

MICHIGAN MONOGRAPH SERIES IN JAPANESE STUDIES
NUMBER 40
CENTER FOR JAPANESE STUDIES
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Transformations of Sensibility

The Phenomenology of Meiji Literature

KAMEI HIDEO

Translation Edited and with an Introduction by
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Center for Japanese Studies
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor 2002

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726.55

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.K2353

2002

Published by the Center for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan,
202 S. Thayer St., Ann Arbor, MI 48104-1608

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Kamei, Hideo, 1937-

[Kansei no henkaku. English]

Transformations of sensibility : the phenomenology of Meiji literature /
Kamei Hideo ; translation edited and with an introduction by Michael
Bourdagh.

p. cm. — (Michigan monograph series in Japanese studies ; no. 40)

Includes indexes.

ISBN 1-929280-12-2 (cloth : alk. paper)

I. Japanese literature—1868—History and criticism. 2. Japanese
literature—Edo period, 1600-1868—History and criticism. I. Bourdagh,
Michael, 1961- II. Title. III. Series.

PL726.55 .K2613 2002

895.6'090042—dc21

2002072878

This book was set in Times New Roman.

This publication meets the ANSI/NISO Standards for Permanence of Paper for
Publications and Documents in Libraries and Archives
(Z39.48-1992).

Published in the United States of America

GRAD
Gift
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Editor's Introduction: Buried Modernities—The Phenomenological Criticism of Kamei Hideo

MICHAEL BOURDAGHS

The decade between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s saw a revolution in the study of modern Japanese literature. It is, first of all, within this context that Kamei Hideo's work should be understood. A new generation of scholars arose in revolt against the largely positivistic methodologies that had dominated post-war scholarship, including author studies (*sakkarōn*), studies of a single work (*sakuhinron*), and literary history (*bungakushi*). Works such as Maeda Ai's *The Establishment of the Modern Reader (Kindai dokusha no seiritsu, 1973)*, Noguchi Takehiko's *The Japanese Language in Fiction (Shōsetsu no Nihongo, 1980)*, and Karatani Kōjin's *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature (Kindai Nihon bungaku no kigen, 1980)*, began the process of challenging orthodox interpretations, often introducing new methodologies in the process, including semiotics, narratology, structuralism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism.¹ Feminist criticism by such figures as Mizuta Noriko and Komashaku Kimi launched a critical reassessment of writing by women and of masculinist assumptions that had guided literary studies in Japan.² From a multitude of directions, established literary knowledge found itself under attack. If there was a shared aspect to this multifaceted revolt, it was a critical stance toward modernity and Enlightenment (and toward existing scholarship that worked within the paradigm of modernization theory). Modernity was no longer perceived as the solution, but as

1. An anthology of Maeda's essays in English translation, edited by James Fujii, is forthcoming from Duke University Press. Karatani's work is available in English translation, edited by Brett de Bary, from Duke University Press (1993).

2. For a useful summary of recent feminist criticism in Japan, see Kitada Sachie, "Contemporary Japanese Feminist Literary Criticism," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* English Supplement 7 (1994): 72-97.

the problem, a problem of which Japanese modern literature and established literary studies were symptoms.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the intellectual ferment continued and in many ways the new scholarship carried the day. Among the influential works published were Asada Akira's *Structure and Power* (*Kōzō to chikara*, 1983), Komori Yōichi's *Narrative as Structure* (*Kōzō toshite no katari*, 1988) and Suga Hidemi's *The 'Birth' of Japanese Modern Literature* (*Nihon kindai bungaku no 'tanjō*, 1995). Feminist criticism continued to flourish, including such important anthologies as *On Men's Literature* (*Danryū bungakuron*, edited by Ueno Chizuko, Ogura Chikako, and Tomioka Taeko, 1992) and *Modern Literature as Read by Women* (*Onna ga yomu kindai bungaku*, edited by Egusa Mitsuko and Urushida Kazuyo, 1992). This period also saw the rise of a postcolonial New Historicism in the work of such scholars as Watanabe Naomi, Murai Osamu, and Kawamura Minato.

As he writes in his preface to this translation, Kamei Hideo's work exists in an odd relationship to this revolution. It is certainly true that he helped pioneer this new wave of scholarship; yet it is also true that the road Kamei paved, while often parallel to the new scholarship, never quite intersected with it. The attention Kamei pays to the textual processes of subject formation, his assumption that subjectivity is a historical construct, and his use of the methodologies of close reading, semiotics and narratology all seem to ally Kamei with the young turks. Yet, on the other hand, many of the philosophical sources and historical assumptions that Kamei employs, especially his stance toward modernity, distinguish him from his contemporaries. Moreover, although he is critical of it, Kamei clearly places himself within the lineage of *kokubungaku*, of academic Japanese literary studies. Whereas his contemporaries largely positioned their critique as external to its object, in many senses Kamei's work is an *immanent* critique. It is this unique position that provides both the excitement and the difficulty in reading Kamei's highly original and provocative works.

In the present book, Kamei, like many of his contemporaries, explores the terrain of early-Meiji writing, which previous scholarship had all too often neglected.³ Rejecting the conventional view that these works represent failed experiments mainly of interest as faltering steps toward the creation of the modern novel, Kamei instead considers these works to contain a variety of possibili-

ties, possibilities that were subsequently lost with the rise to hegemony of the "realistic novel." To recover these possibilities, he performs close readings of the "expressions" used in an astonishing variety of texts. Through these readings, Kamei describes the rise of new modes of "sensibility," modes defined by particular forms of "visual intentionality" as well as by varying degrees of sensitivity to the tonal and rhythmic qualities of spoken language.

The production of these new sensibilities is largely the result of the emergence of a new kind of fictional narrator, what Kamei calls the "immanent non-person narrator." This new narrator creates the possibility for new forms of self-consciousness, because its existence relativizes the sensibilities not only of the various characters who appear in a work, but also of the author who wrote that narrator into existence (and thereby underwent a splitting or doubling of his or her own self). Because literary texts objectify modes of sensibility, they render those modes visible to the subjects (authors, narrators, and readers) who perceive through them—those subjects become able to see the previously transparent lenses through which they view the world. The knowledge about sensibility thus gained empowers them to alter those modes of sensibility. For Kamei, modern literature is at its best moments a site for realizing new forms of self-consciousness and for the evolution of a new kind of ethicality, as it becomes possible to take responsibility for one's own sensibility.

Kamei begins with the opening chapters of Futabatei Shimei's *Ukigumo* (1887–89), long proclaimed Japan's first modern novel, and through a close reading overturns much conventional wisdom. The distinct sensibility of the narrator of those early chapters comes neither from Russian literature nor from oral storytelling genres, Kamei argues, but rather from a genre of popular comic reportage written in a Japanified form of Chinese, the *kanbun fuzokushi* of late Edo and early Meiji. Moreover, like the authors of those works, Futabatei was forced to recognize a gap between the sensibility of his narrator, inherent in its mode of expression, and the object that that narrator depicts—in Futabatei's case, the internal despair of Bunzō, his fictional hero. This recognition leads Futabatei to create the form of narrator found in the second half of *Ukigumo*, one with a new sensibility that allows it to sympathize with Bunzō, to see into his interior and to harbor a sense of shared destiny with that character. A dawning awareness of sensibility achieved through the process of writing had made possible a new form of self-consciousness—for fictional characters, narrator, author, and reader alike.

But this process is not limited to Futabatei. As Kamei's analysis continues, we see the transformation of sensibility and the emergence of new forms of consciousness across a wide variety of genres. In the political novels of the 1880s and in Mori Ōgai's works from the early 1890s, we see the non-person

3. It should be noted, though, that this reexploration of early-Meiji writings was prompted by the publication of the massive *Complete Works of Meiji Literature* (*Meiji bungaku zenshū*), 99 vols. (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1965–83), which made available in reprint form a wide-ranging selection of texts from the Meiji period (though the selection and editing practices adopted for the series have not escaped criticism).

narrator evolve into a self-reflective first-person narrator. The drama of unfolding self-awareness now became a motif in fiction. In Higuchi Ichiyō's brilliant stories from the early 1890s, Kamei traces another line of development: the evolution of a new second-person narrator, one that—by relativizing the sensibility of narrator and author against those of other characters within the text—allows the emergence of a polyphonic novel in Japan, one marked by the dialogic encounter of numerous voices, each marked by a distinct sensibility. This permits the emergence of a new ethicality, a new way for the self to be with others, and situates Ichiyō's love suicides as an important turning point in the transition from the passion-driven love suicides of Edo literature to the ethical suicides of alienated modern characters that appear in so many twentieth-century works.

In subsequent chapters, Kamei traces the tense relations between two kinds of modern realism, one focused on mimesis achieved through visual description, the other on mimesis achieved through reproducing the tone and rhythm of spoken language.⁴ It is the latter form, with its inherent stress on dialogic relations between speakers, that fascinates Kamei. In the stories of Izumi Kyōka, Kōda Rohan, and Kunikida Doppo, Kamei traces the rise of a new interiority, one based on inner speech—the language through which we speak our most private thoughts to ourselves, a language that, paradoxically, we must borrow from others outside of ourselves. Ultimately, this polyphonic, orally based realism leads to the breakdown of the Edo literary technique of *katagi* (character-types), used in works that provided humorous catalogs of various stereotyped stock characters, and the rise of the modern notion of individualized “personality.” A modern literature capable of critically challenging society's norms and conventions had emerged.

The last two chapters in the book trace the waning of this form of orally oriented realism and the rise to dominance of the other, more visually oriented realism. This in turn produces alienation and discrimination, paranoid hallucinations about both domestic and foreign others. Kamei traces this problematic through the different schools of nature description and of travel writing that arose in mid-to-late Meiji and argues that the critical possibilities of modern literature, its ability to relativize human sensibilities and to allow for an ethical coexistence of multiple, autonomous voices, were repressed. In Naturalism and

4. This is a problematic that has been taken up fruitfully in the work of Komori, who was in fact a student of Kamei's at Hokkaido University. See, for example, Komori Yōichi, “Shizenshugi no saihyōka” in *Nihon bungaku kōza 6: kindai shōsetsu*, ed. Nihon bungaku kyōkai (Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten, 1988), 95–113. For another recent example, see Kōno Kensuke, “Onna no kaiwa, otoko no kaiwa: *Ie ni okeru kaiwa no gihō*,” in *Shimazaki Tōson: bunmei hihyō to shi to shōsetsu to*, ed. Hiraoka Toshio and Kenmochi Takehiko (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1996), 167–81.

the I-novel, literature could only blindly reproduce existing sensibilities, and when these genres were accepted as constituting the mainstream of Japan's modern literature, the alternative possible modernity that Kamei has traced here was lost.

Kamei's argument, then, attempts to recover an abandoned wealth of possibilities within Meiji literary writings. This is a project with important implications for the present moment. When the modern “realistic novel,” especially the I-novel, emerged as the sole legitimate form of prose fiction, literary expression was no longer perceived as a relative medium for creating multiple sensibilities, but rather as an absolute medium capable of transparently reflecting the interior of the speaking subject. Such a literature could not produce knowledge of sensibility; it could only reproduce existing conventional sensibilities. According to Kamei, when we accept this as constituting “modern literature,” the danger lies not only in the assumption that a homogeneous sensibility is shared by all people, but also in the implied threat that such a sensibility will be accepted as natural and inevitable. Human beings will lose the ability to actively transform their own sensibilities. Kamei's rereading of Meiji literature is aimed, ultimately, at trying to recover for us a certain margin of freedom.

* * * * *

Undoubtedly, one of the most interesting sections of *Transformations of Sensibility* for English-language readers will be Kamei's scathing criticism of Karatani Kōjin's *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature*, a work that had achieved wide influence among American specialists even before its English translation was published in 1993. Since Karatani's argument has become so well known, Kamei's critique—whether we agree with it or not—provides a useful entryway into explaining the methodological and critical issues that underpin Kamei's argument as a whole. Of course, the various methodological and political positions advocated by both Karatani and Kamei have seen significant change in the years since these works were originally published. For my purposes here, though, I will ignore those subsequent developments in order to sketch an outline of the disagreements that existed between the two when *Transformations of Sensibilities* was first published in 1983.

As we have seen, Karatani's book helped launch a direct and ultimately successful assault on the problematic assumptions that governed the study of modern Japanese literature in postwar Japan. Although Karatani was trained as an academic specialist and held university teaching positions, he wrote largely from the perspective of a *hyōronka*, that is, as a journalistic critic from outside the sphere of academia. In one sense, Kamei's rebuttal in these pages can be

read as the response of one *kokubungakusha*, an academic scholar of Japanese literature, to this critique. In his defense of academic scholarship (a defense that is at times nearly as critical of established scholarship as is Karatani's attack), Kamei charges that Karatani has not only seriously misinterpreted the work of Kamei's scholarly peers, but also that Karatani has provided only the most superficial readings of the literary texts with which he deals.

Beyond differences in institutional position, the first and most obvious difference marking the two arguments lies in the opposing philosophies of history that underlie them. The version of history that Karatani presents, one focused on inversions and epistemic breaks, bears an important resemblance to the form of historiography we are most familiar with from the works of Foucault (although Karatani himself has tended to stress more his debt to Paul de Man and Hannah Arendt, among others). In contrast to Karatani's emphasis on the radical discontinuity of Japan's modernity with earlier periods, Kamei emphasizes continuity, especially with the Edo period. In Kamei, we find a dialectical model of history, one in which historical development occurs not as the result of ruptures or external impact, but out of creative syntheses that resolve internally generated contradictions. Kamei finds the seeds for literary development within literary works themselves. Hence, for example, we will see Kamei locate the beginnings of modern modes for expressing interiority in the late Edo *gesaku* works of Tamenaga Shunsui, and also the stress here on the importance to modern literature of *kanbun*, the Japanified style of writing in Chinese that dominated intellectual discourse throughout the Edo period.

