

The University and the "Global Economy":  
The Cases of the United States and Japan

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Iwao Nakatani, deputy chairman of the government's Economic Strategy Council, joined Sony Corp.'s board on June 29 after resigning from his full professorship at Tokyo's state-run Hitotsubashi University. Nakatani had applied earlier this year to the National Personnel Authority for permission to take up Sony's offer. This was a perfect opportunity for the mandarins to show a change of heart. But they rejected his request, citing regulations that bar public servants from running their own companies or serving on the boards of profit-making firms. Prime Minister Obuchi and the Education Minister spoke up in Nakatani's defense, but to no avail. So Nakatani will teach part-time at Hitotsubashi and consult at several startups.

Irene M. Kuni, "Memo to Japan: Set Your Academics Free,"

Business Week, July 10, 1999

By now we are sufficiently alerted that the touted "global" economy means capital's maximal pursuit of profit and productivity and excision of the unprofitable and unproductive throughout the world. Both the cause and the effect of the vast advances in electronic and biogenetic technology, the productivity and efficiency in communication, transportation, manufacture, and medicine, have been immensely enhanced during the last decade. Capital can reach anywhere in the world practically without cost. "Globalization" aims at the concentration of wealth by taking full advantage of uneven development. The few rich are immensely rich, while the poor are unprecedentedly deprived and multitudinous, and the gap between them is deep and wide. The distribution of wealth is uneven not only between the developed and developing nations but also within each of these

nations and regions, both industrial and unindustrialized. What is most striking in this development, however, is the pervasiveness of this "neoliberal" principle and practice. It is evident in the nearly worldwide project to privatize public resources and to convert all political concerns into economic ones. In public policy discourse, "rational" choice is assumed to be gainful and acquisitive above all other interests. In personal consideration, too, self-interest is taken to be normative and legitimized. This is the moment of triumph for neoliberalism, and critical ideas such as opposition, resistance, and liberation are all but forgotten and discarded as useless and irrelevant in a supposedly seamless globe of capitalism.

This article examines the impact in the United States and Japan of globalization on the university, a site that might be expected to document, interpret, criticize, and intervene in the face of such an event. Several prefatory remarks need to be made here as regards the foci and limits of the article. First, the corporatization of the university is by now in progress nearly everywhere in industrial nations. My choice of these two countries is not meant to be contrastive or typical; it is primarily randomly exemplary. Second, the history of the university is widely discrepant and variant everywhere, even between France and Germany, not to say the United States and Japan. Here, however, I will have to restrict myself to today's state of affairs, leaving the forces of history to chance comments and suggestions. Third, I have elsewhere written about the corporatized university in the United States, especially around the issue of technology transfer and the withering of the humanities.<sup>1</sup> I am fairly certain that my documentation is accurate and up to date. On the other hand, there are developments in Japan about which I am not quite clear, nor, it seems, are most native scholars because of the particular nature of the political discourse in today's Japan. I will discuss that subject more fully later. Finally, my purpose is not just to present the current stages of academia's surrender to business in the two countries but, by comparison, to suggest divergent ways globalization is unfolding in the world.

The alliance between the university and industry in the United States is not a recent event. Aside from the land-grant colleges and universities that are by law required to represent the public interests, even private universities have had far more intimate relationships to society at large, including the business world, than have their European counterparts.<sup>2</sup> Social needs and interests often interfered with "free" learning. Agriculture, engineering, home economics, and defense have never been far from the core of U.S.

higher education. Of course, colleges and universities have also aspired to study and teach the unbridled truth in the name of liberal education, and yet since World War II, defense-related research increasingly occupied the center stage at universities. Such an emphasis on national security, moreover, was not restricted to physical science and engineering but extended to social sciences and the humanities. This balance between utility and free inquiry was maintained without too much ado, however, as long as the idea of nation-state lasted, defining and shaping the structure of culture, ideology, and pedagogy.

It is no surprise that the end of the Cold War overlaps the ascendance of the so-called global economy. In retrospect, the Cold War was no confrontation of two equally powerful empires, as was argued by Western ideologues, but the late stage of capitalism where the hegemony finally vanquished the last bastion of the non/anticapitalist insurgency in the centuries-long history, thus opening the era of the global economy. Once the last military threat is removed, financial and industrial capital no longer needs the confinement of the nation-state for its operation. Now, released from the obligation to keep the nation as a potentially mobilizable whole, capital moves freely nearly everywhere in the world, selecting sites for production and consumption and discarding unprofitable populations and regions. This principle for reorganizing the world on behalf of productivity and profitability, and not tribal and national coherence, equally applies to the governance of corporations, universities, and other social and cultural institutions. National culture, national art, and national literature, together with the national economy, are increasingly irrelevant; instead, efficiency in production is the comprehensive rule, and consumption is the mandate for every citizen. Accountability is foremost in every segment, and excellence — without a specific direction or content — is the manifest objective.<sup>3</sup>

Thatcherism and Reaganomics of the 1980s had been the first step in international capital's accelerated attempt to privatize the public. Funds supporting public programs were radically reduced and rechanneled into the coffer of large corporations. The most successful social revolution of the twentieth century, their program effectively began to transfer wealth from the poor to the rich.<sup>4</sup> The university was to be integrated into this general reorganization of society. Thus the alliance between business and academia has been aggressively promoted since around 1990.

On the campus scene many new developments began to attract the attention of the public. General restructuring of both institutional and disciplinary organization is the most conspicuous. The disciplines formed

around the concept of the nation-state were freshly reexamined. The decline of national literature — English as well as Russian or German, for instance — was obvious, but other nonutilitarian studies such as linguistics, philosophy, or even physics and mathematics were considered ripe for downsizing. The crisis in placement of Ph.D.'s in such disciplines was no longer a result of demography nor a consequence of a downturn in the economy. The change reflected the fundamental reformulation of higher education.

More ubiquitous than those specific permutations is the general policy and outlook toward cost and output. In teaching, course enrollment, degree production, and Ph.D. placement are the bases for planning. For the evaluation of research and scholarship, the quantity of publication and frequency of citation are now indispensable. Thus grants and endowments are valued not only for financial enhancement but also as a demonstration of excellence. Budgetary autonomy is increasingly expected for institutional units, including, for instance, the university press. The university press that was originally intended for the publication of scholarly monographs is now rapidly trying to become a trade publisher, and its list often excludes first books, specialists' monographs, and unpopular topics. The consequences of such a turn toward commercial profits are profound in altering the character of research and scholarship as well as affecting the procedures for academic evaluation. Although the tenure system has not been outright abolished as yet, it is being undermined by the large-scale hiring of temporary lecturers and graduate students. Over 60 percent of undergraduate humanities courses are being taught in the United States by non-ladder-rank faculty.<sup>5</sup> Distance teaching, also known as the virtual university, is another device for downsizing costly classroom instructors. Electronic teaching has not yet attracted as many students as its administrators had hoped, and yet the methods of mass-producing degrees are continually sought and tried, successfully at times, as can be seen in the for-profit operation of the University of Phoenix.<sup>6</sup>

Even staid universities in the United Kingdom such as Oxford and Cambridge are forming a consortium to fight back against the global virtual university being constructed by the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and the University of California, Berkeley, in cooperation with Time-Warner and Walt Disney Company. Vice-chancellors from Britain's leading universities have established the Vice-Chancellors' and Presidents' Forum to tackle the issue. At a recent meeting in Hong Kong, hosted by the Association of University Presidents of China, the British vice-chancellors agreed to plan "global degrees."<sup>7</sup>

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The role of the administrators in the university thus has to be elevated to a new height. No longer expected to be a mere intellectual or even an educational leader, an administrator is a manager par excellence. Most administrative recruits have at least some managerial experience, and presidents and provosts are no longer embarrassed to be called the CEOs of universities. They are there to organize and manage research and education efficiently in accordance with the required norm. Reflecting this organizational situation, administrators' salaries are approaching the scale of corporate managers. In 1998 a corporate CEO received a salary 326 times that of an assembly-line worker (as against 35 times in 1974 and 187 times in 1994).<sup>8</sup> Though not quite in the same proportion, university presidents being paid in hundreds of thousands and even over a half-million dollars (plus benefits) are no longer rarities. One ought to remember that the compensation for contingency workers in academia hovers around \$25,000, rarely rising above \$30,000, with heavy teaching loads and no benefits.

