hopes of the Jewish populace in the latter's rule, which so soon became bitterly disappointed.⁷⁸ Others place the text at the end of the period from 117 to 132 and see a connection with Hadrian's visit to Judaea in 130.⁷⁹ The interpretation of this text evidently depends upon the evaluation one makes of Hadrian's policy prior to 130. Those who view this policy as having been one of increasing suppression must play down the enthusiastic praise of Hadrian (which follows the sharp criticism of Vespasian and Trajan!) and attribute it solely to the beginning of his reign.⁸⁰ Those, however, who view the period up until Hadrian's visit to Judaea as having been a 'Zeit der Ruhe, wirtschaftlicher Erholung und des vom Kaiser geförderten Aufbaus',⁸¹ will probably interpret the text as a reflection of the peaceful situation and will place the erosion of relations between Hadrian and the Jewish population in the period after 130.

Following upon this, it appears to me that the second possibility is the more probable one. The praise of Hadrian in the fifth book of the Sibylline Oracles seems to express a broader mentality among the Jews, as is illustrated also by the coin legends and the building of the *Hadrianeia*, one which welcomed and even actively supported Hadrian's policy of peace. It would be extremely naive to assume that all the Jews of Judaea celebrated Hadrian as *restitutor* and *sōtēr*, but equally unrealistic is the assumption that his policy was rejected by the Jews of Judaea as a whole. The praise of Hadrian in *Or. Sib.* 5 must be seen in the context of the entire evidence pertaining to the period between 117 and 130 and is by no means the single proof for support of Roman policy by hellenized or assimilated Jews in Judaea.⁸²

3. In connection with his discussion of the *colonia*-status of Caesarea (following the first Jewish War) and Jerusalem (under

Hadrian's reign), which included the granting of Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the new colony, B. Isaac has referred to two military documents which cast an illuminating light upon the situation between 70 and 135. The first (*CIL XVI.15*), from the year 71, mentions a Jew from Caesarea by the name of L. Cornelius Simon, who apparently fought as a Roman soldier during the first Jewish War. This raises no problems, since the mixed reaction of the Jewish population of Judaea during this war is undisputed. It is different with the second document (*CIL XVI.106*). Here, one Barsimso Callisthenis is named as recipient of a diploma in 157, again a Jewish soldier from Caesarea serving in the Roman army, who was apparently recruited at the start of the second Jewish War. This is, of course, much more exciting, for a Jewish legionary from Judaea, who fought against his fellow countrymen side by side with the Romans, does not at all fit into the picture of a unified national revolt which incorporated all classes of the population in the struggle against the hated Roman rule. Isaac nevertheless concludes that 'he must have been one of the few Jews who helped to suppress the revolt'.⁸³ However, how do we know that he was 'one of the few'? Neither this nor the opposite conclusion can be drawn from the source with any measure of certainty. The fact that such a case was mentioned at all is significant enough and proves, at any rate, that Jews had fought against Jews. This had been the case in almost all Jewish wars, and as such, it would be quite astonishing if the Bar Kokhba revolt was an exception.

4. The most important evidence for assimilatory tendencies within Judaism in Judaea before the Bar Kokhba revolt remains the text from *t. Shab. 15 (16),9*,⁸⁴ which I have discussed at length in my book on the Bar Kokhba revolt:⁸⁵

The *mašukh* must be (re)circumcised.

R. Yehudah says: He does not need to be (re)circumcised if he has performed the *epispasmos*, because it is dangerous (*mipne še-hu' mesukkan*).

They said: Many *mešukhim* had themselves (re)circumcised in the days of Ben Koziba, they had children and did not die. For it says: Circumcising, he shall be circumcised (*himmol yimmol*) (Gen. 17.13)—even a hundred times! And it is also said: My covenant has he destroyed (Gen. 17.14)—to include the *mašukh*!