One of the results, both revealing and frustrating, of Kamei's incessantly dialectical approach is his insistence on restricting his focus to written texts themselves. Because he is concerned with locating the rise of new modes of expression as the synthesis of contradictions found in earlier modes, he deliberately avoids seeking external, nontextual causes for changes in historical expressions. While he will occasionally refer to the specific historical position of an author, Kamei is mainly concerned with demonstrating that the history of modes of expression can be explained through very close readings of the literary texts involved, picking slowly through the tensions and contradictions internal to each (an approach, as Kamei notes, that he developed out of the work of Yoshimoto Takaaki). In this, he is critical of what he sees as Karatani's superficial readings of many of the same works.

This is not to say that Kamei's work lacks a political or historical dimension. In fact, the arguments made here bear tremendous implications for intellectual and social history. In the second chapter, for example, Kamei critiques the form of sensibility and subjectivity created in the political novels of the 1870s and 1880s for mistakenly confusing Japanese national liberation with

imperial expansion, a sensibility that leads ultimately to the travel writing depicted in the twelfth chapter, when writers describe the "natives" of Japan's future empire in brutally prejudiced language. Likewise, chapter eleven contains a brilliant exposition of the structure of consciousness of social discrimination against domestic minority groups. But Kamei's commitment to the notion that subjectivity and sensibility inhere in our linguistic expressions, and to the idea that literature is the proper domain for the study of that relationship, leads him consistently to restrict his focus to the literary texts under examination, attempting to carry out a political and ethical critique that is immanent to them.

While Kamei's approach to history is dialectical, he does not see historical development as following a necessary or predetermined path. His readings of early Meiji works revolve around the task of uncovering lost possibilities that were opened by those works, possibilities that were eventually forgotten with the rise of the particular ideology of realism that has dominated modern Japanese literature. But Kamei argues that this rise was in no way inevitable, and he remains attentive to the existence of other possible outcomes for the historical development of expressions. Moreover, as is most apparent in the closing paragraphs of chapter one, Kamei hopes that his own work will form an intervention that will alter the dominant assumptions regarding expressions and subjectivity in late twentieth-century Japan. The book as a whole consists of an extended meditation on the possibilities and stakes of resisting the often unconscious norms for behavior and feeling through which societies discipline individual subjects. In that sense, Kamei's work should be understood as one form of reaction to the perceived collapse of the New Left in 1970s Japan (a position it shares with Karatani's work). As Kamei argues in his preface to this translation, New Left activists attempted to subvert the social order by following the dictates of their own sensibilities, unaware that sensibility was precisely the point at which they had been most effectively socialized into that order.

Their divergent philosophies of history lead Karatani and Kamei to radically different conceptions of modernity. In a sense, their clash anticipates the debate over modern visuality that would be carried out in the 1980s and 1990: by Jonathan Crary and Martin Jay.⁵ For Karatani, Japan's modernity is marked by ideological interpolation into a new Cartesian subjectivity of interiority, one

5. I am indebted to Thomas LaMarre for this insight. See his "The Deformation of the Modern Spectator: Synaesthesia, Cinema, and the Spectre of Race in Tanizaki," *Japan Forum* 11: (1999): 23–42. For a condensed form of this debate, see Hal Foster, ed., *Vision and Visuality* (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988). For more detailed versions of the respective arguments, see Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and Jonathan Crary *Techniques of the Observer* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1990).

marked by an unbreachable gap between a gazing subject and its object. It is something to be subjected to ruthless critique, its naturalized assumptions turned on their head and exposed. For Kamei, modernity means something quite different, beginning with its characteristic subjectivity. For Kamei, modern subjectivity follows not so much a Cartesian dualistic model as it does a phenomenological model, one that involves a stronger sense of continuity and dynamic relationality between subject and object. The in-itself of the object and the for-itself of consciousness are necessarily in sympathetic communion.⁶ Moreover, for Kamei intersubjective factors are always fundamentally constitutive of the subject-object relation. Hence, whereas Karatani in his brilliant critique of landscape focuses on the binary split between gazing subject and its object, for Kamei, the verbal description of landscape is always a tri-polar relationship. It involves the gazing narrator, the object of the gaze, and the reader/listener to whom the narrator speaks. To narrate is to establish a community, and so Kamei's argument about landscape is also an argument about what sort of community modern societies should establish.

Accordingly, for Kamei, modernity represents not so much something to be rejected, but an as yet unfulfilled possibility, one that the rise of "modern Japanese literature" has (perhaps only temporarily) delayed. In short, Kamei presents us with something like the "incomplete modernity" seen in the work of such figures as Maruyama Masao, except that Kamei implies that the incomplete project of modernity is not limited to Japan, but something that Japan shares with the rest of the "modern" world. If anything, in Kamei's argument, the unique particularity of Japan's modernity harbors important lessons for the West and other regions suffering through the crisis of modernity.

Already, this suggests that, like "modernity," the meaning of the word "Japan" is quite different for Karatani and Kamei. Karatani's critique of modernity includes a skeptical view of the notion of a unified Japanese cultural identity as one of the invented traditions used to legitimate the modern nation-state. As a result, Karatani tends to stress the erasure of cultural diversity that accompanied the rise of modern Japan. Accordingly, Karatani foregrounds the similar constructions of identity, both subjective and national, that mark the various

6. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), 212–15. For example, contrast Karatani's assertion of the subject in landscape as "the 'inner man,' who appears to be indifferent to his external surroundings" (Karatani, *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature*, 25), one that has withdrawn from the outside world, to Merleau-Ponty's assertion that "As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not *set over against it* as an acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue such as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it 'thinks itself within me,' I am the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself; my consciousness is saturated with this limitless blue" (214).

Meiji writers he discusses: "it becomes clear beyond any doubt that what *all* of the writers of the 1890s encountered was 'landscape'" (Karatani, *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature*, 31; emphasis added). Kamei, on the other hand, criticizes Karatani sharply for ignoring the substantial differences that distinguish various genres, authors, and modes of expression. Kamei undertakes the task of delineating the heterogeneity of Meiji literature (though he is also concerned with arranging that heterogeneity into a sort of dialectical narrative, and though he links all of these various genres on a single ground, the presumed identity of the Japanese language). Nonetheless, in Kamei's sense of crisis regarding the state of modern literature, expressed eloquently in the opening pages of the book, we see many similarities with Karatani's belief that modernity has brought about an erasure of heterogeneity within Japan. As Kamei notes in the closing pages of the book, despite his disagreements with Karatani, they do share a number of similar concerns: What distinguishes them, of course, is the very different methodologies they adopt to approach those concerns, above all Kamei's insistence that any effective critique of Japan's modernity must be an immanent critique, one that arises from within the specificity of the actual experiences of that modernity.

* * * * *

A number of keywords are central to Kamei's argument. Kamei discusses several of them in his preface to this edition. Here, I will take up a few others to explain the translations of them that appear here and to situate them at least provisionally within the philosophical traditions of phenomenology. The discussion of each will inevitably circle back to connect with the others, and in those connections I hope to clarify the system, or more precisely, the complex process that Kamei describes in this work.

Visual intentionality (shikōsei): This is a neologism coined by taking the existing Japanese philosophical term for intentionality (*shikō*) and replacing its first character (*shi* or *hodokosu*: to will) with a homophonous character meaning "to see." (When Kamei uses the conventional term, we have translated it as "intention" or "intentionality"). Intentionality is, of course, one of the keywords of phenomenology, arising from Husserl's insistence that our consciousness is always consciousness of something, that it always involves a dynamic, *intentional* relationship with its object. But what is visual intentionality?

As Kamei notes in an earlier book, he was not the coiner of this word.⁷ When he encountered the word, it seemed a useful tool for resolving a certain dissatisfaction he felt with the theories of J.P. Sartre and Yoshimoto Takaaki.

7. See Kamei Hideo, *Shintai: hyōgen no hajimari* (Tokyo: Renga Shobō Shinsha, 1982), 244–48.

Sartre, in theorizing imagination, had presumed that when, for example, we perceive four lines jotted on a piece of paper as a human face, a two-stage process had occurred: four lines were perceived by the senses, and then an image of a face was produced through imagination. Kamei's dissatisfaction lay in his belief that, in fact, our visual sense perception always imposes an order on the objects it perceives; the realization that what exists on the paper are only four lines, not a face, can only be achieved afterward, through reflection. That is to say, we are able to achieve through reflection an awareness of the actual elements constituting our perception, as they existed before they were organized into an object of our perception. This reflection can in turn lead to an abstract awareness of the structure of our own perception. Sartre was, according to Kamei, uninterested in this process, a process that is very much the subject of the present book. Likewise, Kamei felt dissatisfied with Yoshimoto's theory of self-expression (*jiko hyōshutsu*), the for-itself aspect of language for the speaking subject that Yoshimoto argued was the primary fount of poetic activity. This theory too neglected the process of reflective consciousness necessary for an awareness of this aspect to become possible.

What was needed to address this problem was a word that would express the active role of the eye itself in organizing perception, prior to any intentional conscious processing of the visual image. While seeking such a word, Kamei happened to read Takeuchi Yoshimoto's afterword to his 1971 Japanese translation of Trần Đức Thảo's *Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism*. There, Takeuchi expressed his dissatisfaction with the standard Japanese translations for a number of terms from the vocabulary of Western phenomenology. For example, the French *viser* ("to sight," as in aiming a weapon) from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty was generally translated as *nerau* ("to aim at"). Noting that *viser* was frequently used as a French translation for Husserl's *hinblicken* ("to look at" or "to look toward"), Takeuchi argues that *nerau* lacks the proper nuance of turning one's eyes toward something and proposes using the neologism *shikō* instead, which had previously been coined by translators of Husserl (in fact, though, Kamei notes, Takeuchi did not use this phrase in his translation).

Accordingly, "visual intentionality" (a phrase more awkward in English than it is in Japanese) here refers to the ways in which our visual perception organizes its objects, even before they become objects of intentional consciousness. It expresses the way in which vision is always "already inhabited by a meaning (*sens*) which gives it a function in the spectacle of the world and in our existence."⁸ As we will see below, this makes it a fundamental aspect of what Kamei calls "sensibility."

8. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 52.

Mode of expression or *expression* (*hyōgen*): The word *hyōgen* has long been used in Japanese literary criticism to indicate the style of language characteristic of a specific work or author. The word signifies both a particular style of expression (hence, "mode of expression") and the actual language itself (as in the English, "a particularly apt expression"), either a passage from a given work or the entire work itself. It is similar to the French *écriture* as used in recent literary criticism.

In Kamei's work, *hyōgen* is distinguished from another word that is usually translated "expression," *hyōshutsu*, used, as we have seen, by Yoshimoto Takaaki. (Here, we have translated both as "expression," but we provide a parenthetical gloss in passages that specifically discuss *hyōshutsu*.) As Kamei notes in his introduction, he is influenced by Yoshimoto's work on the history of *hyōshutsu* but wants to distance himself from the notion inherent in *hyōshutsu* of an interior self that pre-exists its manifestation, its outward expression, in speech and writing. Hence, Kamei's *hyōgen* is closer to the "expression" as used, for example, by Merleau-Ponty in his philosophy of language. Merleau-Ponty argues that we should seek not a thinking subject but rather a speaking subject:

... consciousness is inseparable from its expression (consequently, it is inseparable from the cultural whole of its milieu). There is no radical difference between consciousness of self and consciousness of other people. [...] There is no consciousness behind the manifestations. These manifestations are inherent in consciousness: they are consciousness.⁹

For both Kamei and Merleau-Ponty, because we come to self-consciousness only through the language that we share with others, the subject produced through language is inherently intersubjective, a subject with others. Moreover, since the subject is produced through expressions, a change in mode of expression necessarily means a change in our self-consciousness—and in our way of relating to others. Repeatedly in the present work, Kamei argues that the appearance of a single word, or of a particular phrase, in the inner or outer speech of a certain character produces, by a kind of introjection and internalization, a shift in that character's self-consciousness. The character is forced to recognize him or herself as the sort of subject who would utter that word or phrase, a shift that then ripples out to alter the perceptions and expressions of other characters, the narrator, and even the author. Accordingly, when Kamei traces through a vari-

9. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, trans. Hugh J. Silverman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 46–47. Merleau-Ponty is here summarizing the thought of Max Scheler, with whom he is largely in sympathy.

ety of modes of expressions, he is tracing through a history of different possible modes for self-consciousness and for intersubjective existence that are realized in the various works he analyzes here.

One of the most interesting critiques of Kamei's book implicitly takes up the problem of "expression." Mitani Kuniaki, a brilliant scholar of classical literature, agrees that subjectivity is produced through linguistic expressions but argues that Kamei's analysis of the expressions of modern fiction overlooks the central problem of temporality.¹⁰ It is the use of the "past tense" verb ending *-ta* that is the key to expression and subjectivity in modern fiction, Mitani argues. In conversational Japanese, one can use *-ta* forms in relation to one's own past internal experiences (e.g., *Sō omotta*: I thought it so), but one needs to add a conjectural suffix when reporting past experiences of others (*Kare wa sō omotta darō*: He thought it so, I suppose). In modern realistic fiction, however, the narrator can make this sort of impossible, omniscient statement (*Kare wa sō omotta*: He thought it so). Hence, in the expression of modern fiction, *-ta* signals readers that they are entering the domain of fiction, where ordinary rules of conversational usage no longer apply.¹¹ Mitani argues that *-ta* also enacts the unification of the text around a single, monological voice, that it constructs the fiction of an "author" as the subject who unifies the text, thereby eliding the free play of multiple voices that characterized earlier fiction. The real significance of Futabatei's *Ukigumo*, Mitani argues, is its gradual shift from a predominantly present-tense narration, one reminiscent of late-Edo *gesaku*, to a past-tense narration marked by this *-ta* form, a shift that coincides with an increasing capacity for omniscient representation of characters' inner thoughts. Moreover, the significance of later works by such authors as Mori Ōgai, Kōda Rohan, and Higuchi Ichiyō lies not, à la Kamei, in their contribution to the unfolding of this modern mode of expression but rather in their resistance to it: by composing works in the *bungotai* literary language, rather than the new *genbun itchi* style with its characteristic *-ta* forms, they sought to preserve the play of polyphony in their works against the rising hegemony of works unified around the "author."