These are significant episodes in the history of the transformation of the university. The crucial event in the process that exceeds them in importance, however, is the phenomenon of "technology transfer," which has received little notice outside the ranks of active managers of the corporate university. In response to the gradually rising demand for a fuller utilization of public funds, the U.S. Congress passed a bipartisan bill in 1980 under the sponsorship of Senators Birch Bayh and Bob Dole called the Bayh-Dole Act of Patent and Trademark. It authorized research universities to patent and license the results of federally funded research projects. As everyone knows, the Cold War had made available billions of dollars to research universities for decades. These research results were published and open to the public use, and most remained unpatented. The Bayh-Dole Act at first permitted only small start-ups and domestic companies to obtain exclusive licenses for the patents owned by the university. In time the law was loosened so much that any corporation, domestic or foreign, of any size could obtain exclusive rights to the discoveries made in the university laboratories. The patenting activities had been slow until about 1990, after which they have been leaping every year. Up to 1979 the federal government spent more than industry on research and development (R&D), but this ratio was reversed after 1980, until in 1997 the expenditures by the federal government and industry on R&D reached a proportion of 1 to more than 2.<sup>9</sup> The cut may very well have been a part of the Reagan policy to downsize public expenditures. But then the slack was taken up by universities, which increasingly exploited federally funded R&D for the benefit of the corporations.

It should be noted, however, that nationally, R&D is overwhelmingly funded by industry, with universities contributing a mere few percentage points of corporate expenditures. Within the university research expenditures, moreover, by far the largest source of funding is the federal government, with corporations contributing only one-tenth of the federal allocations.<sup>10</sup> As for the basic research versus R&D expenditures, the total national expenditures from all sectors have decisively been in favor of utility at about 1 to 6 or 8, depending on the year between 1960 and 1997. The federal obligations for national research, on the other hand, have been more or less evenly divided since around 1990 (earlier, more had been expended on R&D). Inside the universities, however, federally funded basic research still commands far more weight than R&D at the ratio of roughly 2 to 1. Despite these complicated indices, post-Cold War university technological research has increasingly prioritized marketable and entrepreneurial R&D over basic research, which is not immediately profitable.

A February 1999 report by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom, called *Technology Transfer: The U.S. Experience*, makes it clear that the British universities are trying to learn from the U.S. practice. Although it warns about the variance between the United States and the United Kingdom, the report proper hardly touches on any difference in the makeups of the universities in the two countries. It supports technology transfer as a "public duty, [with] income generation, wider benefits for the university, [and] contribution to economic growth." The report in fact ends with glowing praise for the University of California, San Diego, Connect program, an outreach project for neighboring business, as it emerged in the 1980s when the San Diego area was hit hard by the prospect of a reduction in defense spending. Its objective was to create "a local Silicon Valley" by working "with all companies, whether old or new, but in practice 80-90% [had] been small and fast growing."<sup>11</sup> Of course, the use of university R&D facilities for the benefit of industry could be justified if service so rendered was adequately acknowledged and repaid by its corporate beneficiaries to the source of its funding, the taxpayers. Such, however, is not the case. Corporations, both domestic and foreign, are taking advantage of federally funded research results as a means for downsizing their own laboratory costs. The universities, on the other hand, try to ally themselves with corporations so that they can get not only patent royalties but also direct funding from them.

To take just one instance, the College of Natural Resources at the University of California, Berkeley, made an agreement with Novartis, the world's

largest genetic engineering transnational corporation, which is headquartered in Switzerland. In exchange for \$25 million over five years, the university will grant Novartis exclusive license review rights for a portion of research results conducted by the college, as determined by the ratio of its contributions to the entire budget of the college. The direction of research and which projects to fund will be decided by a joint committee made up of members of the faculty and Novartis. Still in negotiation as of spring 1999 was whether Novartis would contribute \$25 million more for the construction of a laboratory. The corporation is likely to make a huge profit, none of which will be returned to the federal government, taxpayers, or consumers. Yet the arrangement was enthusiastically welcomed by the university and the Berkeley campus. The reasons given for the support were benefits for the graduate students, access to the real world for the faculty, and contributions to the public. (In what sense is Novartis "public"?) The British *Technology Transfer* report lists the benefits of the research alliance for the university as follows: (1) "political support on sensitive issues such as the use of animals in research, toxic usage, new buildings"; (2) "a bridge into high tech industry for . . . students"; (3) "an added attraction to sponsors of research, who are keen to see that there is an effective outreach program which will bring research findings into beneficial use"; and (4) "good relationships with successful new wealth (e.g., 12 endowed chairs)."<sup>12</sup> The British administrators are perhaps less fearful of being candid than are their U.S. counterparts.

The profound effects of technology transfer, as I see them, are quite otherwise. First, it converts learning into intellectual property, and by privatizing public knowledge it obstructs the free flow of information, which constitutes the basis of academic freedom. Second, the commercialization of knowledge and learning also compromises the principles of conflict of interest and commitment. It would seem natural for the inventor/researchers to protect their material self-interest. Business opportunities abound outside their classrooms and labs, and academic independence is liable to be jeopardized by corporate interest. Examples of conflict of interest and commitment are both obvious and abundant. Those who aid start-ups to develop their inventions into commercial drugs and medicines write articles evaluating their efficacy. Those who publish a paper assessing the effects of gene alteration own genome patents that have been licensed for tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of dollars in fees. Furthermore, technology transfer encourages the entrepreneurial spirit among the faculty, which tends all too easily toward competitiveness, self-promotion, and opportunism.

These are serious dangers, and they are now fully manifest at many research universities. Even more threatening, however, is what is happening in the areas outside directly affected applied science. Administrators preoccupied with the alliance between the university and global capital are nearly indifferent to the disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Now that capitalism has reached beyond the stage of nation-statism, its dependence on the nation-based academic disciplines is perceived, as has already been mentioned, to be less strategic by the university administrators as well as students, academic managers, and consumers. Those who are in the humanities, on the other hand, are preoccupied with cultural studies, identity politics, and postcolonial studies, as if oblivious to the real crisis of the humanities in the university, their erasure. They determinedly avoid facing the crucial issues of the ongoing exploitation of the poor and the powerless of the world. The question to be asked now is, Can civilization afford to discard the practice of self-criticism, if that is what the humanities are largely to be concerned with?

The global economy exerts similar pressures on Japanese higher education. The ways the Japanese universities have been responding to the corporate economy, however, are considerably different because of the different roles played by the university in Japan both historically and socially. For instance, it is undeniable that the social role of the humanities in the Western university, as in Japan, has nearly always been legitimation and participation in, and not criticism of and opposition to, power. Still, in the West there has been a practice of liberal arts that is presumably based on secular free inquiry. In a country such as Japan, where state control of knowledge and information was nearly complete until a half-century ago, the idea of liberal education has remained precarious to this day. In the prewar days, individuals persecuted as subversives were only briefly and sporadically able to resist the state authorities, as were the progressives in the early postwar years and the 1960s. The critical will and intelligence that were revealed at these intermittent moments have markedly waned since around 1970, when Japan's booming economy guaranteed a comfortable life more or less for everyone, including academics.