Isaac-Oppenheim have paid no attention to this text, although it makes up the main argument of my thesis on the hellenized and

assimilated Jews in Judaea, who, like the hellenized Jews under Antiochus IV, conformed to Graeco-Roman culture.⁸⁶ This is even more surprising, in that Oppenheimer had, in 1980 (before the publication of my Bar Kokhba book; the passage eluded me at the time), established along these lines a connection between the Jewish city councils of Tiberias and Sepphoris, who had supported Hadrian's policy, and the *mešukhim*: "Those were Jews with assimilationist inclinations including the "stretched", that is, men who stretched their foreskins so that they should appear to be uncircumcised'.⁸⁷

A.M. Rabello has critically and at length analysed the text in *t. Shab.* and my interpretation of it.⁸⁸ He grants the possibility that the text may be referring to Jewish assimilationists, but believes that I had too hastily seized upon this explanation and that I took for granted, that the one who had been circumcised (an adult) either performed the operation of *epispasmos* himself, or had it performed upon him. Against this, he claims that the text is referring to fathers who performed the *epispasmos* upon their circumcised sons, fearing Hadrian's prohibition of circumcision. (The consequence of this would be that *t. Shab.* could be understood, against my argument, as stating that the prohibition was declared before the start of the revolt.) The Romans would have had little opportunity, under the tense situation before the outbreak of the revolt, to pay close attention to which children had been circumcised before the declaration of the prohibition and which had been circumcised shortly thereafter. In this case there would have existed the danger that 'innocent' children or their parents would have been killed, and therefore some parents might, out of fear, have performed the *epispasmos* upon their children. The danger, of which the Tosefta speaks, does not refer, according to Rabello, to the physical danger of two circumcisions performed within a short space of time, but to the danger which would result from the transgression of the prohibition.

This is an extremely forced (and cunning) interpretation of the text. To begin with, it overlooks the fact that the phrase, 'because it is dangerous', is not referring to the original circumcision (which would be reverted by the *epispasmos*), but to the renewed circumcision performed after the *epispasmos*. Pursuing the logic of Rabello, one would have to arrive at the following, rather senseless procedure: Fathers had their children circumcised, either shortly before or shortly after the declaration of prohibition, but then changed their

minds because of Hadrian's decree and concealed the circumcision by performing the *epispasmos*. During the Bar Kokhba revolt they then wanted to reacknowledge their Jewishness, and because of the 'danger' posed by the continued prohibition, did not have to recircumcise their children.

Apart from this, Rabello's interpretation is unsupportable on the basis of other arguments. The Tosefta text, in referring to the danger connected with the repeated circumcision, uses the phrase *mipne še-hu' mesukkan* ('because it is dangerous'). In connection with the anti-Jewish decrees from the time of the Bar Kokhba revolt, however, the Mishnah and Tosefta always use the noun *sakkanah* (*ba-sakkanah, biš'at ha-sakkanah, min ha-sakkanah we-'elakh*).⁸⁹ The interpretation of the 'danger' as referring to Hadrian's prohibition of circumcision therefore ignores the language of the Mishnah and Tosefta. Furthermore, with regard to the contents, such an interpretation is much too limited and heedless of the context. The anonymous dictum, which contradicts R. Yehudah, and insists that a *mašukh* must be circumcised again, is clearly aimed at illustrating that no physical harm befell the many *mešukhim* as a result of a renewed circumcision: if one had performed the *epispasmos* 100 times, then he would have to be recircumcised 100 times, and no harm would befall him! That the *mešukhim* who were recircumcised did 'not die' refers to the procedure of circumcision and not to their having survived Hadrian's persecution. Finally, Rabello overlooks the fact that R. Yehudah's remark, as such, has nothing to do with the Bar Kokhba revolt, but rather deals with the problem of the *mašukh* in general without referring to the actual historical situation of the uprising. Only through the anonymous reply can a relation be drawn to the revolt, and there can be no doubt that this revolt belonged to the past.