Mitani's criticism provides an attractive alternative reading of early Meiji works, while pointing out certain omissions in Kamei's work—though in

10. Mitani Kuniaki, "Kindai shōsetsu no gensetsu: joshō," in *Kindai bungaku no seiritsu*, ed. Komori Yōichi (Tokyo: Yūseidō, 1986), 118–28. Kamei's rebuttal to Mitani, "Wajutsu no yukue," can also be found in the same volume, 129–41. Mitani's essay was first published in *Nihon bungaku* 33:7 (July 1984); Kamei's essay was first published in *Bungaku* 53:11 (November 1985).

11. For a useful explanation of this and other problems of the rhetoric for modern fictional narratives in Japan, see Edward Fowler, *The Rhetoric of Confession* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

fact, while Kamei may not stress the temporal aspects of expressions, temporality is implicitly inherent to the notion of expression.¹² But what we see perhaps most clearly in the debate between the two figures are different stances toward modernity and modern subjectivity. While many readers will likely share Mitani's desire for a more critical stance toward modernity on Kamei's part, it also seems to me that Mitani fails to consider the ways in which such "traditional," non *genbun itchi* writers actively participated in the rise of modernity in Japan. There is nothing so central to modernity, after all, as invented traditions, especially those characterized by nostalgia for an imagined past of undisciplined, utopian playfulness. Moreover, in his critique of the supposedly monologic qualities of the *-ta* writing style, Mitani must ignore the materiality of language, its inherent polysemy, in order to stress its functioning at the conscious level of meaning.

This is a significant omission, because in Kamei's argument, the impact of a certain mode of expression is in many ways preconscious and occurs at the level of materiality. According to Merleau-Ponty, expressions characteristic of a given social group organize the perceptions of the members of that group. This is not so much a matter of the level of meaning, but at the nonsemantic level of phonetics. An infant who learns to repeat certain rhythms and accentuations, modulations of speech, without yet understanding the semantic content of that speech, is already acquiring certain flexible patterns for making differentiations, for organizing raw experience into perception, and for adopting certain affective and judgmental attitudes toward the objects of perception. The very organs of the child's body are being rewritten to produce only certain kinds of perceptions. This is just as true of adults: encountering an expression provokes a reorganization of one's own body, as one reorients oneself to follow the gestural intent immanent in the words of the expression.¹³

12. Expressions are objectifications of "sensibility" (defined at length below), the institutionalized form that molds our perceptions, and perception as defined in the phenomenological tradition is something that always takes place within a doubled temporal horizon of recollection and anticipation, of "retention" and "protention." See Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 69. See, for example, Kamei's explication of Masaoka Shiki's theory of "time haiku" in chapter eleven of the present work.

13. "There is, then, a taking up of others' thought through speech, a reflection in others, an ability to think *according to others* which enriches our own thoughts. Here the meaning of words must be finally induced by the words themselves, or more exactly, their conceptual meaning must be formed by a kind of deduction from a *gestural meaning*, which is immanent in speech. And as, in a foreign country, I begin to understand the meaning of words through their place in a context of action, and by taking part in a communal life—in the same way an as yet imperfectly understood piece of philosophical writing discloses to me at least a certain 'style'—either a Spinozist, critical or phenomenological one—which is the first draft of its meaning. I begin to understand a philosophy by feeling my way into its existential manner, by reproducing the tone and accent of the philosopher" (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 179).

Perception, then, is not a natural but a cultural or intersubjective process, spread contagiously through the culture of expressions.

The angry Japanese smiles, the westerner goes red and stamps his foot or else goes pale and hisses his words. It is not enough for two conscious subjects to have the same organs and nervous system for the same emotions to produce in both the same signs. What is important is how they use their bodies, the simultaneous patterning of body and world in emotion. [. . .] It is no more natural, and no less conventional, to shout in anger or to kiss in love than to call a table 'table.' Feelings and passional conduct are invented like words. Even those which, like paternity, seem to be part and parcel of the human make-up are in reality institutions. It is impossible to superimpose on man a lower layer of behaviour which one chooses to call 'natural,' followed by a manufactured cultural or spiritual world. (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 189)

On similar grounds, Kamei critiques the notion of preserving supposedly untouched "nature," be it inner nature or external nature, as the regnant motif in modern Japanese literature.¹⁴

To put it simply, for Mitani the problem with modern expressions is the hegemony of cogito, the severing of mind from body in the symbolic order, a break established with the *-ta* suffix. But for Kamei, the problem is to achieve an accurate description of the fluid relationship between mind and body in experience, of the continuing connection between the realms of the imaginary and the symbolic in expressions. Our bodies, like our minds, are social products, molded through our expressions into a "sensibility" that itself is something like a language. This brings us to the next keyword in the book.

Sensibility (kansei): "Sensibility," one of the central themes in this book, is, as James Fujii notes, "an elusive term that overlaps such notions as sensitivity, sensual awareness, sensibility, and consciousness."¹⁵ The term has a long usage in the Western philosophical tradition, especially in aesthetics, the branch of philosophy concerned with linking body and mind, subject and object, perception and reason, self and other. As Alexander Baumgarten, one of the founders of this "science of the concrete" vowed, "Science is not to be dragged down to

14. Merleau-Ponty similarly argues elsewhere that "it is impossible to establish a cleavage between what will be 'natural' in the individual and what will be acquired from his social upbringing. In reality the two orders are not distinct; they are part and parcel of a single global phenomenon." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," trans. William Cobb, in *The Primacy of Perception* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 96–155. This passage appears on 108.

15. James Fujii, *Complicit Fictions: The Subject in the Modern Japanese Prose Narrative* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 58.

the region of sensibility, but the sensible is to be lifted to the dignity of knowledge."¹⁶ For aestheticians, the notion of sensibility has implied a harmonious agreement between sense perceptions, aesthetic judgments, and rational intellect.

Sensibility has also been a key term in philosophies of subjectivity. For Kant, sensibility was the faculty that produced mental representations of external objects (unknowable in themselves); it was contrasted to the faculties of the intellect and understanding, which analyzed and judged those representations. Sensibility produced the sensual appearance or mental representation of an external object, its phenomenon, as distinguished from the noumenon, the unknowable thing-in-itself.¹⁷ In a sense, Kamei's project has a Kantian bent to it: it aims at demonstrating how a knowledge not of the object-in-itself, but rather of the sensibility through which we perceive objects, can become an object for reflective consciousness. Like Kant, Kamei is interested in defining the limits of the proper domain of sensibility.

But there is also a pronounced Hegelian dimension to Kamei's usage of the term. Whereas for Kant, sensibility was a universal feature of the working of the human mind, for Hegel (and for Marx, as well as for the later phenomenologists), sensibility was perceived more properly as a historical product, taking particular forms in specific communities at specific historical moments. The values and affects we share with those around us shape our perceptions of the outside world and structure the everyday practices that make up our culture.¹⁸ Sensibility was in many ways the invisible bond that linked communities together; it was the internalized, organic mechanism of culture. Hence, Kamei's project, as is clear from the title of this book, is a history of changing sensibility in the literature of the Meiji period, and he shares with Merleau-Ponty and others a sense that only a return to the level of pre-analytical perception will allow us to understand subjectivities in their concrete historical situations.

Among the more immediate Japanese predecessors of Kamei who also use the term "sensibility" are Yoshimoto Takaaki, whose work Kamei discusses at length in his preface, and Nakamura Yūjirō. In *The Awakening of Sensibility (Kansei no kakusei, 1975)*, Nakamura argues that the crisis of modern society can be overcome only by restoring the passions and sensibility to their rightful place in philosophy as well as in daily life. An excessive emphasis on rationalism, without regard for its connection to affect and sensibility, a privileging of

16. Quoted in Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), 17.

17. Cf. the discussion of the noumenon as "a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility" in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Modern Library, 1958), 155. I am indebted to Joseph Murphy for calling my attention to this passage and its relevance to Kamei's argument.

18. See Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, esp. 120–52.

mind over body, has resulted not only in the environmental disaster of a devastated nature, but also an impoverishment of human nature. Reason and sensibility are not to be opposed, Nakamura argues, but rather reconnected, by way of a reconsideration of the role of language. Likewise, nature and culture—our learned customs or “second nature”—are to be reunited, and through such an exploration, we are to learn how our embodied sensibility is not only a social product but also one that is, à la Lacan, structured like a language. Nakamura concludes his book with a call for revitalizing our sensibilities, one that echoes throughout Kamei's work:

But when our sensibility is systematized and structured like a language, then even when we feel things or harbor mental images, we are unable to escape the domination of a habitualized, rigidified linguistic system. But at the same time, out of this we are able to detect the systematic, rigid character of our way of feeling and of our mental images, we can grasp with our own eyes our ways of feeling and of imagining, we can remake and renew them, we can reassemble their hitherto existing forms of combination, and thereby live out more fully those ways of feeling and images we have accumulated in the past, while at the same time opening up a new path to a rich creativity. In this, the grasping of our own language and our way of feeling things, together with our detecting the systematicity of the “natural,” do we not find the most effective strategy to employ against domination at the hands of an otherwise invisible sensibility?¹⁹

Sensibility, then, is a site whereby knowledge is linked to affect, and mind to body, where the sense perceptions presented to our conscious mind arrive already embedded within a network of social meanings. In that sense, Kamei follows that “broad movement in the history of philosophy [. . .] which has interrogated the primacy of consciousness or experience in conceptions of subjectivity and displaced the privilege of these terms by focusing on the body as a sociocultural artifact rather than as a manifestation or externalization of what is private, psychological, and ‘deep’ in the individual.”²⁰ As one of the pioneers of what came to be known as the “theory of embodiedness” (*shintairon*) in Japan, Kamei in this book is very much writing a critical history of the senses, and attempting to trace out (while remaining immanent to them) their connections to consciousness, rational knowledge, and ethicality.

19. Nakamura Yūjirō, *The Awakening of Sensibility (Kansei no kakusei)* [1975], reprinted in *Jōnen ron*, vol. 1 of *Nakamura Yūjirō chosakushū*, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), 77–353. This quotation appears on 352.

20. Elizabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 115.

Immanent, non-person narrator (naizaiteki muninshō katarite): Kamei's entire argument revolves around the production of the narrator characteristic of modern fiction. In fact, he argues that the unification of a literary work around a single, consistent focal center is perhaps *the* defining feature that distinguishes modern literature in Japan from its predecessors.²¹ As is well known, the *genbun itchi* movement of the Meiji period called for a reform in literary language, including the replacement of *bungotai*, the classical literary writing style, with a more colloquial style. Numerous late Edo works had already reproduced colloquial language in passages of spoken dialogue; what was new in Meiji was experimentation with colloquial language in what is called *ji no bun* in Japanese, the passages attributed not to one of the characters in the work but rather to the narrator—the passages of narratorial “background” against which the “figure” of spoken dialogue emerges. This in turn, according to Kamei, led to the rise of a new writing style for depicting spoken dialogue, one which respected the individuality of diverse speaking voices yet refracted them through the unifying consciousness of a single narrator.

The rise of a new kind of subjectivity in Meiji literature was, then, the production of a new kind of narrator. Moreover, as Kamei notes, the narrator of a literary work is involved not merely as a subject gazing at its object, but also as a speaking subject who narrates to other subjects—it is inherently an intersubjective being whose words effect a certain kind of communal bond with others. Accordingly, Kamei in this work frequently investigates the relationship established in various works between the narrator (*katarite*) and that narrator's implicit or explicit auditor (*kikite*).²²

In essence, in Kamei's argument, phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny: he uses the processes leading to subject formation in the child as theorized by such figures as Piaget, Merleau-Ponty, and Vygotsky as a framework to explore the

21. Tomiko Yoda pointed out to me the similarities between Kamei's non-person narrator and the “fourth-person narrator” that Yokomitsu Riichi discusses in his essay, “On Pure Fiction” (“Junsui shōsetsu ron,” 1935), which Kamei cites in chapter one of this work. Yokomitsu posits the fourth-person narrator as the necessary voice for the modern novel, in which the author must create a means for pulling together the multiple levels of consciousness and self-consciousness that characterize self-reflexive modern existence.

22. In fact, the above-mentioned debate between Kamei and Mitani revolves largely around their different conceptions of the mode of reception of the literary text. Mitani focuses on the ability of an external reader to identify with the sensibility objectified within the world of the text via the narrator's words, while Kamei focuses on the point of contact between that narrator's words and the auditor, the implied listener that those words project as an active participant within the scene of narration (an imaginary process that in turn can reshape the sensibilities of actual readers). See Komori Yōichi, “Kaisetsu,” in *Kindai bungaku no seiritsu*, ed. Komori Yōichi (Tokyo: Yuseidō, 1986), 249–63, esp. 258–59.

formation of modern writing styles in Meiji Japan. Kamei uses these to explain the characteristics of what he calls the “non-person narrator” found in many early Meiji works, including the opening chapters of Futabatei’s *Ukigumo*. This narrator differs from that found in earlier *gesaku* works of prose fiction and yet is not assimilable to the categories of narrator type (first- or third-person) that would be established with the rise of realism. It adopts the lively, sarcastic tone characteristic of Edo *gesaku* narrators, yet is spatially positioned within the scene described, unlike the typical third-person narrator or the earlier *gesaku* narrators, who were situated in a transcendent exterior space. While it is spatially immanent to the scene, this narrator remains invisible to the other characters in the text—unlike the typical first-person narrator. Moreover, this narrator is not omniscient; it is unable to fathom the thoughts or emotions of the characters it depicts. And this narrator’s sensibility often renders it unsympathetic to the novel’s protagonist, even as they occupy the same spatial setting.