In literature, arts, and intellectual discourse, politics has now been carefully avoided in defense of the status quo, and hard subjects have been eagerly replaced with "soft" consumer topics. Intellectual rigor is visibly being compromised. Extreme colloquialism, nonparaphrastic and nonsyntactic structure, and neologism, especially foreign words, have affected even

academic writing style. References have been reduced to a casual minimum, removing the possibility of constructing a discursive system. Instead of substantive and coherent writing, conversations conducted by a group of "writers" are transcribed, edited, and printed, and this form, called *zadankai*, has been the dominant mode of discourse in Japan for several decades.<sup>13</sup> Although political discourse has not entirely vanished, it is usually conducted in abstruse abstractions. Thus there is seldom a serious argument, and only rarely do we find well-documented and closely reasoned assertions or refutations. The development of bibliography and book review, too, is minimal. Most journals of opinion have vanished, and those remaining are packed with disjointed gossip and random judgments. Of course, the general disarray of intellectual discourse is perhaps worldwide as a function of intensified consumerism and neoliberalism. Yet in most societies, even in the United States, educated and mature exchanges do survive. In today's Japan even this much vitality is not easy to detect. How, then, is the university being appropriated into the corporate structure?

Talks about university reform began the minute the U.S. Occupation authorities radically changed the institutions of higher education. In conformity with the U.S. system of institutional articulation, the elitist gymnasium (*kyūsei kōto gakkō*) was abolished,<sup>14</sup> and many new colleges and universities were created in the name of democratic education. The change was both inconsequential and profound. If General Douglas MacArthur's policy planners dreamed about truly democratic education even their own country did not possess, such a fantasy was of course disabused at once. Deep-rooted nation-statism and hierarchism were preserved with emperism, as we will see below. The proliferation of new colleges and universities, on the other hand, provided a great many people with easy access to higher learning. The result, eventually, was a disastrously lowered academic standard among both students and faculty, accompanied by a huge expansion of the college-educated population. The former contributed to the elimination of criticism as has already been mentioned, while the latter encouraged consumerism and leisure activities. Undeniably, inflated higher learning led to the deterrence of prewar exclusivism, but such popularization was not invigorated with information and judgment. The dissatisfaction with the postwar educational format has been quite pervasive ever since its inauguration, although there has been little argument as to the specifics. After the decade-long protests against the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Pact that died down around 1970, there was a surface calm. Underneath, however, a tension persisted between the Ministry of Education, which would restore the

prewar paradigm of power and control if it could, and the leftist teachers' unions, which would hold on to their socialist/communist ideologies of the immediate postwar years. The tension gradually yielded to a stalemate and then stagnancy, where little was said and argued.

We may recall that in the United States, too, enrollment in higher education dramatically expanded after World War II. The total number of B.A.'s, M.A.'s, and Ph.D.'s conferred in 1950 more than doubled the corresponding figures in 1942.<sup>15</sup> In the United States, however, higher education did not suffer from immediate deterioration in quality as a result of this sudden expansion. The reasons for this avoidance of vitiation are not easy to identify precisely. The infusion of European refugees and ideas during World War II is certainly one factor. The emergence of the United States as the hegemon may have provided resources for sophisticated scholarship and experimentation. The entry of working-class students into the academic scene as a consequence of the GI Bill was no doubt another factor in reshaping the by-then petrified elitist tradition in higher education. The Jews, the Irish, and other white male ethnic minorities, followed by their female counterparts, invigorated the university, although the admission of African Americans and other darker-skinned minorities was delayed by a few more decades. The effects of the Cold War, on the other hand, visibly affected the general direction of academic discourse toward conservatism, nation-statism, and capitalism, as we have already seen.

During the 1980s Japan nearly dreamed about unseating the United States as the world's economic hegemon. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, imagining himself to be the Ronald Reagan of Japan, tried to adopt a general policy of privatization. In 1984 he established the Special Council on Education (*Rinji Kyōiku Shingikai*) to look into the possible courses of reform and to report directly to his office. Business leaders played an important role in the formation of the council, and its recommendation was for liberalization and diversification (*jiyū-ka* and *kosei-ka*) of universities. The liberalization of education did not mean an emphasis on academic freedom and experimentation, but on the contrary, it was an ideology of choice—the choice to educate only a few or the choice not to educate—the principle of neoliberalism. It fought against educational equality. In this sense, "the neo-liberalism at the bottom of the ideology of choice does not at all contradict the principle of state control."<sup>16</sup> In the 1990s the Nakasone reform principle came to serve as a guideline, as the global economy forced Japan—moribund increasingly in so many civilizational aspects—to face its long-unremedied structural failures.

Here we need to examine briefly the stagnancy of the Japanese university, which is ultimately traceable to the issue of academic freedom in Japan. First, in reaction to the wartime state control of higher education, academic freedom and university autonomy were legally guaranteed in the immediate postwar years. Thus the Ministry of Education was discouraged from interfering with universities and colleges, which presumably enjoyed unprecedented intellectual freedom and administrative autonomy.<sup>17</sup> The Ministry of Education, however, is the sole state funding agency for the national universities and colleges, and it also provides assistance to municipal, prefectural, and even private institutions. The officials of the ministry make decisions on the merits and demerits of even the most minuscule proposals and applications made by academic institutions, and their "advice" (that is never specified by law or regulation) has final power and authority. Thus, while the universities and colleges are presumably free of governmental control and interference, they are in fact totally in thrall of the ministry. It must also be mentioned that the Ministry of Education has a powerful bureaucracy that shares its conservative ideology with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has ruled Japan during most of the postwar years. In recent years, however, impatience with this fossilized education bureaucracy has been rising within the LDP itself. And under pressure from industrial leaders, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry are making demands on the Ministry of Education, as Japan's economic slump becomes increasingly serious. Thus authorities and policies are far from precisely articulated.

Second, a semblance of academic freedom and university autonomy, on the other hand, is manifest in a manner hardly anticipated by the postwar reformers. Practical administration is largely left to the decision of every university and college without governmental interference. That means that every institution is managed by its academic senate or senates (that is, professorial assembly, *kyōjukai*, either campuswide or departmentwide). Some colleges and universities make decisions by a unified senate, but not others. When there is a disagreement, as there often is, among its many units and ranks, an institution as a whole cannot reach any decision at all, thus choosing the status quo as the only viable solution. With a few exceptions, such as Tsukuba University, which directly belongs to the Ministry of Education and where the president traditionally dictates, the head of an institution often has no power of arbitration or decision making, nor is there a board of trustees and regents empowered to adjudicate. A firmly established hierarchy of professors who jealously guard their prerogatives often controls