Hadrian's Policy and the Bar Kokhba Revolt

The transformation of Judaea into a consular province together with the obligatory assignment of a second legion and the intensified road construction undertaken in Judaea cannot be seen as having been the reply to Jewish unrest, nor should it be viewed as a military intervention intended to prevent unrest. This action was not directed towards the repression of the Jewish population, but towards the establishment of peace and of secure borders in the east of the Empire. Pagan coin legends and the erection of *Hadrianeia* in cities

with both pagan and Jewish inhabitants do not provide evidence for the alleged provocative paganizing of the city councils (in the sense of anti-Jewish acts). They are, rather, indications of an increasing adoption of the hellenization, as propagated by Hadrian, by assimilated Jewish circles. The foundation of Aelia Capitolina was the most logical result of this policy and was probably welcomed by hellenistic and pro-Roman elements within the Jewish population. Positive evidence, such as the enthusiastic praise of Hadrian in the fifth book of the Sibylline Oracles, the participation of Jewish soldiers on the side of the Romans during wartime and, above all, the numerous *mešukhim* prior to the outbreak of the war, illustrate that a rather considerable part of the Jewish population in Judaea had indeed imbibed the 'Zeitgeist'.

It is therefore almost certain that a group of assimilated and hellenized Jews existed in Judaea⁹⁰ who welcomed, and perhaps even actively supported, Hadrian's policy of hellenization,⁹¹ and it appears likely that these were for the greater part city dwellers.⁹² The comparison with Antiochus IV and the Hellenists in Jerusalem remains, in my opinion, not a misguided one.⁹³ It is, however, a different issue whether this justifies drawing a further analogy and interpreting the Bar Kokhba revolt as the result of an inner Jewish conflict between the 'assimilated' and the rest of the law-abiding population (in the terminology of the Maccabean period: between 'Hellenists' and 'ḥasidim'). It is on this point that I have received the strongest opposition.⁹⁴ M. Hengel, who has most stressed the parallel between Hadrian and Antiochus,⁹⁵ is cautious when referring to a possible inner Jewish conflict: 'Wie E. Bickerman in seinem klassischen Werk, *Der Gott der Makkabäer*, 1937... nachweisen konnte, wurde Antiochos IV. im Grunde in einen innerjüdischen, allmählich eskalierenden Streit hineingezogen. Das kann man so bei Hadrian gewiß nicht sagen, doch läßt sich eine vorausgehende innerjüdische Auseinandersetzung nicht ausschließen'.⁹⁶

The starting point for any realistic evaluation of the situation in Judaea at the beginning of the revolt must be the realization that obviously the entire population of the province did not join unitedly in the revolt (not to mention the Diaspora). An analysis of the literary⁹⁷ and numismatic evidence⁹⁸ limits the extent of the revolt to the region south of Jerusalem to the coastal plain in the west and to the Dead Sea in the east. In particular, there is no evidence which speaks in favour of a participation on the part of Galilee. The Rabbis

cannot be considered to have been the spiritual pioneers of the revolt, but rather it was the priests who supported the uprising. Furthermore, the Bar Kokhba letters also indicate that Bar Kokhba did not enjoy full support even within the region of the revolt and had trouble keeping his own men in line.⁹⁹

Against this background, it is very probable that Hadrian's policy in Judaea was judged differently by the various Jewish groups and that the revolt was *also*¹⁰⁰ an expression of these diverging interests. The more rural population of Judaea in the narrower sense,¹⁰¹ who were loyal to the Law and inspired by the Priests, surely viewed the development in a much different manner than did the urban population in the larger cities in Galilee and on the coastal plain, which was influenced by Hellenism. This certainly does not imply that the rural population of Judaea stumbled 'into a war against the Roman Empire because of a rivalry between the hellenized and "law-abiding" Jews in the cities'.¹⁰² Nevertheless, the political 'cooperation' between hellenized Jews and Hadrian undoubtedly intensified the situation and perhaps led to a state of affairs in which the revolt was the only way left to stop what the 'pious' saw as a fatal development. Hadrian was, in Judaea, by no means a player unaware of the rules of the game; however, through his enforced policy of Romanization, viz. Hellenization and urbanization, and hence, through the aggressive dissemination of an intellectual climate which increasingly found followers among the Jewish population of Judaea, he may have become, like Antiochus IV, the 'catalyst' in a process over which he eventually lost control.