This narrator, who had disappeared from Japanese fiction by early in the twentieth century, is fundamental to Kamei’s argument because it represents a rough equivalent to the mirror stage in theories of subjectivity. As Kamei notes in his introduction, he encountered the notion of the mirror stage not in the works of Lacan, but in the phenomenology of Miura Tsutomu and Merleau-Ponty. According to those theories, the infant child begins to emerge into the position of an ego, a subject, by locating outside of itself an ideal image of its own coherence, in the specular image of its own body that it sees projected in the mirror. This fantasy image then carries forward the process of constructing the fragmented body into what Lacan calls an “orthopaedic” whole.²³ By identifying itself with this image, the child also begins the leap into self-awareness, because it can now demarcate its own body from other bodies and from the external world (even as this image comes into the self from outside).

I gradually become aware of my body, of what radically distinguishes it from the other’s body, at the same time that I begin to live my intentions in the facial expressions of the other and likewise begin to live the other’s volitions in my own gestures. The progress of the child’s experience results in his seeing that his body is, after all, closed in on itself. In particular, the visual image he acquires of his own body (especially from the mirror) reveals to him a hitherto unsuspected isolation of two subjects who are facing each other. The objectification of his own body discloses to the child his difference, his ‘insularity,’ and, correlatively, that of others. (Merleau-Ponty, “Child’s Relations,” 119)

23. Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 4.

The child comes to recognize itself not only in the image, but also as the “real” self who gazes at the image: the beginning of its “split subjectivity.” The child also here begins the process of moving from a specular self toward a fully socialized self, because it realizes that the mirror image represents its self as viewed from the position of others.²⁴ That is to say, it comes to recognize the existence of others as other, beings with their own sensibilities and consciousnesses.

The child reaches the final stage of subjectivity through the acquisition of socialized language, which again requires the child to project itself into the position of the other who gazes back at the self. In using language, I must place myself into the slot opened up for a speaking subject in language, an external place that can be occupied by anyone. I must simultaneously occupy the position of the I and of the other who gazes at me, of the I who enunciates and of the I about whom the enunciation is made. What emerges is a socialized split subject, and the mirror stage is the key step in its emergence.

Kamei argues here that the non-person narrator of early Meiji resembles the mirror stage of psychoanalysis and phenomenology. Early authors such as Futabatei and the authors of the political novels discussed in chapters two and three discovered in their narrators a kind of ego ideal. A new kind of self-awareness was now possible, one that was intimately connected with notions of democracy and national solidarity promoted by activists in the People’s Rights Movement of the 1870s and 1880s. But these authors and their readers quickly became dissatisfied with this narrator, because it failed to establish the sort of intersubjective relationship with others that was needed. As Kamei argues, the sensibility of the narrator in the early chapters of *Ukigumo*, for example, renders it unsympathetic to the novel’s protagonist. Even as Futabatei identified with it, he was forced to step back from this ego ideal, to recognize it as such and to acquire conscious knowledge of the sensibility that shaped its perceptions. This split self-consciousness in turn allowed him (and other authors) to reshape the narrator, to relativize its position against the objects it cognized and against the words of others. This very process, the splitting off of one’s own ideal image from one’s consciousness of that image, a process that necessarily involved a growing awareness of one’s own sensibility (and that of others), became the proper theme of modern literature. New ethical and creative possibilities were born—and almost as quickly lost, when after the emergence of Natu-

24. Note that for Kamei, as for Merleau-Ponty and Vygotsky, the child is from the beginning socialized, since the very perceptions through which it sees the mirror image are mediated by sensibility, and also because the child before the mirror stage is not an individualized subject but “an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life” (Merleau-Ponty, “Child’s Relations,” 119). But it is only after emerging into language and the ethicality of a self-consciousness that knows itself to be with others, that it can be called a socialized *subject*.

ralism and the I-novel in the early 1900s, the subject that emerged from this historical unfolding became naturalized, internalized, and accepted as a universally given entity with an unchanging sensibility.

It is the immanent non-person narrator that provides the key to Kamei's readings of early Meiji texts. It is also the key to the critiques he makes of numerous linguistic and literary theorists of subjectivity. Kamei argues that they ignore the mediating role of the narrator in the subject/object relations that are established in literary texts: in their rush to explore the terrain of the symbolic order of language, they are too eager to skip over the imaginary aspects of subject formation that arise during the mirror stage and continue to color linguistic expressions. Conversely, theories of visual subjectivity (including Karatani's "landscape") ignore the mediating ear and voice of the narrator's words. The non-person narrator, with its distinct sensibility, links voice and gaze in its expressions and functions to mediate authorial subjectivity.

The centrality of the narrator to Kamei's argument has been one source of criticism of the present book. Should we assume that the narrative passages in a given work are produced through a single coherent subject position, even one as nuanced, historicized, and socialized as is Kamei's non-person narrator? As James Fujii notes, "Kamei runs the risk of essentializing a different subject that is defined not so much in terms of flesh and bone as the locus of perception and sensibilities" (Fujii, *Complicit Fictions*, 61). Such concerns led subsequent scholarship in Japan, especially in the work of Komori Yōichi, to focus not so much on the narrator (*katarite*) as on the narration (*kataru*). Moreover, we might also ask whether the narrator in a literary text can actually function as the ego ideal for its author, the author's split subject, or whether that ego ideal must lie at yet another level, beyond the explicitly designated narrator. Nonetheless, Kamei's creative deployment of the idea of non-person narrator, a brilliant theoretical innovation in literary analysis, allows him a new language by which to connect the unique specificity of early Meiji literature to broader theoretical questions and thereby to reveal how those texts challenge unspoken assumptions that underlie much structuralist and formalist criticism. It is a strategic move that makes the present work literary criticism in the best sense of that term.

* * * * *

Our goal in translating the work was to provide the most useful and readable English-language version possible, one that whenever possible clarified the more elusive passages in the Japanese original and that included supplemental information that the original assumes its reader already possesses. Nonetheless, we have repeatedly had to bend the English language in an attempt to echo the

reverberations that are set off in Japanese by Kamei's unique language, as well as by the various Meiji-period texts he quotes. But all translations are of course betrayals, and with a work as dense and as dependent on the resources of the Japanese language as is this one, this is all the more true. We highly recommend that anyone deeply interested in the complexities of Kamei's argument should return to the Japanese-language text and create his or her own translation.

All footnotes in the translation have been added by the translators and editor, except where noted. The brief summaries that precede each chapter are by the editor. We have also added citations for works quoted, which the original, following standard publishing practices in Japan, did not include. When the work quoted has appeared in English translation, we have cited that translation, although we have often modified the translations. Such modifications are not meant as criticisms or corrections of the published translations, but rather were necessary in order to highlight in English more clearly the specific points that Kamei discusses in his readings. For works not previously translated, we have cited modern reprint editions where they exist, particularly the *Meiji bungaku zenshū* (abbreviated as *MBZ* in citations), the most complete and widely available collection of Meiji-period writing. For works not included in that edition, we have cited other modern editions when available. Also, in quotations, to avoid confusion with ellipses as used in Meiji fiction, we have used brackets to distinguish ellipses that mark omissions from the quoted source.

I would like to thank a few of the many persons who have contributed to this project. First of all, on behalf of all the translators, I would like to thank Prof. Kamei, not only for writing such a brilliant and challenging book, but also for answering literally hundreds of questions about the text over the four years the project required. His prompt and lucid responses to our many queries, and his careful attention to the translated texts, have contributed enormously to whatever value this translation may have. Secondly, I would like to thank the many translators who contributed their labor and intellect (and sensibilities) to this project for their fine work and patience throughout the lengthy editing process. I learned a great deal from each of you. Satoko Ogura has, as always, contributed to my work here in countless ways, large and small. I also thank my colleagues and graduate students at UCLA, who have read over and provided helpful comments on various sections of this manuscript, in particular Seiji Lippit, Shu-mei Shih, Shoichi Iwasaki, Michael Marra, and David Schaberg. Two graduate student research assistants at UCLA, Wengxia Peng and Leslie Winston, performed herculean tasks in tracking down citations, locating texts and preexisting translations, and in untying the many knots that were encountered in the editing process. I also thank Wengxia Peng for her invaluable help in translating the *kanbun* passages from chapters one and twelve. Numerous

conversations with Naoki Sakai, Thomas LaMarre, K. Mark Anderson, Murai Osamu, and Takahashi Akinori have also helped me understand this work and guided my editing, even if they were not direct participants in the project. Work on this project was also supported by generous grants from the UCLA Academic Senate and the UCLA Center for Japanese Studies. Finally, I would like to thank Bruce E. Willoughby and Leslie Pincus of the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies, as well as the anonymous outside reviewer for the press, for their enthusiastic support of this project, which has made it possible for us to bring Kamei's remarkable work to an English-speaking audience.

Author's Preface to the English Translation

TRANSLATED BY MICHAEL BOURDAGHS

From 1978 to 1982, I published a series of twelve articles in the journal *Gunzō* under the titles "Transformations of Sensibility" ("Kansei no henkaku") and "Transformations of Sensibility Revisited" ("Kansei no henkaku sairon"). In 1983, these were published in book form by Kōdansha under the title *Transformations of Sensibility (Kansei no henkaku)*.

I believe that this work played a certain role in changing the conception of modern literature in Japan and in setting the tendency for the way literature was viewed in the 1980s. At roughly the same time as I was writing this book, new schools of thought were introduced into Japanese literary studies, including the textual theories of structuralism and so-called poststructuralism, and these became major topics of discussion among scholars and critics. As a result, at the time of its publication this book ended up being lumped together with that trend. When I began writing these essays, though, I myself was conscious of no such connection. In fact, I originally conceived of my project as one grounded in theories that had been produced independently in Japan, but because I criticized modern views of literature and advocated a new method for reading, my work was viewed as sharing a common intention with those new methodologies.

In fact, this book at present is out of print and very hard to obtain in Japan, but now Michael Bourdaghs and other young American scholars have undertaken to translate it into English. Hoping this is of interest to American scholars, I would like to take this opportunity to describe the development of what we might call Japan's homegrown theories and methodologies, those that do not consist of the application of imported structuralist or poststructuralist methodologies to Japanese literature.

Chapter Seven
Shinjū as Misdeed: Love Suicides
in Higuchi Ichiyō and Chikamatsu Monzaemon

TRANSLATED BY LEWIS HARRINGTON

In this chapter, Kamei traces through literary portrayals of suicide, from the passion-driven double suicides of Edo-period theater to the suicides of modern, alienated individuals in late Meiji fiction such as Shimazaki Tōson's Spring and Natsume Sōseki's Kokoro. Kamei argues that these novels arose out of a critical reaction to a wave of earlier fiction that narrated love suicides, including Higuchi Ichiyō's "Troubled Waters" and Hirotsu Ryūrō's The Love Suicides at Imado. In examining the "philosophy of suicide" harbored by Ichiyō's story, Kamei argues that the key lies in its mobilization of a second-person narrator. The flow of narration moves seamlessly between various characters' voices (especially since no punctuation is used to distinguish between speakers), weaving their distinct tones into the narration, yet also at the same time maintaining a distanced, effaced position. A dynamic tension between ground (narrative description) and figure (spoken dialogue) is maintained throughout, a technique whose origin Kamei traces to the Edo-period jōruri puppet plays of Chikamatsu Monzaemon. Further ties to Edo-period theatrical genres are brought out through a comparison of Ichiyō's appropriation of the different modes for relating body to voice that characterized jōruri and kabuki. Kamei concludes that what emerges in Ichiyō's heroine is an embodied sensibility that perceives itself as an offense against the social order, but that nonetheless commits itself wholly to that offense, finally to the point of self-destruction.

Most likely, Genshichi asked Oriki to die with him and Oriki was unable to refuse. At least, Higuchi Ichiyō's "Troubled Waters" ("Nigorie," 1895) is writ-

ten in a manner to allow such a reading.¹ As Maeda Ai has vividly analyzed, this is because in Oriki's feeling of ostracization, as if she had been completely cut off from this world, there is certainly "already the portent of a wretched death."²

In the case of Hirotsu Ryūrō's *The Love Suicides at Imado* (*Imado shinjū*, 1896), on the other hand, it is most likely the courtesan Yoshizato who proposes the double suicide.³ With the man she loves having returned to his hometown, Yoshizato lies crying in a room when Zenkichi enters. Zenkichi is a customer whom Yoshizato has repeatedly rejected. Zenkichi says he is visiting her for the last time; even if he wanted to, he will not be able to visit her again; and that being the case, he pleads, will she not be with him for just one night?⁴ Most likely Yoshizato intuits a certain resolve in Zenkichi's words and allows him to stay in the brothel. She sells her clothes, borrows as much as money as she can from her friends in order to pay off Zenkichi's bills, and finally throws herself into the Sumida River together with him.

What a truly miserable way to die!

Death is the only way for the man, Zenkichi, to transcend his oafishness. For the woman, however, the point is not that she loves this man, but rather that she is reduced to such dire circumstances that all she can do is intensify her own unhappiness by surrendering herself to his oafishness. That she has to be accompanied in death by a man she has hated makes her death all the more wretched.