the senate, and it is nearly impossible even for the Ministry of Education needless to say their president, to overrule them. University autonomy thus means the faculty's fierce will to be left alone, rejecting any criticism, suggestion, and guideline from outside as illegitimate interference. The evaluation of teaching by the students constitutes in the eyes of some faculty a violation of academic freedom. Even the distribution of a syllabus among the students constitutes an infringement of academic freedom for some faculty.<sup>18</sup> Academic freedom and autonomy in Japan, then, signify in fact unlimited territorial independence and isolation having little to do with the principle of free inquiry and learning. There is no doubt that Japan's reform plan today is part of a project to integrate the university into the economic scheme of corporate Japan, as we shall see later. On the other hand, the university faculty's determined isolation not only from the conservative national bureaucracy and business but also from the public, their own students, and finally even from intellectual life itself should not be overlooked in our consideration of academic corporatization. The relationship of the Japanese academics to the intellectuals of the world is thus often merely social and diplomatic and is seldom maintained through a vigorous critical and learned exchange. A fundamental reform is indisputably in order.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the current university reform issues in Japan, I must mention the extraordinary reluctance to clarify, define, and articulate any policy matters on the part not only of the Ministry of Education and other political and bureaucratic organizations but also of the academic administration and faculty. This acceptance of indeterminable expression is so pervasive and matter-of-fact in today's Japan that the only way for an outsider to understand it is to view it as a deliberate political strategy to turn all issues into ad hoc negotiations among the insiders. Incomprehensible terms are chosen, and decisions are made on the basis of undecipherable ambiguities. The negotiating parties obviously know that they are not communicating with one another, but they proceed regardless. Scholars who write on these matters recognize that the crucial terms are left undefined, and yet they have learned to float in the quandary.<sup>19</sup> Perhaps they have no other choice; even if they should request clarification from the Ministry of Education, they would be not likely to get it. Besides, even the officials in the Prime Minister's Office or within the LDP probably have no answer. No one seems willing or able to make a commitment. And in this consensual uncertainty, consensus seems to be forming. For this article I have culled through books, articles, and newspapers as well as the official 1998 report to the Ministry of Education by the Council on the Univer-

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sity, *On a Vision of the Twenty-First Century University and the Future Reform Policy: The University That Is Radiant with Diversity in the Competitive Environment* [21-Seiki no Daigakuzō to Kongo no Kaikaku Hōsaku ni tsuite: Kyōsō-teki Kan'kyō no nakade Kosei ga Kagayaku Daigaku], which many regard as one of the crucial educational documents in twentieth-century Japan.<sup>20</sup> I must confess, however, that there are many undeterminable core issues that can only be surmised rather than clearly interpreted and assessed.<sup>21</sup>

The Nakasone principle is by now thoroughly incorporated into the higher education policy of the long-dominant LDP. (Perhaps the best proof of this supposition is to be found in the October 1999 appointment of Nobuhiro Nakasone, the son of the former prime minister, as minister of education. Nobuhiro had had no prior experience in education whatsoever, though such an appointment has not been a rare incident in postwar Japan.)

How is this neoliberal principle being formulated into specific plans? The 1998 report is so full of abstractions and generalizations as well as subterfuges that a précis is both difficult and irksome to devise. With the assistance of a number of articles and books on the subject, however, extractions can be attempted, and some comments can be made. While it emphasizes diversity, flexibility, and specialization among universities, the overall objective is the adaptation of the university to the economic needs of Japanese industry in the global economy. Reform planners must first identify the industry's long-term requirements and then implement them by first consolidating the LDP bureaucrats who are not necessarily in agreement, by mobilizing the hesitant university administrators, and by persuading—and if necessary by coercing—the faculty who feel threatened with the likelihood of downsizing or the loss of jobs, security, authority, and finally, "freedom."

The main proposals being considered by the governmental agencies are the elimination of general education; the diversification of institutional types; the expansion of graduate school; the establishment of a review system for accreditation, tenure, and appointment; the expansion of continuing education; and finally, the formation of a business-academia-government alliance on behalf of technology transfer.

The Japanese project of making higher education productive and efficient begins with the reduction of general education. In the postwar college and university system, the idea of general education (*kyōyō gakkō*)—or liberal education—was imposed on all students as a required curriculum for the lower division. This was a mixture of Japan's own elitist model of the gymnasium concept and American-style liberal education. With the hugely expanded college population, now standing at some 40 percent of the age

group, the humanities courses were largely a failure. There was no competent faculty, nor was there a serious interest among students. Besides, there was a rising need for expanded professional, or even occupational, training for the increasingly competitive world economy. Thus the first step in rationalization took the form of the abandonment of general education, which was not only not immediately useful but also could lead to the inculcation of criticism and subversion. The elimination of liberal arts education was carried out in the 1990s in most national universities, except for a few, such as the University of Tokyo, where it has remained as a four-year program for universal education.<sup>22</sup> The humanities, which are being questioned and de-emphasized also in U.S. universities now, have been abandoned once and for all in Japan, and the faculty in the division have been absorbed by professional departments and schools.

The exception of the University of Tokyo is an example of institutional "diversification," which the reform plan promoted. There is no longer a uniform idea of the university guaranteeing equal education for all. Educational institutions are now hierarchically classified into community college, four-year college, research university, key research university, graduate school, and so forth. State funds and resources are allocated accordingly, with a focus on leading research universities. Thus the plan would dispense with the costly obligations for all citizens—somewhat like Margaret Thatcher's educational reform in the United Kingdom. The policy of diversity thus aims at reducing general costs while raising efficiency and productivity. The principle of the elder Nakasone tries to recuperate economic elitism. Likewise, expansion of graduate schools is on the agenda.

Industry requires highly trained engineers and scientists who are not being produced in sufficient numbers at present. While the number of graduate students rapidly increased in the 1990s (a tenfold increase since 1960), the graduate program in Japan is still markedly underdeveloped compared with that in the United States and European countries. The number of graduate students per 1,000 people in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan was, respectively, 7.74, 4.86, 3.54, and 1.31 in 1996.<sup>23</sup> The need for expanding both graduate school facilities and faculty is obviously acute as the demand for professional training rises in these days of the knowledge industry, and plans are being made for rapid implementation. In view of the tight budget situation ridden with a huge deficit every year, however, the realization of such plans is far from assured.

The diversity in the categories of university and college from community college to graduate school requires a system of evaluation and accreditation.

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As I have already mentioned, most faculty members are quite reluctant to accept a reviewing practice of any kind, either institutional or personal, that might lead to their humiliation and reassignment, in addition to greater pressure and tension. The classification of institutions in accordance with their qualities and performances as well as reputation looks downright undemocratic and hierarchic to them. Aside from the difficulties of evaluation, there are significant legal problems regarding any change in the terms of employment. First, the faculties of the national universities are civil servants generally assumed to be the state's lifetime employees. Thus a university faculty member can be neither hired for a limited term nor fired after a limited term. In other words, unless a new civil service code is established, termination of employment is impossible for a professor. And the civil service code is—because of the power of teachers' unions and institutional inertia—nearly impossible to change. Thus although a real tenure review is widely perceived as critical, there is as of now no legal ground and likelihood for instituting it.

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In the spring of 1997 the Diet did pass a very limited alteration enabling a term contract for a few categories of academic employees (*kyōiku ninki hō*, or the Law Regarding Educational Appointment). What these categories are, however, is unclear, very much like most Ministry of Education rules and regulations. Despite the wording of the bill that was passed in the Diet, for example, the ministry explains that if a university wants to appoint a professor for a definite duration, such an arrangement can be made in any category. As usual, however, no one knows for sure what this situation means, and time alone will decide how the law is to be implemented.<sup>24</sup> On the whole, supporters of the tenure system argue that the system of review and evaluation—"as in the United States"—will vitalize research and education and that academic freedom is already secure in postwar Japan. They assume that competition improves productivity as in the market economy.<sup>25</sup> Those who oppose the review system maintain that time limitation discourages serious long-term projects and that the private university is likely to abuse it to control the faculty politically. They further fear that the faculty will be distracted by the quantity of publication at the expense of serious teaching and research. Neither side addresses the lethargy and deterioration of critical will and intellectual vigor in today's Japan. Supporters are solely concerned with industrial utility, while the oppositionists care only for the security of their employment. The atmosphere is gradually changing, however, and the faculty, slowly surrendering to the rhetoric of market in society at large, seems much less confident now in fighting for their status quo. The

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advisory committee to the president of the University of Tokyo, for instance, intimated in the summer of 1999 the eventuality of accepting the reform proposal.