NOTES

1. Cf. e.g. P. Schäfer, *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand. Studien zum zweiten jüdischen Krieg gegen Rom* (TSAJ, 1), Tübingen, 1981; Sh. Applebaum, 'The Second Jewish Revolt (AD 131-135)', *PEQ* 116 (1984), pp. 35-41; L. Mildenberg, *The Coinage of the Bar Kokhba War* (Typos, 6), Aarau, Frankfurt a.M. & Salzburg, 1984; A. Oppenheimer & U. Rappaport (eds.), *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt. A New Approach*, Jerusalem, 1984 (Hebr.); N. Bickhoff-Böttcher, *Das Judentum in der griechisch-römischen Welt. Gesellschaftliche und politische Beziehungen und Konflikte von der Mitte des 1. Jh. v. Chr. bis zum Ende des 2. Jh. n. Chr.* (Diss. phil. Osnabrück, 1984); M. Hengel, 'Hadrians Politik gegenüber Juden und Christen', *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), pp. 153-82 (*Ancient Studies in Memory of Elias Bickerman*); B.

Isaac-A. Oppenheimer, 'The Revolt of Bar Kokhba: Ideology and Modern Scholarship', *JJS* 36 (1985), pp. 33-60; D. Golan, 'Hadrian's Decision to Supplant "Jerusalem" by "Aelia Capitolina"', *Historia* 35 (1986), pp. 226-39. I am grateful to my student Aubrey Pomerance for the English translation of this article.

2. Cf. the summary in Isaac-Oppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), pp. 44ff.

3. Cf. Isaac-Oppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), pp. 45f.; further Mildenberg, *Coinage*, pp. 102ff.; Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984), pp. 174ff. Mildenberg, who has critically evaluated my thesis concerning hellenized, pro-Roman Jews, has not considered my analysis of the Roman sources dealing with the prohibition of circumcision. He refers (p. 105 n. 295) to Rabello's 'full account', which is, for the most part, a repetition of Juster's arguments (A.M. Rabello, 'The Legal Condition of the Jews in the Roman Empire', in *ANRW* II.13 [Berlin & New York, 1980], pp. 699-703); cf. on the other hand, T. Fischer, Review of Mildenberg, *Coinage*, *WdO* 17 (1986), p. 183 n. 15: 'Hadrians erneutes und verschärftes Verbot der Kastration betraf m.E. die Beschneidung nicht'; R. Wenning, Review of Mildenberg, *Coinage*, *ThR* 84 (1988), col. 110: 'eine Datierung des Verbotes [sc. der Beschneidung] vor dem Bar Kokhba-Aufstand ist nicht gesichert und die Argumentation von Schäfer für eine spätere Ansetzung erscheint dem Rez. überzeugender'.

4. Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 158.

5. B. Isaac & I. Roll, 'Judaea in the Early Years of Hadrian's Reign', *Latomus* 38 (1979), p. 55; E. Schürer, G. Vermes & F. Millar, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.-A.D. 135)*, vol. I, Edinburgh, 1973, p. 518.

6. *Fasti Ostienses, Inscriptiones Italiae* XIII.1, p. 205; Schürer, Vermes & Millar, I, p. 518.

7. H.-G. Pflaum, 'Remarques sur le changement de statut administratif de la province de Judée: à propos d'une inscription récemment découverte à Sidé de Pamphylie', *IEJ* 19 (1969), pp. 232f.