But why did works that described such abject love suicides reach a peak in this age? If such works as Izumi Kyōka's *Noble Blood, Heroic Blood* (*Giketsu kyōketsu*, 1894) and "The Operating Room" ("Gekashitsu," 1895) are also counted, then the end of the third decade of Meiji, that is, the mid-1890s, is certainly the age of love-suicide literature. It is also clear from such works as Natsume Sōseki's "Dew on the Shallots" ("Kairōkō," 1905) and "The Heredity of Taste" ("Shumi no iden," 1906) that a critical transformation of that plot device was a central motif for the literary world in the latter half of Meiji 30s.

1. The conclusion of "Troubled Waters" is ambiguous. Both Oriki, a prized courtesan, and Genshichi, a long-time customer who has declined in the world largely due to the patronage he has lavished on her, are found dead, an apparent double suicide, but Oriki's corpse has been stabbed in the back, as if she had perhaps tried to flee.
2. Maeda Ai, *Higuchi Ichiyō no sekai* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1989), 208.
3. Hirotsu Ryūrō (1861–1928) was an important mid-Meiji novelist, associated with the Ken'yūsha group led by Ozaki Kōyō. Hirotsu is known as the creator of the "tragic novel" (*hisan shōsetsu*) genre through such works as *Cross-Eyed Den* (*Heme-den*, 1895) and *Black Lizard* (*Kurotokage*, 1895). *The Love Suicides at Imado* is his best-known work.
4. Zenkichi has bankrupted his family business in his previously unsuccessful pursuit of Yoshizato and has now even sent his wife back to her parents, suggesting that he has decided upon a desperate course of action.

In my understanding, it was Shimazaki Tōson's *Spring* (*Haru*, 1908) that effected a crucial transformation in the portrayal of suicide.⁵ When viewed as a work that portrays Kitamura Tōkoku's tragic death (suicide) as an intellectual problem, it undoubtedly has certain shortcomings. It is doubtful whether Tōson understood even half of Tōkoku's philosophy. But the point I would like to concentrate on is how *Spring* is written as if Aoki (Tōkoku) proposes the suicide of his entire family because of the strained circumstances of their lives. "Aah, you're a lost cause [*haibokusha*], and I'm a lost cause, too. How about it? Should we do it? Together, you and me. . . ." (*MBZ* 69:106). While the crux of this proposal lies in Aoki's belief that they are all lost causes, his wife Misao does not think of herself in this way. "If we didn't have kids, well then, I wouldn't care how things ended up [. . .] Haven't I suffered enough for your sake, don't I sacrifice everything just to obey your words? Isn't that enough?" (*MBZ* 69:106). For Genshichi in "Troubled Waters" and Zenkichi in *The Love Suicides at Imado*, it is the breakup of their families that triggers their love suicides. But in Aoki's case, it is the opposite: bound up in the logic of household-and-home, he dies a wretched death *within* the family. After his death, Aoki's family refuses to probe the reasons behind the suicide, dismissing it with such comments as "From that time on, Father was crazy" and "Well, even I don't understand" (*MBZ* 69:128). Nonetheless, precisely because that is the case, his suicide must have had a new philosophical meaning. That is to say, the suicide of a person unable to find anyone to share his feelings of being a "lost cause" and who dies a wretched death even within the family corresponds, in terms of the structure of the novel, to a new philosophy: the philosophy of one who dies what is literally an *individual* death, having found no one willing to take up his proposal (his *words*).

That being the case, in the earlier love-suicide fiction, there must also be a corresponding philosophy of the love suicide. The deaths chosen by the men and women in "Troubled Waters" and *The Love Suicides at Imado* are not overtly tied to any particular philosophy, at least in the usual sense of the term. In terms of literary history, following up on the transformation that Tōson's *Spring* effected, Natsume Sōseki in *Kokoro* (1914) advances a new philosophy of suicide: suicide as ethical self-judgment. Moreover, Sōseki understands that everyone shares the potential for being driven to a tragic death within the family, a knowledge that enables him to portray with such a delicate hand the actual

5. *Spring* is an autobiographical novel that depicts Tōson's days as a member of the youthful Romantic school of writers and poets of the mid 1890s. One of its central incidents, as Kamei discusses below, is the suicide of the group's leader, the charismatic Aoki, modeled after Kitamura Tōkoku (1868–94). Following this shock, the novel's protagonist (modeled after Tōson) flirts with the idea of suicide, but finally resolves instead to struggle on and find some meaningful way to live out his own life.

circumstances of modern domestic life. The suicide of Sensei in *Kokoro* accordingly is made into an ethical question, not only in its motives, but in that it carefully excludes any element that could lead to its being interpreted as a death whose cause lies within the family. Sensei's suicide, thus, is planned so as not to burden in any way the remaining members of the family. In that sense, its philosophy of suicide is at the same time a philosophy of the family.

After Tōson's portrayal of the problem within the world of the intellectual classes, the shock value of lower-class love suicides of the type seen in "Troubled Waters" and *The Love Suicides at Imado* abruptly faded. Of course, even in love suicides, a human being can only die an individual death. Nevertheless, in these works we encounter something astonishing: at that time, it was thought reasonable not only for characters to desire someone else to accompany them in death, but also for them to find someone who would actually fulfill that desire. If we could extract the philosophical meaning of the consciousness that marked this earlier form of human relations, it would help clarify the true nature of the literature of Sōseki and others who pursued a critical objectification of it and thereby created a new philosophy of suicide.

One key for solving this problem lies in the notion of being "a lost cause" that was rejected by Aoki's wife in *Spring*. Genshichi and Zenkichi, both "lost causes" in the sense of being unable to maintain their families and households, seek fellow travelers for their self-punishment in prostitutes, women alienated from the norms of domestic life, the roles of bearing and raising children. And these prostitutes are in fact posited as the root cause of the destruction of the families of Genshichi and Zenkichi. If that is the case, then what kind of beings are Oriki and Yoshizato?

In her writing style, Higuchi Ichiyō makes clear that they are beings who can live only in the world of the second-person.

* * * * *

In a rare move, Ichiyō opens "Troubled Waters" by describing the characters' voices. While I do not know the extent to which this was a consciously chosen methodology, this mode of writing does result in the birth of a characteristically second-person writing style, one that continually invokes the presence of a "you."

What is first heard in the work is the coquettish voice of a woman trying to stop men in a vulgarly frank tone of voice, a "harangue" marked by an exaggerated familiarity.⁶ The men, however, run off to the public bath, and as

the woman then enters the shop, stepping over its threshold, she angrily grumbles, "They won't come back later. They've no intention of coming. Once they get married, that's the end of it." Then, from inside the shop, another woman says "Otaka, you're really talkative, aren't you," and this launches us into a depiction of the world of the women inside the shop. Note that the author limits her perspective of expression to the inside of the shop, delineating a mode of life that can be seen and heard only within its threshold.

But this is not the only limitation the author imposes on herself.

"I suppose I'll have to stand out in front again tonight, trying to snare a customer. What kind of life is this?" In a fit of anger, she sat down in front of the shop and kicked at the earthen floor with her sandals. She was a woman of perhaps twenty-seven, perhaps thirty. She had plucked her eyebrows and painted a dark line in their place and had outlined her widow's peak in black. A thick layer of powder covered her face. Her lips were rouged a shade of crimson so deep they lost their charm and suggested more a man-eating dog than a courtesan. ("Troubled Waters," 218)

This is a portrayal of the woman called Otaka. But when the narrator, who is immanent to the depicted scene, portrays Otaka's manner of speaking, the narrator's own manner of speaking—that is, the tone of voice in the passages of narrative description (*ji no bun*)—becomes homogenized with Otaka's. This narrator, who critically depicts with an ironic eye the women of the shop, takes on the same meddlesome and bitter tone of voice that marks the other women. The narrator, of course, does not appear as a character in the scene, but her mode of expression is like that of, for example, a woman hired as kitchen-help who gazes with a critical eye at the goings on.

The house was a two-story building twelve-feet wide in front. A festival lantern hung beneath the eaves, and a little pile of salt, good for luck, invoked prosperity. Bottles of one of the better brands of saké lined the shelf above the bar, but whether there was anything in them was another question. Now and then came busy sounds of someone starting a fire in the clay stove in the kitchen. At best, one might expect a chowder or a stew, served up by the lady who owned the place, although, according to the sign in front, the house aspired to the status of a full-fledged restaurant. What on earth would they do if someone actually came and ordered something? They could hardly claim to have just run out of their entire stock. Nor would it do to fall back on the excuse that they were only in the business of entertaining men. A good thing people seemed to know better! No one was boorish enough to order any side dishes. ("Troubled Waters," 219)

6. All quotations from "Troubled Waters" are adapted from the translation of the story that appears in Robert Lyons Danly, *In the Shade of Spring Leaves* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 218–40. The passage discussed here appears on 218.

This passage introduces the inner conditions of the shop with an ironic eye, showing how they are engaged in a rather dubious business, but the mode of expression itself negotiates some dubious territory. This is because the tone that appears here is like that of a woman who, conscious of the gaze of outsiders, has objectified the situation of her own kind, and who accordingly addresses her coworkers with a mixture of self-scorn. We can call this a second-person writing style. Even passages of narrative description are written under a conception that internally sketches in the existence of an interlocutor, and thus the manner of speaking of Otaka and the others can be incorporated into those passages quite realistically. Or, to put it differently, the narrator relates to the voices of others as if she were one of them, but she also always retains her objectifying consciousness as an external, effaced narrator.

Moreover, and this is an important point, the second-person writing style by its nature must be written entirely in *words* of agreement or repulsion. That is, expressions of sensibility-determined value judgments are frequent, and they function together with the emotional manner of speaking of the characters to force the characters' consciousnesses to attend to the dialogical relations that exist in the present moment (in the *here and now*). The following is a representative example of this type of expression; note that Ichiyō here is also clearly announcing her idea for the work's plot and composition.

Otaka looked at her [Oriki] as if remembering something. "Oriki—" She scratched the base of her hairdo with a copper bodkin *kanzashi*. "Did you mail the letter?"

"Mm," she answered absent-mindedly. "But he still isn't going to come. I was just being polite," Oriki laughed.

"Who are you kidding? You took all that paper to write to him. And two stamps on the envelope! Don't tell me you were just being civil. You've known him ever since Akasaka, haven't you? So what if you've had your misunderstandings? You can't afford to break with him. It's up to you. Why don't you make more of an effort and try to keep him? You can't treat people that way and expect to do all right."

"Thanks for the advice, but he's not my type. You'd better get used to it—there's nothing between us." She talked as if the topics were of no concern to her.

"You astonish me," Otaka laughed. "You're as selfish as a grand lady. Ah, but me—there's no hope for me," she sighed, reaching for her fan to cool her feet. "I used to be a flower of a girl. . . ."

From the window she could see men passing in front of the shops. Calls of solicitation vied with each other in the night. ("Troubled Waters," 219)⁷

It seems that Oriki, before falling to the level of this seedy restaurant of illicit prostitution, was a geisha in Akasaka. Her fresh, fashionable appearance, with her "hair, just washed and done up in a great Shimada chignon knotted with a twist of new straw" ("Troubled Waters," 218), is a lingering trace of that past prosperity, but probably more than that a display of the self-conceit of someone who takes pride in such things. The playboy Yūki Tomonosuke is probably attracted by this, Oriki's status as a heterogeneous element. Oriki's haughtiness is revealed by the fact that she only speaks her true feelings to a wealthy customer like Yūki. Herein lies the necessity for his appearance. The popular geisha, blessed with a wealthy and handsome customer, coolly drives away the broken Genshichi—this is the role of an Akasaka geisha, but Oriki performs it in this dubious restaurant located in a newly developed area on the fringes of the city. In this setup, where a character's career drags her down to the position of an outsider in lower-class society, we can of course see the self-reflection of Ichiyō herself.⁸

It is just as important to note also that in the conversation quoted above, Oriki and Otaka speak about exactly the same matter, but in quite different ways.

The object of the conversation between the two is the customer Oriki has known "ever since Akasaka." Regarding techniques of holding onto customers, their ways of thinking are utterly antithetical. What Otaka says is, for a woman of this profession, very commonsensical, and in that respect it demonstrates a shrewd appraisal of the motives behind the letter Oriki wrote. While Oriki's response to Otaka on the surface seems to speak of her dislike for the customer she has known her "ever since Akasaka," it actually demonstrates how she attends to and reacts against Otaka's commonsensical advice. In that sense, Otaka's *words* manifest a common ground (the hidden truth) shared by the women, against which Oriki's *words* are spoken and thereby highlighted as the showy bluster of her heart (her vanity and shows of courage).

That showy bluster is, ultimately, self-scornful. Thus, as the common ground grows more dominant, Oriki loses her vanity and pluck. That change appears clearly in the unfolding of expressions in chapter five of the story, which begins by alluding to an *uramibushi* (song of ill-will):

White demons, someone had dubbed them. And, in fact, there was an air of the nether reaches to it all. Even those who appeared guileless were ready to drive a man into a pool of blood, or chase the customer up the side of a mountain of needles. If they enticed men with their soft voices, they could also sound as shrill as a pheasant being swallowed by a snake. ("Troubled Waters," 230)

7. In the original Japanese text, as is typical in Ichiyō's writing style, in this passage there are no quotation marks to distinguish the characters' and narrator's voices from one another, nor any paragraph breaks. See the discussion of punctuation in Ichiyō in chapter six.

8. During her short life, Higuchi Ichiyō experienced the fall of her family from respected samurai status to utter poverty.