As a result of a radical decline in the birthrate, the Japanese population is rapidly aging, and the productive age group is losing in proportion. This demographic development satisfies in some measure the industrial need for downsizing,<sup>26</sup> but it also works against the demand for a highly skilled workforce. The shortage of trained workers will have to be somehow remedied by locating a new source of labor. Adult education and advanced refreshment courses are the answer. Continuing education, however, needs the relaxation of the long-established idea that education is for the young only. Such a reorganization of life cycle, moreover, further requires a change in social structure as well as the general attitude toward work and study. People must be made to understand that lifelong education is a psychologically and professionally disturbing pursuit. In order for Japan to achieve acceptance of professional retraining, even family life will have to be reorganized. Are people ready to make adjustments to their personal life? A husband for his wife's return to college? To the workplace?

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There are other difficulties, such as faculty resources, tuition burden, and campus facilities. The government of Japan, already suffering from a heavy deficit every year, cannot be expected to finance all these extra demands. Higher education is an expensive venture, and despite the reputation of Japan as a Confucian nation that reveres learning, Japan's spending on colleges and universities, as compared with other industrial nations, is extremely low. The ratio of the expenditures on higher education to gross domestic product is as follows: Canada, 1.6 percent; Sweden, 1.5; Denmark, 1.4; Australia and Holland, 1.2; United States and Switzerland, 1.1; France, Germany, and Austria, 0.9; Spain, 0.8; United Kingdom and Italy, 0.7; and below all of these nations, Japan stands at 0.5 percent.<sup>27</sup> For an economic superpower, Japan is amazingly indifferent to the physical conditions of its universities. Their campus facilities—labs, classrooms, libraries, and offices—are all in dire disrepair as well as overcrowded. Yet the LDP's answer is not an increase in the educational budget but privatization and downsizing, which are now called "the plasticity and flexibility of the educational and research system: the autonomy of the university." The 1984 report of the Special Council on Education to Prime Minister Nakasone was highly critical of the uniformity of the college and university that resulted from the tension and stalemate between the Ministry of Education and the teachers' unions. It recommended the liberalization, diversification, and conversion of the

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national university into *tokushu hōjin* (special corporations).<sup>28</sup> This idea has been redefined and renamed in the current university reform debate as an "independent administrative corporation" (sometimes translated as "independent administrative agency"), or *dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin* (DGH, hereafter).

The meaning of the phrase, once again, is not clear. But its model is said to include both the British administrative concepts of agency and the U.S. public university.<sup>29</sup> Since the former reference is not specific enough, let me focus on the latter model in trying to understand what the term is intended to mean in the Japanese context.

While a national university as it exists now in Japan is owned, administered, and managed as a part of civil service, the state university in the United States belongs to the state but is administered and managed by a private independent corporation. It is placed under the oversight of the board of regents or trustees that confers autonomy in micromanagement to the university administration. The regents and trustees are usually appointed from the business circle of the state. The administration, headed by the president, is then responsible for the faculty, students, and staff. The faculty is represented by the academic senate that claims the right to co-governance with the administration of the university in matters of education, research, and public service. The state university is legally financed by the state but accepts tuition and/or fees from the students, which amount to a considerable portion of the operating costs. It also receives grants and contracts from multiple funding sources, such as the federal government, foundations, and private corporations. In the case of some universities, such as the University of California system (whose annual budget amounted to \$13 billion in 2000), these outside funds exceed the state input severalfold.

Of course, the details vary widely. Some universities are well established and powerful on the U.S. higher education scene, while others languish as mediocre institutions devoted largely to vocational training. The ranking is conducted not by the state or federal authorities but by private educational agencies. The precise role of the president vis-à-vis the faculty, on one hand, and the board, on the other, for example, is not easy to define. The same is true of the governor of the state, who can be sympathetic or hostile to the university. The academic freedom and university autonomy of the faculty senate also vary in their range, from nearly complete at some universities to under constant pressure from legislators or the governor at others. The state university is, however, far more autonomous than the Japanese national university, by and large. There are far fewer laws and regulations that bind the faculty as public employees as would be the case at the Japa-

nese national universities. The autonomy of a private university, such as the Harvard Corporation, is nearly complete in this respect (although, of course, inextricably incorporated into the capitalist system, generally), but even that of a state university is quite pliant and adjustable to the changing conditions of the global political economy. And that flexibility is supposedly what the DGH is being designed to achieve.

The LDP's objective of converting the national university into a DGH is hardly the enhancement of free inquiry or critical intelligence, but the incorporation of university technology into Japan's industrial network, thereby saving the capital outlay for the government and broadening the profit base for corporations. Japan's phenomenal success in manufacturing up to the 1980s has not been matched by its performance in the 1990s "global" development in information and gene technology. On the other hand, the university that has been costing the taxpayers an increasingly heavy burden is not producing intellectually or technologically. What is needed, as industry and government leaders—and, increasingly, university administrators—see it, is a closer alliance of industry, university, and government, or a *san, gaku, kan* partnership. The LDP dream seems to run like this: Industry will provide the DGH, once it becomes a reality, with lists of its urgent needs as well as its practical know-how, while the DGH presumably will give industry its knowledge and technology. With fewer restrictive laws and regulations governing it, the DGH will facilitate the cooperation by freer exchange of personnel, resources, and programs. Engineers from business and academia can work together at joint R&D centers; industry can rely on the university for a greater share of employee training, while the newly expanded class of graduate students will be assured of employment. By utilizing the discoveries and inventions generated at the university, industry can save lab expenses for costly R&D. The greater pliancy of the DGH, as it is being planned, will enable quick "rational" responses to the ever-changing market demands and profit strategy. Now diversified DGHs can interact and make maximum contributions to the economy, which particularly needs a jump-start in this decade-long stagnation. More importantly, by the conversion of the national university to the DGH, the state can eventually turn many national universities into full-fledged private institutions independent of national subsidies, in time. Even at an early stage, the Japanese government calculates that it will be able to save one third of its annual allocations.<sup>30</sup> In short, it is a call for a Japanese version of corporatization of the university, especially technology transfer.

The talk on technology transfer began to circulate in Japan in the 1980s

after the Bayh-Dole Act passed in the United States Congress. There had been a prewar case of the Riken Research Institute.<sup>31</sup> After World War II there was a development at the Tsukuba Research Center that was established by the Ministry of Education by forcibly transplanting the Tokyo University of Education in Tsukuba some forty miles from Tokyo. Intellectuals on the left fiercely fought against the move, but in time Tsukuba became the LDP's proud model city for an industry-university-government research park. Still, its success in science consortiums was not sufficient to expand the tripartite alliance. In this aspect, Japanese scholars were, and still are, Confucian in their traditional posture of contempt for entrepreneurial "greed."<sup>32</sup> Of course, if academics are skeptical about industrial scientists, industry, too, mistrusts Japan's academic scientists as impractical, outdated, and useless. In fact, industry openly admits that it prefers importing technology from U.S. universities to turning to Japanese academics.<sup>33</sup> Only in the 1990s—by then Japan's economic boom had long vanished—did the profit-driven partnership become a respectable topic among Japanese academics.