8. B. Isaac & I. Roll, 'Legio II Traiana in Judaea', *ZPE* 33 (1979), pp. 149-156; J.R. Rea, 'The Legio II Traiana in Judaea?', *ZPE* 38 (1980), pp. 220-22; B. Isaac & I. Roll, 'Legio II Traiana in Judaea—A Reply', *ZPE* 47 (1982), pp. 131-32; Isaac-Roll, *Latomus* 38 (1979), pp. 56ff.

9. Isaac-Roll, *Latomus* 38 (1979), pp. 56ff.

10. Sh. Applebaum, *Prolegomena to the Study of the Second Jewish Revolt (A.D. 132-135)* (BAR Supplementary Series, 7), Oxford, 1976, p. 23; Isaac & Roll, *Latomus* 38 (1979), p. 62.

11. Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 159 n. 33.

12. B. Isaac, 'Roman Colonies in Judaea: The Foundation of Aelia Capitolina', *Talanta* 12-13 (1980-81), p. 46; Isaac & Roll, *Latomus* 38 (1979), p. 57 n. 17.

13. E. Schürer, G. Vermes, F. Millar & M. Black, vol. II (1979), p. 179.

14. Hill, *BMC Palestine*, p. xv; A. Kindler, *The Coins of Tiberias, Tiberias*, 1961, No. 7b and pp. 21f.

15. *Adv. haer.* 30,12, PG XLI, col. 426; F.M. Abel, 'Chronique: II.—Les fouilles juives d'el Hammam, à Tibériade', *RB* 30 (1921), pp. 440f.

16. Hill, p. xxviii.

17. Hill, p. xii: reign of Antoninus Pius.

18. The evidence is a milestone from the year 130 with the new name; cf. B. Lipshitz, 'Sur la date du transfert de la legio VI Ferrata en Palestine', *Latomus* 19 (1960), pp. 110f.; E.M. Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman Rule. From Pompey to Diocletian* (SJLA, 20), Leiden, 1976, p. 432.

19. Hill, pp. xi-xiii.

20. Hill, p. xi. In Athens, Hadrian completed the construction of the temple of Zeus Olympios in 128/29 (Pausanias 1.18.6ff.); cf. Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 180. Upon Garizim he probably constructed a temple of Zeus Hypsistos; see Hengel, p. 171 with n. 89.

21. Only from an inscription from the Christian era; cf. Germer-Durand, 'Mélanges III: Inscriptions romaines et byzantines de Palestine', *RB* 4 (1895), pp. 75ff.; F.T. Ellis & A.S. Murray, 'Inscription Found at Caesarea', *PEFQS* (1896), pp. 87f.

22. R. Wenning, *ThR* 84 (1988), col. 110; *idem*, correspondence from Nov. 25, 1988: 'Die beiden überlebensgroßen Sitzstatuen in Marmor und Porphyrt. . . verstehe ich als Darstellungen des Hadrian. Bei der Marmorstatue könnte man u.U. an den Divus Traianus denken. Die Porphyrtstatue könnte das Kultbild des Hadrianeums von 130 gewesen sein.' As to the bust of Antinoos, cf. R. Savignac, 'Chronique', *RB* 13 (1904), p. 84, No. 2 (plate).

23. Cf. L.J. Levine, *Caesarea under Roman Rule* (SJLA, 7), Leiden, 1975, pp. 32f., 34, 44ff.

24. Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 171 and p. 180 with n. 123.

25. *Talanta* 12-13 (1980-81), p. 46.

26. Isaac-Roll, *Latomus* 38 (1979), p. 66.

27. Y. Meshorer, *Jewish Coins of the Second Temple Period*, Tel Aviv, 1967, pp. 92f.; cf. Schäfer, *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, p. 37 n. 32. In the meantime, B. Lipshitz ('Jérusalem sous la domination romaine. Histoire de la ville depuis la conquête de Pompée jusqu'à Constantin [63 a.C.—325 p.C.]', *ANRW* II.8, Berlin & New York, 1977, p. 481) has drawn attention to further Aelia coins which have been found near Hebron together with Hadrian coins from the time *before* the Bar Kokhba revolt: 'Ces monnaies ont fourni une preuve irréfutable que la nouvelle colonie a été fondée pendant la visite de l'empereur dans la province de Judée en 130'.