In folk songs (e.g., the song “Utaura” contained in the *Collection of Recitations and Songs Ancient and Modern*), this sort of listing of images related to Buddhist notions of hell—the mountain of needles, the pond of blood—is used to describe the terrifying world that prostitutes would encounter after death.⁹ But here this is reversed, and it is the restaurant women themselves who are figured as the devils in a this-worldly hell. This, of course, is portrayed as being in part the self-consciousness of the restaurant women themselves, so that the passage continues:

Still, these girls had once spent the same ten months in the womb as everybody else—when they were small, they too clung to their mothers’ breasts and were fondled and coaxed to babble their first words; when they were offered their choice of money or candy, like any other child they held their hand for the sweets. In the trade, one did not look for an honest woman; one girl in a hundred shed tears of true love for a man. . . . (“Troubled Waters,” 230)

What arises here is a narrative voice that sounds as if it belongs to one of Oriki’s coworkers, so that it can immediately follow the above passage by entering into a grumbling entreaty, an exclamation that in the original Japanese simply flows out of the above, marked off by neither quotation marks nor a new sentence—beginning: “hey listen to me, what about Tatsu, the dyer” (“Troubled Waters,” 230). One restaurant woman feels sad about the dishonesty of customers, while another who has a child sobs, “Ah, today is the sixteenth, the Day of Souls [. . .] I certainly didn’t choose this profession lightly, but I suppose my boy despises me for it” (“Troubled Waters,” 230–31). While these grumblings belong to women other than Oriki, they unfold as one continuous stream of language in the original Japanese, with no sentence or paragraph breaks or quotation marks to distinguish between speakers. As a result, Oriki’s desire for death is realized in a form that brings into Oriki all the complaints of the others. As we saw in the previously discussed scene, Otaka speaks the commonsense of the professional woman in the unadorned manner of being-in-itself, whereas Oriki stands outside and therefore objectifies that commonsense. In fact, however, the *words* of Otaka and others provide the opportunity for making Oriki’s vanity visible and, in the end, for crushing it.

9. *Collection of Recitations and Songs Ancient and Modern (Ginkyoku kokin taizen)* is an Edo-period collection of popular ballads. It is reprinted in Fujita Tokutarō, ed., *Kōchū Nihon bungaku rujū: kindai kayō shū* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1929), 350–432. “Utaura” appears on 393–94, although this version is missing the last several lines from the version that Kameci cites below.

This unique method for developing plot through mode of expression cannot be grasped through a reading strategy that brackets the characters’ spoken dialogue between quotation marks. While this might present difficulties for a structuralist methodology, if we attempt a faithful reading of Ichiyō’s original text in which spoken dialogue is woven seamlessly into passages of narrative description, we should be able to see how the opportunity for *words* exists even within passages of narrative description, and likewise how a relationship between ground (background information) and figure (conspicuous emotional expressions [*hyōshutsu*]) exists even in the lines of dialogue spoken by various characters.

* * * * *

This type of relationship between ground and figure was quite common in Edo-period literature. I was reminded of this problem by Yoshimoto Takaaki’s essay “On the Theory of Construction” (“Kōseiron”) in his *What is Beauty for Language? (Gengo ni totte bi to wa nani ka, 1965)*.¹⁰ Allow me to quote from Chikamatsu Monzaemon’s *jōruri* puppet play, *Kagekiyo Victorious (Shusse Kagekiyo, 1686)*.¹¹ The courtesan Akoya, spurred on by jealousy, reveals Kagekiyo’s hiding place to the Rokuhara military authorities. Learning that Kagekiyo has been captured, she goes to apologize, bringing their two children Iyaishi and Iyawaka, but Kagekiyo stubbornly refuses to forgive her.

(Ground) [Akoya] So no matter how much I beg your forgiveness, you refuse to listen?

(Speech) [Kagekiyo] Shut up! Shut up! I cannot stand the sight of you, go home this instant. I no longer love any of you!

(Ground) [Akoya] Oh, having outlived you in this way, is there anywhere I can call home? Oh my children, even though your mother knows she has erred and is trying to apologize, did you hear what your merciless father said? With your father and my husband thinking us his enemies, even you children have no reason to go on living. From now on, don’t think that you had a father. You are the children of this mother only. If I too go on living and my disrepute over straying from the true path spreads, I will regret it even after I die. So children, die with me and apologize in the next world.

10. Yoshimoto Takaaki, *Gengo ni totte bi to wa nani ka*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1965).

11. Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724) is widely recognized as the greatest playwright of the *jōruri* puppet theatre genre. It should be noted that in *jōruri* performances, all spoken dialogue is voiced by a chanter who sits at the side of the stage, sometimes adopting the voice of one of the puppet characters, sometimes speaking in his own voice as narrator, but weaving all the voices into a single flow of narration.

(Speech) Oh, master Kagekiyo, see the depths of my deceitless heart!

(Ground) Pulling Iyaishi near, drawing her dagger with a swoosh, and saying *namu amida butsu*, she stabs Iyaishi. Iyawaka is surprised and cries out, *No, no, I'm not my mother's child. Father, help!*, and he runs up and presses his face into the lattice of his father's cage. [Akoya] *What a cowardly thing to do*, and she pulls him near. He bursts out, putting his hands together, [Iyakawa] *Please forgive me, please go easy on me. From tomorrow I'll behave and we can shave the top of my head for my mage hairstyle. We can even burn moxa on my skin. What an evil mother. Father, help!*, and so he cries at the top of his lungs.

(Ground) [Akoya] *Oh, it is reasonable to not want to die. However, you are not murdered by your mother, but rather you are murdered by your father who should save you. Look at that, your older brother also died quietly, and if you and your mother do not die, we have no excuse before your father. Although it is unfortunate, please try to understand*, she advises and Iyawaka is persuaded, *If that is the case, then let us die together*. And having said *Father, good-bye*, he approaches his brother's corpse, firm in his resolve to die, and looks up at his mother. But Akoya becomes dizzy trying to decide where to stab her son, loses her strength and falls down writhing in sadness. [Akoya] *Yes, but there is already no use. Consider this your fate from a previous life and do not begrudge your mother. I will follow you in death, namu amida*, and with that she stabs Iyawaka through the chest. And saying *Well, master Kagekiyo, with this please dispel your grudge against me. Please welcome them into the Pure Land, merciful Buddha*, she presses the sword against her throat and falls on top of the corpses of her sons, the lives of a mother and her children having been lost. What a truly hopeless scene!¹²

What astonishing hatred!

In *jōruri* scripts, “ground” (*ji*) did not as such signify what we would call narrative description (*ji no bun*), just as “speech” (*shi*) did not necessarily signify lines of spoken dialogue. Moreover, it seems that there was consider-

able variation from period to period in the relation between the two terms. If, however, we provisionally permit ourselves to apply modern novelistic distinctions to these terms, “speech” would refer to the other-oriented *words* of the characters—the hailings and answerings of utterances exchanged between the characters themselves, or the verbal attacks and censures they direct toward their interlocutors. On the other hand, “ground” would refer to expressions made from the position of the narrator, depicting the movements and spoken lines of the characters, or more precisely, of the puppets enacting those characters. When *words* appear within “ground,” they often represent the act of recounting something to one's own self or, when that is not the case, the manifestation of some emotion so urgent that it does not allow for the adoption of the sort of other-directed tone that characterizes “speech.”

An opportunity for *words* is present in any human action. *Words* are mediated by, born out from corporeality. At least, we can say that this type of expression consciousness existed among the authors of *jōruri* plays. The mode of writing of the modern novel, by contrast, brackets out spoken dialogue within quotation marks. These take the form of other-directed utterances made from the standpoint of the characters themselves, utterances from which embodiedness is almost entirely abstracted away. On the other hand, corporeality itself, that from which the *words* have been abstracted, is confined to passages of narrative description that portray the expressions and actions of the characters from the standpoint of the writer (more properly, the immanent narrator). In this sense, we can say that in Edo-period modes of expression, the degree of mutual alienation between *words* and body was quite small.

The reason for this likely lies in the mode of performing through the manipulation of puppets. The chanter/narrator, while indicating the actions through his descriptive expressions, breathes emotional life into the puppets. Or rather, the narrator comes to possess the puppets corporeally. Chikamatsu described the circumstances of this as follows:

Jōruri differs from other forms of fiction in that, since it is primarily concerned with puppets, the words should all be living things in which action is the most important feature. [. . .] Once when I was young and reading a story about the court, I came across a passage that told how, on the occasion of a festival, a heavy snow had fallen and piled up. An order was then given to a guard to clear away the snow from an orange tree. When this happened, the pine tree next to it, apparently resentful that its boughs were bent with snow, recoiled its branches. This was a stroke of the pen which gave life to the inanimate tree. It did so because the spectacle of the pine tree, resentful that the snow had been cleared from the orange tree, recoiling its branches itself and shaking off the snow which bends it down, is one

12. *Shusse Kagekiyo* is reprinted in Chikamatsu Monzaemon, *Chikamatsu shū*, vol. 16 of *Kanshō Nihon no koten*, ed. Hara Michio (Tokyo: Shogaku Tosho, 1982). This passage appears on 92–94. In the original Japanese, there are no paragraph breaks in this passage. The words in parentheses here appear in superscript annotations in the original; they (along with other annotations that are omitted here) indicate how the ensuing lines should be chanted in performance. Also, in this translation, italics and character names in brackets have been added here for clarity's sake; there are no equivalent markers in the Japanese text. It is precisely the flexible ambiguity of this style (which the markers in the English translation unfortunately undermine) that Kamei is highlighting here.

which creates the feeling of a living, moving thing. Is that not so?
From this model I learned how to put life into my *jōruri*.¹³

If that is the case, then what exactly is a puppet? Of course *jōruri* puppets had their origins as magic ritual objects, but by Chikamatsu's time they had probably already lost their folk religious meaning. Whatever the case, a "lifeless wooden puppet," i.e., a human who has been estranged from life and turned into a *thing*, was for Chikamatsu precisely the indispensable condition for summoning up "a variety of emotions" (*Souvenir*, 437). Through the mediation of the visual intentionality of the "lifeless wooden puppet," he tried to sketch internally the embodied self-image of the characters placed in that scene. According to Yoshimoto Takaaki, when this is achieved within linguistic expressions, a mode of expression is born "that transcends the dimension of narrated content to such an extent that the characters who appear thusly in the dimension of the act of narrating begin to exist, within the ideas of the authors and within the drama of language itself, as images of fully living human beings who maintain their totality in acting of their own volition and in relating to others" (Yoshimoto, *What is Beauty for Language?* 2:470).

Words are born in tandem with an image of the body. Chikamatsu in particular worked hard to give expression to this in the case of women.

To be precise, many things are said by the female characters which real women could not utter. Such things fall under the heading of art; it is because they say what could not come from a real woman's lips that their true emotions are disclosed. If in such cases the author were to model his character on the ways of a real woman and conceal her feelings, it would permit no pleasure in the work. (*Souvenir*, 438)

If that is the case, then for Chikamatsu, what exactly is a woman? Among the people in this world, it is she who is most thoroughly reified into a *thing*, so that she invites only tragedy if she tries to act on her own volition. Otane in *The Drum of the Waves of Horikawa* (*Horikawa namitsuzumi*, 1706), while washing clothes with her younger sister Ofuji, reflects upon the loneliness of sleeping alone while her husband is away:

(Ground) [Otane]: Aah, Ofuji. (Speech): No matter what, always serve your master in such a way as to please him. (Ground): Forget about men. That's what I've learned the hard way. Because Master Hikokurō

13. Chikamatsu's words are quoted in the preface to *Souvenir from Naniwa* (*Naniwa miyage*, 1738) by Hozumi Ikan (1692–1769). Quotations from the work here are adapted from the translation by Donald Keene in Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, eds., *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 437–40. This passage appears on 437.

and I were a couple that had a relationship before we were married, when we did get married we were happy beyond words. (Speech): The sadness of being married to a low-level samurai; his being held hostage in Edo every other year. Even when he is back home in this province, he is stuck in the castle everyday. Ten nights a month he has guard duty. Making love like a married couple, how long has it been since we did it?¹⁴

In carelessly speaking these scandalous words, which violate the norms of modesty and self-control and which no real samurai wife could have uttered, Otane inadvertently ignites her own passion, the first step toward her tragic ending.

In the case of *Kagekiyo Victorious*, the prostitute Akoya, upon seeing a letter from Kagekiyo's official wife, is pierced by a sense of humiliation that ordinarily she would have been able to suppress:

How bitter I feel, how angry, spiteful, envious! If in love social status makes no difference, then how dare they call me a prostitute? Even if I am a prostitute, the real wife is the one who has the children. Don't they know this? While I don't bear a grudge towards her, I feel bitter for having cared so much, for having loved, for having exhausted my affections. What I cannot forgive is that beast of a man, that philanderer. Oh, my resentment! Oh, how inexcusable! (*Kagekiyo*, 59–60)

This rage drives Akoya into a corner, in which excuses and apologies are useless. Akoya appeals to Kagekiyo: "Even so, my jealousy is a result of how much I love you, my master. Jealousy is something that all women feel" (*Kagekiyo*, 81). But he refuses to listen. If that is the case, perhaps in the very act of thinking that "in love social status makes no difference," Akoya has already overstepped the bounds of her status as a prostitute. At this point, Akoya has already resolved to die. She pleads earnestly: "Please forgive me for everything. If you would tell me once more in this world that you forgive me, it would give me the strength to commit suicide, it would be proof that I didn't betray you out of viciousness" (*Kagekiyo*, 81). Kagekiyo, however, not only refuses her request but even vows his hatred of their two children: "When I think that you two were born from the womb of that vicious woman, I end up hating even you two" (*Kagekiyo*, 86).

It is a situation so full of hatred that Kagekiyo refuses Akoya even the pretext that would give her strength to commit suicide. Akoya has no recourse but to use tragedy to expose the mercilessness of Kagekiyo's stance. She stabs

14. Chikamatsu Monzaemon, *Chikamatsu Monzaemon shū* 1, vol. 43 in *Nihon koten bungaku zenshū*, 51 vols. (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 1971), 233–34.

their son to death as he tries to flee, desperately imploring his father for help. Akoya is driven to kill her children out of hatred for her relationship with Kagekiyo: "You are not murdered by your mother, but rather you are murdered by your father who should save you." This same rage brings about her own death too. It is as if the only possible end that can result from making female characters say "things which real women could not utter" is a tragedy that befalls the female characters themselves.