In a series of symposia on industry, the university, and government cooperation, business leaders, university administrators, and government bureaucrats regularly met between 1984 and 1992 specifically to talk about technology transfer.<sup>34</sup> The participants' sense of urgency for an increased flow of knowledge was palpable, yet they largely thought of it as a new management style, still groping for a full significance of the undertaking. In October 1994 a large-scale conference of U.S.-Japan university presidents on the future of science and the university was held. The seriousness of the Japanese chief administrators was demonstrated by the list of participants: the presidents of the very best national universities such as Tokyo, Kyoto, Tsukuba, Osaka, and Tōhoku were there, as were officials of the Ministry of Education and industrial leaders. In contrast, the U.S. side was represented by the presidents of the University of Hawaii, Michigan State University, Michigan Technological University, Western Michigan, Erlham College, and California State University at Pomona, all reputable institutions but certainly no equivalents in prestige compared with the Japanese side. If the participants already suggest an imbalance in the expectations of the two sides, the transcripts of the speeches confirm it. Of the three topics of the conference, environmental technology and the exchange student program do not reveal a yawning gap between the two factions. However, in the first session of the conference, which discussed technology transfer (which seems to be the real focus of the gathering), there was hardly any commu-

nication. The Japanese participants without exception spoke in generalizations, indicating the lack of familiarity with the subject as a step in the process of corporatizing the university. The Japanese side assumed that science still essentially means basic science, while the U.S. contingent took it for granted that they were there to talk about applied science, not "curiosity-driven science." The American representatives were actively converting university research projects into a profitable business, presumably benefiting corporations and inventors (i.e., professors) alike.<sup>35</sup> Thus they discussed venture capital, incubators, competition, start-ups, and intellectual property as crucial foci in the ongoing economic-academic development, while the Japanese participants admitted they were unversed. What is most striking about the Japanese participants is that they usually did not see any change in the future. For example, they pointed out that academic employment in Japan is on a twelve-month basis, which prohibits a national university professor from working as a consultant for a private corporation. That arrangement appeared settled, although the restriction is merely a matter of governmental classification, which could be altered if the public so desired.

Half a decade later, one of the participants in the 1994 conference, the then-president of the University of Tokyo, was the minister of education. Several other participants are now in the forefront for the corporatization of the Japanese university via gradual privatization. There is a definite change in the climate now, although the process is far from complete, as we have seen. Several features in the Japanese development of privatization and technology transfer need to be mentioned. First, one element that has no counterpart in the United States is the dominant leadership role assumed by the Ministry of Education and other government agencies. They initiate, drive, and macro- and micromanage the movement toward privatization in its direction, pace, and scale, and the university is pronouncedly passive in its deliberation on its future. One needs to remember that in the United States, too, the main source of funding for university R&D remains the federal government. As can be seen from the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the government is not at all absent in the process of university corporatization. Yet the U.S. university is far more aggressive and entrepreneurial in its decision and implementation. In Japan, on the other hand, although the monopoly of higher education by the Ministry of Education seems waning before the increasing influence of the Ministries of Finance, International Trade and Industry, and Foreign Affairs, among others, industry still seems to work its will through the mediation of the LDP and the Ministry of Education. And the university simply trudges along.

In a symposium called "Academia-Government-Industry Partnerships Towards the 21st Century: Science and Industry in the Network Society," held in November 1996, the participants from both the United States and Japan talked about the same subjects. But the tone was distinctly different. Here technology transfer was a given. The participants were confident about the future of the business-government-academia alliance. There was no self-conscious hesitation, needless to say criticism, only the conviction that the triad will carry the twenty-first century into their corporatized utopia<sup>36</sup>

Second, the reluctance of the Japanese faculty to capitalize their research is striking in contrast to the venturesomeness of the U.S. professors in technology. The Japanese are as of now indifferent to the ownership of their inventions that result from university research. Patent applications are prominently few.<sup>37</sup> It may well be due to the lack of experience in entrepreneurship, as is certainly the case with the general failure to open start-ups and spin-offs. It is also undeniable, however, that a sense of the public still survives among university researchers in Japan, who assume that their university inventions are naturally public property, as U.S. scholars once did. When Jonas Salk developed a polio vaccine in the 1950s, it never occurred to him to patent his discovery. His question then—"Could you patent the sun?"<sup>38</sup>—is becoming incomprehensible to today's business-minded American scientists. Can venture capitalism be kept out of the Japanese university?

Third, the reluctance to commercialize their university research is inextricably tied, in this case, to their general intellectual lethargy, their inactivist doctrine, which isolates today's Japanese university faculty from many segments of the intellectual, cultural, and industrial world. Their refusal to participate in the program of university conversion into the DGH, or an agency for the global economical paradigm, is unquestionably attractive in itself. At the same time, their program of inaction may well be due less to a reasoned-through objection to global capitalism than to the defense of their inexcusable status quo, a sanctified space of self-indulgence. In the analysis of this situation, one needs to distinguish sharply between the business-governmental agenda of appropriating higher education, on one hand, and the academic professionals' self-interest in the status quo, on the other, an astounding program of inactivism, doing nothing.

Fourth, the Japanese faculty's jealous protection of their tenure system that means virtually review-free and lifetime employment will not last much longer regardless of the outcome of the DGH proposal. They insist that the introduction of an outside review system will inevitably destroy the

possibilities of serious research projects that may well take several years to yield results, but such an argument is finally unconvincing. They will have to first demonstrate how productive research projects are in fact being conducted now thanks to the freedom from time restrictions. Such evidence is sadly absent at the moment.

Finally, the Japanese academics' assumption that they have an important role to play in the national economy and culture is astonishingly naive and uninformed. In this globalized economy, capital does not require Japanese academics for basic research and R&D. Japanese corporations can always invest in the U.S., European, and other university labs that hanker for overseas investments. If the Japanese university blindly resists, corporations can always go abroad and purchase service at a lower cost at MIT, Cambridge, Johns Hopkins, or the University of California at Irvine. Research is being conducted with funds provided by the U.S. taxpayers, and corporations—Japanese, American, Swiss, or whatever—can take full advantage of these research results by acquiring them with very little outlay. They are free to move globally. Japanese academics—as, for example, represented by Hasumi Sanehiko, president of the University of Tokyo and of the Japan Association of National Universities in the summer of 1999<sup>39</sup>—do not seem to be fully aware of their very much weakened position. Nor does a conversation between Hasumi and Arima Akito, his predecessor as president of his university and the minister of education until September 1999, betray signs of understanding.<sup>40</sup> They seem to believe that the DGH was a mere policy matter rather than a symptom of the radical transformation of the global economy, of which Japan and its universities were no more than parts. If they are at all serious about preserving their university, they need to devise a fundamental alternative strategy to survive economically and maintain their critical position. In the 1994 conference on the future of science and universities, Arima remarked that the U.S. universities have problems similar to those of the Japanese. But, he continued, "my conclusion is that after all, the American universities are twenty years ahead of us Japanese."<sup>41</sup> Does this mean the Japanese are still playing the game of time and progress: "They were there a long time ago, we must catch up"? If this is what is in the minds of Japanese leaders, it augers ill indeed.