28. Mildenberg, *Coinage*, p. 100; *idem*, 'Bar Kokhba Coins and Documents', *HSCP* 84 (1980), p. 333; cf. also Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 172.

29. *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 51.

30. G.W. Bowersock, 'A Roman Perspective on the Bar Kokhba War', W.S. Green (ed.), *Approaches to Ancient Judaism*, II, Ann Arbor, 1980, p. 133.

31. M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, Oxford, 1926, p. 318.
32. Isaac-Oppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 51.
33. *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, Oxford, 1937; 2nd edn, 1971, p. 279; *idem*, 'The Urbanization of Palestine', *JRS* 21 (1931), p. 82.
34. *Latomus* 38 (1979), p. 64.
35. *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 51.
36. Isaac-Roll, *Latomus* 38 (1979), p. 64; Isaac-Oppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 51: 'an indication perhaps that the local administration had been transferred to non-Jewish elements'.
37. Isaac-Oppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 51.
38. *B. A.Z.* 25b; *Lam. R.* 3.6 = *Lam. R.*, Buber, p. 128; *b. Nid.* 61a; *t. Kel. B.B.* 2.2.
39. *Toledot ha-yehudim be-'eres yiśra'el bitequfat ha-mishnah we-ha-talmud*, vol. II, Tel Aviv, 1961, pp. 1-2.
40. *Latomus* 38 (1979), p. 64 n. 56.
41. Schäfer, *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, pp. 106ff.
42. See n. 13.
43. A. Oppenheimer (ed.), *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt* (Issues in Jewish History, 10), Jerusalem, 1980, p. 11; English translation under the title 'The Bar Kokhba Revolt', *Immanuel* 14 (1982), pp. 61f.
44. *Talanta* 12-13 (1980-81), pp. 31-54.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 48 n. 78.
46. Philo, *Spec. Leg.* 36, 287.
47. Following F. Millar, *The Emperor and the Roman World*, London, 1977, p. 407.
48. Isaac, *ibid.*
49. *B. A.Z.* 10a.
50. *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt*, p. 11 = *Immanuel* 14 (1982), p. 62. Compare this with my conclusion in *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, p. 49: 'Mit seinem Vorschlag, auch Jerusalem als römische Kolonie erstehen zu lassen, wollte Hadrian daher nicht gezielt-provokativ den jüdischen Nationalismus ausrotten und rannte er auch nicht unbefangen-naiv in bereits gezückte Messer, sondern setzte er eine Politik fort, die er bereits auch in *Palästina* mit einigem Erfolg begonnen hatte und von der er annehmen konnte, daß die von zahlreichen assimilierten Juden nicht nur geduldet, sondern gewünscht wurde'. I am delighted by this additional confirmation which escaped me at that time.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Talanta* 12-13 (1980-81), p. 48 n. 78.
53. Dio, *Hist. Romana* 69.12.1.
54. *Approaches to Ancient Judaism*, II, p. 137.
55. An equestrian statue of himself and one of Jupiter (Jerome, *CCL* 73, p. 33), Gaius or Titus (Origen, *GCS Orig.* 12, pp. 193f.); the pilgrim of

Bordeaux (CCL 175, p. 16; cf. H. Donner, *Pilgerfahrt ins Heilige Land*, Stuttgart, 1979, p. 56) speaks of two statues of Hadrian and is probably referring to Hadrian and Antoninus Pius.

56. Bowersock, *Approaches to Ancient Judaism*, II, p. 137; J. Wilkinson, *Jerusalem as Jesus Knew It*, London, 1978, pp. 178f.

57. *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 172.