Everything begins with scandalous speech—"things which real women could not utter." But a reflective consciousness that could elevate the emotional charge unleashed by those words into the realm of the ethical never arises. Therein lies the cause of the tragedy of Akoya and other female characters like her. This reflects the limitations of Chikamatsu's dramatic modus operandi. The consciousness of expression of the narrator here is unable to distance itself from the internally generated body image (and the *words* that arise from it) and hence is unable to establish a viewpoint that could objectify the scene in its entirety. The contradictions and lack of integration that arise between the various scenes is probably also due to this.

Seeing Akoya kill his children in order to spite him and then kill herself, "Kagekiyo cries and writhes with screams, but already there is nothing he can do. *Are there no gods or buddhas in this world? Somehow please forgive me. Oh, my children. Oh, my wife,* says Kagekiyo, who could be mistaken for a demon as he raises his voice and cries out" (*Kagekiyo*, 94). Shortly thereafter, however, upon the appearance of Akoya's brother Jūzō, Kagekiyo, in a feat of unbelievable strength, breaks out of his cage and overpowers him. This type of a development could not occur in the world of novels. If Kagekiyo was in possession of such strength, why was he reduced to impotent screams and writhing inside the cage as he watched his helpless children murdered before his eyes? If this were a novel, the author himself would have had to entertain this doubt.

But what if Chikamatsu had been able to situate an immanent narrator within this scene? Of course, this supposition can really only apply to prose narratives, but let us here try to read Chikamatsu's play in the mode of "drama as language," after the manner of Yoshimoto Takaaki. Such a narrator would portray the tragedy of Akoya and her children, and next, of course, would shift its line of vision to Kagekiyo, who has just witnessed the murder of his young and helpless children. Regardless of whether or not it would directly manifest this in its expressions, this gaze would inevitably include an ethical critique of Kagekiyo's stubbornness. How would Kagekiyo respond to this ethical questioning? Of course, there is no reason to expect Kagekiyo would answer directly to the questioning of the narrator, who while being immanent to the depicted scene would not appear directly as one of the work's characters. None-

theless, as Kagekiyo faces Jūzō, he would necessarily be portrayed as a person tormented by his own ruthlessness, yet as one who must still search for some grounds for self-justification. In Chikamatsu's play, however, his reaction to Jūzō is depicted as follows: "Kagekiyo cackles with laughter. *Hey, you block-head, don't you know that they [Akoya and her children] died because of their sadness caused by your greediness? On top of that, just what do you mean by calling me a samurai beast?*" (*Kagekiyo*, 102). In a novelistic world mediated by an immanent narrator, Kagekiyo could not possibly denounce Jūzō in such a flippant tone.

The history of the Edo-period novel, from Ueda Akinari to Takizawa Bakin, is the history of how the immanent narrator came to structure realistically the spatial relationships of the various characters.¹⁵ It is simultaneously a history of the strengthening of the moralistic tenor of the questioning that was inherent in the narrator's perspective. This is especially so in Bakin's works, where all of the characters are forced into making self-justificatory long-winded speeches. The grounds for those justifications sometimes extend to karmic causal relations that stretch across several generations. The immanent narrator retains the memory even of past events that have been forgotten by the characters themselves, and the various characters, as if forced to answer to the narrator's questioning, are made to produce speech and actions that seek to avow their own consistency and constancy. The modern novel dissolved this moralistic tenor and thereby acquired a more objective perspective. It accordingly enhanced its ability to pursue the essence of human existence in all its variety. Be that as it may, it is clear from this history that without the immanent narrator, the more rigorous grasp of spatial structure and the temporal expansion of the characters' consciousnesses could not have arisen. The various characters who appeared in Saikaku's late seventeenth century works, for example, still lacked a consciousness that would lead them to strive for consistency in their speech and actions. The lack of a clear organic structure in Saikaku's works, which are nothing more than a series of largely unrelated short episodes strung together, also comes from this.¹⁶

15. Ueda Akinari (1734–1809) wrote in a number of prose fiction genres, including *yomihon* and *ukiyozōshi*. He is best known for *Tales of Moonlight and Rain* (*Ugetsu monogatari*, 1768) and *A Tale of Spring Rain* (*Harusame monogatari*, 1808), both collections of ghost stories. Takizawa Bakin (1767–1848) wrote numerous works of fiction in the *yomihon* and *kusazōshi* genres. His heroic tale, *The Story of Eight Virtuous Heroes* (*Nansō satomi hakkenden*, 1814–41) is one of the most famous works of late Edo fiction and continued to enjoy wide popularity well into the Meiji period.

16. Ihara Saikaku (1642–93) was a popular writer of *ukiyozōshi* fiction. His best known works include *The Life of an Amorous Woman* (*Kōshoku ichidai onna*, 1686) and *Five Women Who Chose Love* (*Kōshoku gonin onna*, 1686).

In *Kagekiyo Victorious* as well, Kagekiyo, who until now has been sobbing loudly inside his cage, suddenly “cackles with laughter,” inveighs against Jūzō, and then breaks out of the cage. His stubbornness toward Akoya and her children instantly changes into a violent passion directed at Jūzō. In this sense, the lack of consistency between scenes in *Kagekiyo Victorious* represents not only a problem inherent to the genre of *jōruri*, but also this era’s historical limitations in terms of development of narrative form. Certainly, as Yoshimoto argues, we see here the appearance of a new technique in narrative development, one in which “on their own, the characters speak and establish mutual relationships, and it is by these means that the situation moves forward” (Yoshimoto, *What is Beauty for Language?* 2:465). But there is one important point missing from this reading: Yoshimoto is unable to problematize the fact that the characters here still lack any relationship to themselves, any being-for-itself relationship. Let me put this more precisely. In both Akoya here and in Otane from *Drum of the Waves of Horikawa*, we find the bare beginnings of a relationship with the self. But they are unable to break out of the form of relational consciousness that is characteristic of second-person narration, and so they never reach a level of self-reflection at which they could produce their own ethicality. Hence, Akoya can only lament, “How dare they call me a prostitute? Even if I am a prostitute, the real wife is the one who has the children,” and Otane likewise declares, “Forget about men. That’s what I’ve learned the hard way.” Kagekiyo and Hikokurō (Otane’s husband), in contrast, are backed by the whole system of institutionalized ethical norms and are not troubled by the least doubt about their own conduct. Hence, it is inevitable that Akoya and Otane will meet defeat.

Yoshimoto Takaaki grasps this point in the following manner:

Cornered by Kagekiyo, who is backed by Confucian ethics and hence remains implacable, Akoya acts as if she has *no choice* but to kill her children and then herself. She does not die because she acknowledges and submits to Kagekiyo’s ethics; she dies rather out of sheer petty spite: “You are not murdered by your mother, but rather by your father who should save you” [. . .] It is Akoya and Iyawaka, killed by his mother as he cries and screams, who on the surface seem to die in the service of doctrine. But in this scene the [this-worldly, vulgar] pettiness of the mother and Iyawaka conflicts with and prevails over Kagekiyo’s Confucian ethics. It serves as an unmistakable proclamation of the universality of the petty ethics of Edo-period townspeople society. (Yoshimoto, *What is Beauty for Language?* 2:520)

This is an important remark for understanding the essence of drama in Chikamatsu. When we adhere to the works themselves, however, we find that

Akoya and Otane are able to render their own acts to consciousness only as careless mistakes. Because they accept this form of consciousness in their relation to themselves (a budding self-consciousness), they inevitably lose out to the official, institutionalized ethics of Kagekiyo and Hikokurō, which are foreign to that type of consciousness, and they are left no choice but to expose the heartlessness of those ethics through acts of suicide. If we pursue this further and locate the ethical core of the philosophy they represent, it lies precisely in the absolute nature of their defeats. Yoshimoto Takaaki, in the end, lacks a methodology that could grasp literary style at the level of the immanent narrator, and for that reason, even in his history of modern expressions (*hyōshutsu*) in *What is Beauty for Language?*, he can approach expressive structure only at the level of the author. His analysis is relatively valid for works appearing after the latter half of the Meiji 30s, that is, after around 1902, when expressions that depended on an “I”-sensitivity came into general use. But for earlier works, his arguments are marked by arbitrariness and his readings quickly fall apart when we examine alternative passages from the same works he discusses. That he ended writing separately both a history of expression (*hyōshutsu*) and a theory of plot construction, the former as a history of the modern novel and the latter extending to Edo-period drama, is likely also due to his failure to consider the role of the immanent narrator.

* * * * *

But in Ichiyō’s “Troubled Waters,” it is Genshichi’s wife Ohatsu who finds herself cornered. Having endured and sacrificed so much for her husband, she is tormented day after day by the same painful question: Why isn’t he in the least concerned about their family? In a fit of anger, she throws away the cake that Oriki has bought for Ohatsu’s son Takichirō. When Genshichi cannot forgive this spiteful act, she responds as follows:

“It was wrong of me. Forgive me. I shouldn’t have thrown the cake away, after Oriki was kind enough to give it to us. It was wrong. You’re right—for the things I’ve said about Oriki, I’m the one who’s a demon. I’ll never say anything bad about her again, ever. I’ll never mention her after this, I swear. I’ll never gossip about her, so please don’t divorce me [. . .] Even if you hate me, at least consider Takichi. Please. I’m sorry Genshichi.” She bowed down on the floor and wept. “No, it won’t work.” He looked toward the wall, with no intention of listening to any further argument. He had never been so cruel. Was this what happens to a man when a woman bewitches him? Not only was he prepared to cause her anguish, for all she knew he might let their adored son starve to death. No amount of begging or apologiz-

ing was going to save the marriage, but she might at least still save the child. "Takichi, Takichi," she called. "Who do you like? Your father or your mother?" ("Troubled Waters," 239)

She cannot believe that the true reason for their plight lies in the role she plays as a thoughtful, devoted wife. When she voices hatred for Oriki, it takes the form of scolding the child for his lack of good sense. When she tries to head off divorce, the reason she gives is again the child: "at least consider Takichi. Please." She does not think her position as a wife so unstable that she would have to defend herself against Oriki by asserting, as did Chikamatsu's Akoya, that "in love social status makes no difference" and that "the real wife is the one who has the children."

In that sense, Ohatsu is in the same position as Aoki's wife in *Spring*. Aoki is rebuffed when he suggests double suicide to his wife: "Aah, you're a lost cause, and I'm a lost cause, too. How about it? Should we do it? Together, you and me. . . ." If Genshichi approached Ohatsu in the same way, her reply would probably have been the same as that of Aoki's wife. Although Ohatsu has a husband, she does not think of him as a love partner. And while she can countenance the existence of a wife who leaves her husband because of his failures as a provider, she cannot conceive of a husband who would abandon his wife because of her supposed inadequacies as a woman.

In the end, Ohatsu takes the child and leaves. But what is distinctive here is that, at least in passages that portray the household of Ohatsu and Genshichi, the mode of expression of the narrative description takes a neutral stance. Seen in terms of the history of expression, Ichiyō's expression foreshadows the historical process of the shift away from an *oral style* that used judgmental language manifesting sympathy, revulsion, or irony, and toward the non-emotional, judgment-neutral, *written style* of what would be called naturalism. While the immanent narrator's *words* of course adhere at times to Ohatsu's standpoint and at other times to Genshichi's emotions, nowhere are they melded into the spoken dialogue of Ohatsu and Genshichi so that they cannot be clearly delineated from one another. In other words, in these passages, the characters' spoken dialogue is completely bracketed off from the *words* of narrative description. Correspondingly, the third-person objectivity of the narrative description is strengthened. This characteristic becomes clear when we contrast the mode of description in the passage introduced above, describing the world of Oriki and her fellow prostitutes at the restaurant Kikunoi, with that in the following expression:

On the outskirts of the new quarter, where a narrow alley ran between the greengrocer's and the hairdresser's shops, the caves hung

so close together that the passageway all but had its own roof, and the space between the crowded tenements on each side of the lane was so tight that on a rainy day one could scarcely open an umbrella. Missing sewer covers left gaping holes in the middle of the road. It was not an easy path to navigate. At the end of the road stood a rubbish pile and a small, ramshackle house. The rain shutters no longer closed properly, and the place looked quite unsafe. It did, however, have both a front and a back door, unlike the other houses in the alley. Removed as it was, fortunately, from the center of town, it boasted a porch some three-feet wide, which overlooked an empty lot in back. There, weeds grew with abandon and begonias and China asters and bean vines entwined themselves around a makeshift bamboo fence. It was here that Oriki's Genshichi lived. ("Troubled Waters," 227)

Here, the narrator's bantering, ironic commentary that characterized the earlier passage has almost entirely disappeared. Moreover, when Ohatsu's external appearance is subsequently portrayed, it is described with the same objectivity. In a sense, this could be called a refinement in the mode of expression of modern prose, but the spoken dialogue that appears in this kind of narrative description will inevitably be haunted by a sense of estrangement.

Ohatsu's sole desire is for Genshichi to awaken from his infatuation with Oriki and devote himself to his work, raising the capital necessary to restart his former business. Precisely because of this, the people of the tenement-house slum are mindful of the poverty of Genshichi's family and refrain from offering the usual gifts of rice cakes or dumplings at the time of the spring and autumnal equinoxes, knowing that they cannot afford to reciprocate. This makes things even more unbearable for Ohatsu, yet although she often complains, she of course tries with all her might to pluck up Genshichi's spirits. It does not dawn on her, however, that her acting the part of the devoted wife is Genshichi's heaviest burden. That is to say, Ohatsu's consciousness is entirely occupied by thoughts of public opinion and the restoration of the family business. She lacks any ability to consider matters in the manner of the second-person, with its characteristic embodiedness. She lacks any thought of what Genshichi might mean to her as a man or what she as a woman might mean to him. Naturally, any conversation between the married couple must end at cross-purposes.