This lack of comprehension is highlighted in the example of Japan, but it is evident among U.S. critics of the corporate university as well. The corporatization of the university is destructive anywhere, as I have argued throughout this article. It degrades learning into intellectual property, ob-

structing the free flow of information and knowledge. This transformation of judgment and criticism into ownership will not be contained within a narrow space of applied science. Social science and the humanities are certainly vulnerable, although as nonindustrial subjects they are by nature unprofitable. Those in the fields of "curiosity-driven science," as U.S. university administrators contemptuously call it, are beginning to feel that they, too, should have a share in the circulation of intellectual property. Mass-marketing of humanities lectures via telecommunication in a virtual university, for instance, is an increasingly prominent possibility. If this conversion of learning into intellectual property is the direction the U.S. academy is now taking, does it also have to be the destination of the Japanese university? Should the Japanese scholars not recognize and reaffirm whatever they still seem to retain? The fast lane to catch up with U.S. scholars is not what they need. By facing up to their social isolation and intellectual lethargy, they can recover something they have not quite lost yet. The Japanese scholars' refusal to marketize their knowledge and information, if that is what keeps them from the DGH project, is admirable in itself. Fully articulated as a program of social service, that could serve as a model for emulation by scholars in the rest of the world. To document, criticize, and intervene as well as provide inventions and discoveries for social utility, such a program of public service both as critics and servants is immensely valuable in this globalized world. Is it possible to merge the anti-DGH movement into a program to rebuild the public idea of the university?

Notes

- 1 Masao Miyoshi, "Ivory Tower in Escrow," *boundary 2* 27.1 (2000): 7-50. Its German translation was published in *Lettre Internationale* (Berlin) in the spring of 2000. Its Chinese and Italian translations are also being planned.
- 2 The Morrill Act of 1862 stipulates that the land-grant colleges and universities teach such socially useful subjects.
- 3 See Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* (Cambridge, MA, 1996), for a full exposition about the notion of excellence in academia. The contentless *excellence* is identical to the idea of *success*, and the word is unselfconsciously brandished, for instance, in advertisements for Hofstra University: "We Teach Success," as printed regularly in the *New York Times* since about 1997.
- 4 *Their* does not mean Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan personally. Obviously they were acting under the guidance, instructions, or orders of their industrial and financial leaders.
- 5 MLA, *Final Report: MLA Committee on Professional Employment* (New York, 1997), 8.

- 6 Lawrence Solely, "Higher Education . . . or Higher Profits? For-Profit Universities Sell Free Enterprise Education," *In These Times*, September 20, 1998, 14-17.
- 7 Simon Targett, "Universities Aim at Media Giants," *Financial Times*, May 27, 1999.
- 8 See the special report on executive pay, "The Good, the Bad, the Ugly of CEO Salaries Scoreboard: Executive Compensation," *Business Week*, April 20, 1998, 64-110, with contributions by Jennifer Reingold, Richard A. Melcher, Gary McWilliams, and other bureau reports. The figures for 1974 and 1994 are from the Web site of the House Democratic Committee, available at [www.house.gov/democrats/research/6ceopay.html](http://www.house.gov/democrats/research/6ceopay.html).
- 9 "No. 988, R&D Expenditures: 1960 to 1997," in Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1998*, 116th ed. (Washington, DC, 1998), 609.
- 10 "No. 990, Performance Sector of R&D Expenditures: 1992 to 1997," Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract*, 610.
- 11 Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom, *Technology Transfer: The U.S. Experience* (London, 1999), 8, 30.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 31.
- 13 See chap. 9, "Conversation and Conference: Forms of Discourse," in my *Off Center: Power and Culture Relations between Japan and the United States* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 217-31.
- 14 Uzawa Hirofumi, an internationally respected economist, is nearly nostalgic about his days in the First Higher School, the most coveted institution of the pre-war Japan, in his *Nihon no Kyōiku o Kangaeru* [Concerning Japanese education] (Tokyo, 1998).
- 15 Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (White Plains, NY, 1989), 1:385.
- 16 Ouchi Hirokazu, "'Takuetsu-sei' no shihai" [Control by excellence] *Gendai Shisō Daigaku Kaikaku* [Contemporary ideas: University reform] 27.7 (1999): 146.
- 17 Katō Hirokazu, "Monbushō to Kobetsu Daigaku no Kankei" [The relationship of the ministry of education to individual universities], in *Daigaku, Kyōyōbu no Kaitai-teki Shūen* [The disintegration of general education in the university] (Fukuoka, 1997), 127.
- 18 Thus the 1998 *Report of the Council on the University* lists the word *syllabus* as the first of eight terms that need explication. Others include *the semester system, teaching assistant, Faculty development, research assistant, refresh education, and GPA system*, presumably unfamiliar terms requiring glosses for the university instructors.
- 19 Yamagishi Shunsuke, a journalist who specializes in educational matters, writes how secretive the Ministry of Education is. He also points out that the ministry's explanations are both incomprehensible and unforthcoming. See "Monbushō-yo! Jōhō o Kōkai-seyo: Kokuritsu Daigaku wa Burakku Bokkusu" [Ministry of Education! Release public information: The national university is a black box], special issue, "Kokuritsu Daigaku Biggu Ban" [Big bang, national university], *Ronza* (April 1997): 28-33. Obscurantism is not a bureaucratic monopoly. The white paper on the University of Tokyo, *Tokyo Daigaku: Genjō to Kadai 2* (Tokyo,

Q: What is the main point of the text?  
 A: The text discusses the transformation of judgment and criticism into ownership in the context of higher education. It argues that social science and humanities are vulnerable to this transformation. The text questions whether the Japanese university system is heading in the same direction as the U.S. academy, which is increasingly converting learning into intellectual property. The author suggests that Japanese scholars should recognize and reaffirm whatever they still seem to retain, and that they can recover something they have not quite lost yet. The text also discusses the Morrill Act of 1862 and the concept of excellence in academia. The author notes that the word 'excellence' is often used in advertisements for Hofstra University, and that it is identical to the idea of 'success'. The text concludes by questioning the secrecy of the Ministry of Education and the incomprehensibility of its explanations.

この文章は、高等教育の自由な情報の流れと知識の流通を論じている。社会科学研究と人文科学は、工業製品ではないにもかかわらず、競争力のある市場で扱われる可能性がある。この文章は、日本の大学がアメリカのアカデミーの方向に進んでいるのか、それとも独自の道を歩んでいるのかを問いかけている。著者は、日本の学者がまだ持っている何かを認識し、再確認し、失った何かを取り戻すことができるかもしれないと述べている。また、1862年のモリル法と「卓越性」という概念についても触れている。著者は、卓越性という言葉が、しばしばホフストラ大学の広告で使われており、それは成功の概念と等しいと指摘している。文章は、文部省の秘密主義と説明の不可解さを批判し、国立大学の「ブラックボックス」化を懸念している。

27

1997), supposedly describes every departmental and disciplinary program at the university. One chapter on the School of Literature (Bungakubu) has a seven-page summary of the school's program. This section, written by Takahashi Kazuhisa, an assistant to the president, has eleven finely printed long paragraphs and they contain exactly thirteen sentences altogether. None of the paragraphs is decodable, even if a reader spends hours. The writer cannot have written the section for a single possible reader. This text, like so many in today's Japan, is published to prohibit reading and communication.

20 The council members were appointed by the Ministry of Education, and they consist of twenty regular members, many of whom are university administrators and faculty, with a half-dozen chosen from business and industry. There are other subcommittee members also appointed by the ministry. The council was first formed by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1987, and it had made eighteen reports before the 226-page 1998 report, published on October 26, 1998 (hereafter cited as *The 1998 Report of the Council on the University*).