58. *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 49.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

61. I. Ben-Shalom, 'Events and Ideology of the Yavneh Period as Indirect Causes of the Bar-Kokhva Revolt', Oppenheimer-Rappaport (eds.), *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt. A New Approach*, pp. 1-12 (Hebr.).

62. *Y. Taan.* 4.8, 68d.

63. Oppenheimer, *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt*, p. 15 = *Immanuel* 14 (1982), p. 67.

64. *Y. Taan.* 4.8, 69a: 'Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel said: There were 500 schools in Bethar and in the smallest of them there were no less than 500 children. They used to say: When the enemies are upon us, we will march out against them with these styluses and will pierce their eyes. When, however, the sins caused it, they (= the Romans) rolled each one of them in a scroll and had them burned, and from all of them I alone have remained'; *Lam. R.*, 2.4 = *Lam. R.*, Buber, p. 104; *b. Git.* 58a; on this see Schäfer, *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, pp. 136ff.

65. Isaac-Oppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 52.

66. Oppenheimer, in Z. Baras *et al.* (eds.), *Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the Muslim Conquest* (Hebr.), Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 49f.

67. *Ibid.*

68. D. Goodblatt, 'The Title *Nasi*' and the Ideological Background of the Second Revolt', Oppenheimer-Rappaport (eds.), *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt. A New Approach*, pp. 113-32 (Hebr.).

69. Mildenberg, 'The Elazar Coins of the Bar Kokhba Rebellion', *Historia Judaica* 11 (1949), pp. 77-108; *idem*, *The Coinage of the Bar Kokhba War*, pp. 29f.

70. Review of Mildenberg, *Coinage*, *Gnomon* 58 (1986), p. 327; the symbolism of the coins is also a reference to the Temple (Hengel, *ibid.*, p. 330).

71. Cf. Schäfer, *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, pp. 75f., on the pertinent passages.

72. Adriatic Sea; cf. also in the rabbinic literature *M. Teh.* 93.6, ed. Buber, pp. 415f.

73. Reference to Dan. 4.21.

74. *Or. Sib.* 5.46-50; translated by J.J. Collins, in J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, vol. I, Garden City, NY/London, 1983, p. 394.

75. Collins, *ibid.*, pp. 390f.
76. A. Rzach, 'Sibyllinische Orakel', *PW* II.2.4 (1923), cols. 2134-36; Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 154 with n. 7; Bowersock, *Approaches to Ancient Judaism*, II, p. 134 with n. 20.
77. Problematic then is v. 51, which includes Marcus Aurelius; this can be best understood to be a later addition: Rzach, *ibid.*, cols. 2134f.
78. Alon, *Toledot ha-yehudim*, vol. I, Tel Aviv, 1967, p. 283; Isaac-Opppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 47 n. 61.
79. Bowersock, *Approaches to Ancient Judaism*, II, p. 134.
80. Although they only criticize other authors, without themselves directly addressing the text, this seems to be the opinion of Isaac-Opppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 47.
81. Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 158.
82. As Isaac-Opppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 47, have accused me of arguing. I quoted the Sibylline Oracles at the conclusion of my extensive discussion of the *mešukim*, which they have fully ignored. An altogether different question is whether tension between pro- and anti-Roman groups was also responsible for the outbreak of the war; see below.
83. *Talanta* 12-13 (1980-81), p. 50.
84. *Y. Shab.* 19.2, 17a; *y. Yeb.* 8.1, 9a; *b. Yeb.* 72a; *Gen. R.* 46.13.
85. *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, pp. 45ff.
86. M. Hengel has also recently argued along the lines of this thesis (*JANES* 16-17 [1984-85], p. 160 n. 37); 'Dies weist darauf hin, daß nicht wenige Juden im jüdischen Palästina vor dem Aufstand Apostaten geworden waren und wie einst unter dem Hohepriester Jason in der Zeit des Antiochos IV. den Epispasmus vollzogen hatten. . . '.
87. *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt*, p. 11 = *Immanuel* 14 (1982), p. 62.
88. 'Il problema della "circumcisio" in diritto Romano fino ad Antonino Pio', *Studi in onore di Arnaldo Biscardi*, II, Milan, 1982, pp. 206ff. = 'The Edicts on Circumcision as a Factor in the Bar-Kokhva Revolt', Opppenheimer-Rappaport (eds.), *The Bar-Kokhva Revolt. A New Approach*, pp. 41ff.
89. *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, p. 198 and p. 205.
90. Naturally, I meant by 'in Jerusalem' (*Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, p. 48) Jerusalem as *pars pro toto* for Judaea. This misleading formulation was first brought to my attention by Mildenberg (*Coinage*, p. 103 n. 286), who ascertains a change of mind between the statements in *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand* and those in *Geschichte der Juden in der Antike* (Stuttgart, 1983, pp. 161f.): 'Schäfer has recently modified this point of view considerably. . . : the limitation of the pro-Roman/anti-Roman rivalry to Jerusalem is dropped in favour of a broad-based rivalry throughout Judaea. . . '.
91. Cf. also R. Wenning, *ThR* 81 (1985), col. 369: 'Daß weite Teile der Bevölkerung Palästinas Hadrians "Hellenisierungspolitik" begrüßten und weiterführten, ein Vorgang, der sich nach dem BKA enorm potenzierte, ist dabei nicht in Abrede zu stellen'; Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 160