On this point, Ohatsu's plight contrasts strikingly with the tragedy of Akoya. Akoya's cognition of reality never expands to transcend the realm of her embodied consciousness. Because she lacks a commonsensical, worldly sense of reality that could restrain her corporeal passions, Akoya falls into a painful plight: even her own children demand that she return them to their father. Ohatsu, conversely, acts out the public ideal of the wise wife who suffers in order to

restore the family business. Although Ohatsu momentarily lost self-control when she sees the cake her child has received from Oriki, upon learning of her husband's anger, she immediately admits that she is in the wrong and apologizes by portraying herself as a bad woman. Of course it is not the case that she has committed any unforgivable wrongs, and she is confident that her son would choose her over her husband.

This ideal-driven self-sacrifice and self-persecution reminds us of typical characters in a kabuki play, as opposed to those in *jōruri*. The characters in kabuki strive to remain loyal to some ideal associated with their role, an effort that, due to their inability to divulge their true motivation to others, invites unexpected misunderstandings. Hence, their surface oafish behavior often conceals a hidden ideal that, when at last revealed, leads to the restoration of their honor. Naturally, there are also cases when they really do engage in unmitigated oafish behavior, but, even in such cases, what seems at a glance to be a useless suicide that tries to atone for that behavior often ends up becoming, after one thing leads to another, the distant cause for a happy ending. That is to say, if "Troubled Waters" were a kabuki drama, it would begin with the scene of the marital separation of Genshichi and Ohatsu. Genshichi would harbor a hidden ambition, or again, he would be visited by a certain dramatic change of heart, and in the end would return to Ohatsu and their son. But the resemblance between this story and the kabuki extends beyond the motivations of the characters: even the mode of writing in the story's depiction of Genshichi's household is reminiscent of a kabuki script. The passages of narrative description restrict themselves to the explanatory role of stage directions, so that forward movement in this tragedy of a couple who fail to understand one another is accomplished solely through the lines of spoken dialogue they exchange.

To again borrow Yoshimoto Takaaki's ideas, here "the spoken dialogues occurring between the characters, which drive the dramatic progression, are already bracketed out, and passages of narrative description now serve only to string them together" (Yoshimoto, *What is Beauty for Language?* 2:528). Yoshimoto grasps this mode of expression in the following manner:

Puppeteering, or the manipulation of the puppets, whether or not one considers the religious origins of the puppets as magical objects à la Origuchi Shinobu, has a doubled nature: human beings dialogue with each other behind the puppets, and at the same time they self-externalize that dialogue onto the puppets. [. . .] However, when the language of *jōruri* begins using a mode of expression that brackets spoken conversation between quotation marks, the acting agent is no longer a puppet but a human being. Through the appearance of the flesh-and-blood performer, the drama for the first time must inevitably attain a certain totalization. This is the terminal point at which

Chikamatsu's conception of *jōruri* arrived in less than half a century. This terminus also harbored implicitly a necessary switch to kabuki drama [in which puppets were replaced by human actors] (Yoshimoto, *What is Beauty for Language?* 2:528–29)

In my understanding, this means that the *words* that were separated from actions in a process of mutual alienation within the "ground" passages of *jōruri* were in kabuki re-constituted as exchanges of other-oriented "speech." Those exchanges now took place on a level governed by the hidden motivation, the character role-ideal from which corporeality has been abstracted away. While the actions of characters are of course indicated in the stage directions and performed by the actors, the most dramatically tense scenes are constituted through the gap between the "speech" representing the character's hidden ideal and the painful actions arising out of the need to constrain his or her true feelings. Or again, we find a mode of expression constituted through a duality of deceitful "speech" that seeks to divert others' attention, and actions or poses that convey the unspeakable hidden ideal. In either case, the crux of dramatic development is sought in a rupture between *words* and body, and when a situation arises in which the two can be united, the dramatic contradiction comes to closure. Only a living human being could carry out this complex dramatic process.

Ichiyō's "Troubled Waters," however, ends with the divorce of Genshichi and Ohatsu. Ichiyō herself here smashes the kabuki-style schema, a schema also found in her story "Child's Play." She abandons the final moment of unification, in which *words* are restored to body. With this, Ichiyō denied the restoration of Genshichi's reputation and family, the ending that the majority of her readers had likely anticipated. In a way, she playfully invokes her readers' horizon of expectation. Three rumors concerning the love suicide of Genshichi and Oriki are introduced in the conclusion to "Troubled Waters." While scholars have busily debated which of the three rumors best conveys Ichiyō's intention, in fact all three were possible within the horizon of expectation that Ichiyō posited. Even the possibility of a restoration of Genshichi's honor, including the posthumous repose of his soul, is indicated, however faintly, in the following rumor: "He, on the other hand, did a splendid job of it! Hari-kiri and the whole business. Who would have thought he had it in him? Ever since the days he lost his bedding shop, at least. But he died like a man. Went out in a blaze of glory" ("Troubled Waters," 240).

On the other hand, I have already touched upon how Oriki was a being in whom were gathered the thoughts and feelings of the women of the Kikunoi. While the sections that focus on Ohatsu are kabuki-like, the expressions that center on Oriki are more like *jōruri*, although this difference is of course not absolute. Note the symbolism involved in having Oriki's existential agony re-

peatedly expressed (*hyōshutsu*) through the corporeal suffering of headaches. Her headaches probably derive from her worries:

She hated it! She hated! She felt almost delirious and leaned against a tree at the side of the road. "I'm afraid to cross to the other side; I'm afraid to stay where I am." It was her song, the echo of her voice, but where was it coming from? "I have no choice," she whispered. "I will have to cross the bridge by myself. My father fell treading it. They say my grandfather stumbled, too. I was born under the curse [*urami*] of many generations, and there are things I have to undergo before I die. [. . .] Sometimes I wonder if I've lost all sense of kindness and decency. No, I mustn't think such things. It won't do me any good. With my station in life and my calling and my fate, I'm not an ordinary person anymore. It's a mistake to think that I am. It only adds to my suffering. ("Troubled Waters," 232)

While the "curse" (or "grudge": *urami*) of many generations, according to what Oriki tells Yūki a little later, signifies a curse of misfortune passed down through many generations, we can also sense here the nuance of having borne the curse or grudge of society (*seken*), since just before this comes the passage in which the grief and grudges of the women of the Kikunoi are written so as to flow directly into Oriki. Here, the passage echoes the grieving voice in the previously cited an Edo-period folk song, "Utaura":

If I close my eyes for a while and look back on the past, my old friends are all dead. If I use my fingers to count the dead, many kinsmen have passed away. Time passes, things change. Nowadays, what goes on forever? People stay but I go away. No one is constant. The Three Worlds are without peace, like a burning house. Even a heavenly saint must suffer and die, all the worse for the lowly and poor, whose sins cannot be light. [. . .] Since the fault arises with myself, my heart's demon torments me and I suffer. Resentment [*urami*] piles up on the mountain of sexual passion. The circle of karma keeps turning. The more I think about it, the angrier I get. Pierced by the sword, the path of Asura titans. Fallen one by the other on the ground and destroyed in a moment. The more I think about it, the angrier I get. The name I had in this world is blown away. My name is buried in the snow of a winter storm; it disappears and is no more.

Why has the singer of these lyrics fallen into this living hell? It is not because she has committed some unforgivable wrong. After long thought she still fails to come up with an answer, and so at last she has no choice but to understand this as the result of fate and karma from a previous life. The very fact of having been born into such a base and poverty-stricken position must be punishment

for some crime that she is not aware of. When she comes to this conclusion, the result is that her own "heart's demon" torments her even more. Here there is no longer any distinction between cursing and being cursed, between bearing a grudge and being the target of a grudge. This type of abject sensibility borne by prostitutes since the Edo period flows in Oriki, too, carried into her via the immanent narrator.

I have already touched upon how Oriki is set up as a heterogeneous element even among the restaurant women at the Kikunoi, a princess among commoners. A kabuki-like conceptual idea flows even through Oriki's teasing banter: "My ambitions are as grand as those of Ōtomo Kuronushi, who wanted to rule the entire world" ("Troubled Waters," 221). However, just as in "Child's Play," we find a nomadic half-speaker set in the interior of the Kikunoi, one who continuously picks up the worried *speech* of the restaurant women in a second-person feminine tone of speech reminiscent of a kitchen maid. (Note by contrast how the immanent narrator in the scenes depicting Genshichi's family is de-feminized and rendered neutral.) The flow of this nomadic half-speaker molds Oriki's sensibility, and she is finally rendered into a self-conscious being. Whereas the restaurant women's feelings are of a second-person type, meaning they are unable to transcend simple embodied consciousness, Oriki's self-consciousness as mediated through the narrative description has no choice but to feel more and more strongly a self-tormenting sense of being closed off from the world. "Sometimes I wonder if I've lost all sense of kindness and decency. No, I mustn't think such things. It won't do me any good. With my station in life and my calling and my fate. . . ." ("Troubled Waters," 232).

One of the main points in Yoshimoto Takaaki's reading of Chikamatsu's plays is to find in Akoya and Otane's petty and oafish behavior (such misdeeds as informing on others, committing adultery, etc.) the key to dramatic development. Leaving aside whether or not we agree with Yoshimoto's assertion that this vulgar, worldly behavior ultimately triumphs over official ethical doctrine in such scenes, it is certain that Chikamatsu's philosophy of drama cannot be grasped without this point. Akoya and Otane reproach themselves for their misdeeds and die before their honor can be restored. In Oriki's case, however, even in the absence of any specific misdeed, the painful conditions of the present world are rendered despairingly inescapable and absolute. No matter what she might say by way of explanation or vindication, there is no reason to expect society would listen, and so Oriki in despair defiantly embraces the dishonor of being a restaurant woman at an illicit brothel. That is to say, her attitude and sentiment in and of themselves constitute her misdeed, her revolt against the social order. Ichiyō, having carried the matter through to this point, no longer has any need to manufacture further dramatic events. As with Midori in "Child's

Play,” Oriki’s sentiment no longer has any concrete object, and all that remains is to portray the collapse of Genshichi’s family after he succumbs to the flames of Oriki’s despairing passion. At the conclusion, having driven Genshichi to ruin, all that Oriki can do is cast her lot with him in a love suicide.

In rendering Oriki’s passion absolute, so that by itself it constituted a misdeed, Ichiyō realized the most profound human philosophy possible in the 1890s. While that absolutization arose as a result of the positing of an immanent narrator, Ichiyō’s writing style also utilized elements from *jōruri*, allowing her simultaneously to excavate a sensibility of tragic women that had existed since the Edo period.

Ichiyō herself may have encountered a psychological crisis in which her passions themselves seemed misdeeds. If so, it was likely a passion that could bring only conflict with the norms of the family, and what created it was the situation of the petty bourgeois intellectual, who can only gaze skeptically at any attempt to provide an explanation for circumstances. The sense of being a lost cause as a flesh-and-blood woman that arose from this situation is sketched out as Oriki’s misdeed, and it eventually provides the willing receptacle for Genshichi’s proposal. In the face of the situation of the petty bourgeois intellectual, one that tries to attain self-exhibition through ideal-laden *words*, she attained the “outrageous words” of passion that a real woman was not allowed to speak. And having attained those “outrageous words” through her own embodiedness, she buries herself in them. To connect this with the previous chapter, there is a type of institutionalized sensibility that we are apt to understand as being our private “I”-sensibility. Furthermore, in the depths of its embodiedness there lies submerged a sensibility of shared suffering, what might be called the communality of hell. For human beings dragged down by a shared suffering, the only salvation lies in being buried together, like lovers in a double suicide. This astonishing attempt was carried out on the level of narration: not by bracketing the lines of spoken dialogue between quotation marks, but rather by weaving them into the flow of narrative description.

Chapter Eight

The Burdens of Ethicality: Izumi Kyōka and the Emergence of the Split Subject

TRANSLATED BY JOSEPH MURPHY

In this chapter, Kamei turns to the fantastic world of the writer Izumi Kyōka, using it to identify a blind spot in structuralist literary theory. Comparing three versions of the manuscript for the story Noble Blood, Heroic Blood, Kamei traces the experiments in composition and form that Kyōka carried out. In particular, he focuses on the modes of intersubjective recognition the various versions of the work solicit from their readers. He traces through the process whereby the heroine of the story at first comes to inhabit a certain attitude, that of a stereotypical character-type, a dissolute “iron lady,” that inheres in certain expressions she uses, but then achieves a self-reflexive awareness of that sensibility through her relation with the work’s hero. This unfolding drama of self-consciousness eventually awakens in her a sense of ethicality, a need to take responsibility for her own sensibility, which allows her to transcend the “iron lady” character type. Kamei also examines the writing style Kyōka developed to portray passages of direct spoken dialogue, arguing that much of the pleasure of and driving force behind the narrative derives from Kyōka’s skillful handling of these expressions, an aspect of writing style that would subsequently be lost to readers accustomed to the protocols of “realism” that came to dominate modern fiction in Japan, as a visually oriented mimesis elbowed out an orally oriented mimesis as the dominant technique. Kyōka uses the device to solicit contemporary readers’ interest, but then transcends it and his readers’ horizon of expectations by shifting the direction of the plot toward an ultimately ethical resolution of its central problem, one in which the characters take on an unpredictable life of their own, having transcended the domination of authorial intent of character type.

Textual correlations done by Mita Hideaki and Koshino Itaru of the two extant handwritten manuscripts of Izumi Kyōka’s *Noble Blood, Heroic Blood* (*Giketsu*)