21 In the special issue of *Gendai Shisō* mentioned in note 16, Abe Kinya, president of Hitotsubashi University, remarks that the Japanese national university is being converted into an institutional form called *dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin* (roughly, independent administrative corporation). He then observes that in a committee he organized for the Association of the National Universities to discuss the term, no one, including himself, economists, and education scholars, knew what the term meant. He explains that the Japanese term is a translation of the English word *agency*, as it was used by Prime Minister Thatcher's cabinet. He reports that the government official in charge was invited but declined to attend because the plan had not been decided on. Apparently in "three to five years" a next stage in the conversion process will be reached, but no one knows whether that means the conversion itself will take place in that time frame, or merely the decision on whether or not to go ahead with conversion. In another article in the same issue, Iwasaki Minoru, a sociologist at the Tokyo Foreign Language University, describes the same situation. The Ministry of Education and the Prime Minister's Office have already made the agreement about the conversion timetable without knowing for sure what the concept of *dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin* means.

The habit of using a term without knowing what it means is not limited to the bureaucrats. Motohashi Tetsuya, a noted translator of Anglo-American critical theorists, writes a whole article in the same university reform issue on the meaning of the word *agency* without once considering it in the context of administrative organization. Instead, he rambles on in this obviously recycled article about subjectivity, subalternity, Judith Butler, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, gender studies, etc., etc. The fact that the editors did not reject this irresponsible article says a great deal about the malaise of today's Japanese intellectual life.

22 There are many books on the process of the elimination of *kyōyō gakkō*. One of the best is Amano Ikuo, *Daigaku: Chōsen no Jidai* [The university: The age of challenge] (Tokyo, 1999), esp. chap. 13. See also Katō Hirokazu, *Daigaku, Kyōyōbu no Kaitai-teki Shūen*.

23 *The 1998 Report of the Council on the University*, 158, 164.

24 For the arguments pro and con limited-term appointment, see a special issue devoted to the topic, *Ronza* [Forum] (November 1997). Of the three supportive writers, two are university administrators and one is an industrial engineer who is visiting the University of Tokyo. Of those against, two are faculty members and one is president of a private college. There is one neutral paper by a professor that describes the tenure system in the United States in glowing terms.

25 See, for instance, Nakajima Mineo, "Daigaku nimo Shijō Genri to Min'i o" [Market principle and public opinion for the university], *Ronza* (November 1997): 12-17. Nakajima is president of the Tokyo Foreign Language University.

26 "By absorbing the unemployed and homeless," as a cynic would call it. See "Rinkyōshin Ikō no 'Daigaku Saihen' Katei ga Sashi-shimesu mono" [What is meant by the process of "university reform" since the Special Council on Education], *Gendai Shisō* 27.7 (1999): 236-52.

27 *The 1998 Report of the Council on the University*, 173.

28 Yamagishi Shunsuke, "Monbushō-yō!" 28-29; Ōuchi Hirokazu, "Takuetsu-sei no shihai," 134-53.

29 Hosoi Katsuhiko refers to the corporate structure of the U.S. state university in chap. 1, "Daigaku Jiko Hyōka to Daigaku no Arikata" [The self-criticism of the university and the modes of the university], in *Daigaku Hyōka to Daigaku Sōzō: Daigaku Jichi Ron no Saikōchiku ni Mukete* [The evaluation and creation of the university: Toward the reconstruction of the idea of university autonomy], ed. Hosoi Katsuhiko et al. (Tokyo, 1999), 32.

30 The current allocation for the national universities runs around ¥1,569,800,000,000, which can be reduced to around ¥1 trillion by the conversion. The national universities enroll about 30 percent of the students, while the private universities that enroll 70 percent of the students receive from the state only ¥300,000,000,000. See Yamagishi Shunsuke, "Monbushō-yō!" 30. See also Atōda Naosumi, "Min'ei-ka wa Gyōkaku no Shinboru da" [Privatization is the symbol of a policy change] *Ronza* (April 1997): 10-16, and *The 1998 Report of the Council on the University*, 175.

31 See the conversation between Arima Akito and Hasumi Shigehiko, "Dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin-ka wa sakerarenai" [DGH is inevitable], *Ronza* (February 2000): 28.

32 "America has something Japan sorely needs: Greedy professors" (Irene M. Kunii, "Memo to Japan: Set Your Academics Free," *Business Week*, July 19, 1999). For a view from a different perspective, see Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium*, vol. 3 of *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture* (Oxford, 1999), esp. 245.

33 The special issue of the *Tsūsan Jānaru* [MITI journal], May 1998, has several articles relevant to this mutual aloofness between industry and university. See also Nishizawa Jun'ichi, "Dokusō-teki Kenkyū no Ikusei" [Nurturing original research], in *Zunō Rettō "Nihon" no Sosei: San Gaku Kan Kyōryoku no Shin Tenkai* [The creation of knowledge archipelago Japan: The new development of the cooperation of the industry, university, and government], ed. Nishizawa Jun'ichi (Tokyo, 1993), 35-61.

- 34 A group of scholars, industrial leaders, and government officials met over eight years in Fukuoka, Kyūshū, to discuss the tripartite alliance. Papers from these meetings were collected and published as *Zunō Rettō "Nihon" no Sosei*.
- 35 See, for example, Imura Hiro'o's summary statement about the first session of the conference, *Kagaku to Daigaku no Shōrai: Nichi-Bei Daigakuchō wa Kataru* [The future of science and the university: Japanese and American university presidents speak], ed. Ezaki Naoto and Onoe Hisao (Kyoto, 1995), 212–17.
- 36 Nara Sentan Kagaku Gijyutsu Daigakuin Daigaku Kenkyūkai, *21-Seiki ni Muketeno San-Kan-Gaku Renkei Senryaku: Netto wāku Shakai ni okeru Kagaku to Sangyō* (Tokyo, 1998).
- 37 "Gakusha to Tokkyo: Nihon no Daigaku Shutsugan Fushi" [Scholars and patents: Few applications of the Japanese university], *Yomiuri shinbun*, July 5, 1998.
- 38 Seth Shulman, *Owning the Future* (Boston, 1999), 54.
- 39 *Japan Times*, September 13, 1999; editorial, *Asahi Newspaper, Evening News*, September 20, 1999.
- 40 Arima Akito and Hasumi Shigehiko, "Dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin-ka wa sakerarenai," 15–31.
- 41 Ezaki Naoto and Onoe Hisao, *Kagaku to Daigaku no Shōrai*, 38.

### The University, Disciplines, National Identity: Why Is There No Film Studies in Japan?

Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto

The situation surrounding the university has been radically changing for some time. It is said that the university is in crisis, even in ruins. It is losing the clear sense of identity, mission, and reason for its existence. What the university does or stands for is not at all self-evident. In the United States this crisis is manifested in many forms at various sites of institutional conflict and struggle: the "cultural wars" between right and left, the debate on canons, cultural studies and its impact on established disciplines, increasing bureaucratization, and wholesale adoption of the principle of a market economy.

In Japan drastic changes have been introduced in the university system since the early 1990s, and their true impact is yet to be fully experienced by faculty, students, and society. They are part of a general trend of liberalization, administrative reform, and relaxation of government regulations, which are in turn a response to globalization of economy and cultural interaction. The pressure to reform the university is further intensified by the economic recession of the 1990s and the decreasing number of children. The university is supposedly becoming more globally oriented and competitive; its new mission is to make students understand and open to other cultures and societies; students also must be trained to develop into active agents in ever-more-complex networks of information. Rhetorics of globalism, information society, and cross-cultural understanding abound, yet exactly what do these words and phrases mean? How are they specifically related to socioeconomic development since the 1980s, the period of "post-