n. 37: 'Daß diese Kreise das Beschneidungsverbot Hadrians... begrüßten, ist wahrscheinlich, ob sie die Politik des Kaisers in Richtung auf ein solches—wie einst Menachem und seine Freunde gegenüber Antiochos IV.—direkt beeinflußten, entzieht sich unserer Kenntnis und erscheint als schwer vorstellbar'.

92. Mildenberg, *Coinage*, p. 103 n. 286.

93. *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, pp. 48f.; explicitly also Hengel, *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), pp. 180f.

94. For example, Oppenheimer, *JStJ* 14 (1983), p. 220; S.J.D. Cohen, *The Second Century* 2 (1984), p. 119; R. Wenning, *ThR* 81 (1985), p. 369; Mildenberg, *Coinage*, p. 103 n. 286 and p. 105 n. 297; Isaac-Oppenheimer, *JJS* 36 (1985), p. 47: 'This is an artificial transfer of the situation in the second century BC to that three centuries later, and the Sibylline Oracle is no sufficient basis for such a theory'; T. Fischer, *WdO* 17 (1986), p. 183 n. 15.

95. *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 180: 'In eigenartiger Analogie zu Antiochos verstand er (sc. Hadrian) sich als Repräsentant des Zeus-Jupiter auf Erden und wurde als "Olympios" im griechischen Osten mit dem Gott "identifiziert". Antiochos und Hadrian wollten durch eine panhellenische Politik die Einheit ihres Vielvölkerstaates stärken'.

96. *JANES* 16-17 (1984-85), p. 181 n. 125.

97. Schäfer, *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, pp. 102ff.

98. Mildenberg, *Coinage*, pp. 81ff.; cf. both maps on pages 83 and 86.

99. Schäfer, *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, pp. 74f.

100. Certainly not exclusively, but also; this 'also' (cf. *Der Bar Kokhba-Aufstand*, p. 49, at the bottom of the page) has been mostly overlooked by my critics.

101. Concerning the Jewish rural population between 70 and 132, cf. Mildenberg's apt remarks in: *Coinage*, pp. 84f.

102. This is Mildenberg's rather ironic citing of my argument, *Coinage*, p. 103 n. 286. His remark that 'Schäfer fails to explain why and how such a divided Jewry was able to wage a war of this length, extent and persistence' (p. 105 n. 297) fails to directly address my argument. The Jewry of the Maccabean revolt and of the first Jewish War was anything but united, and nonetheless was able to wage long and sustained wars—why should the Bar Kokhba revolt have been different?